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This thesis examines some aspects of the economics of tobacco control in South Africa, Uganda and 
Zambia. The first part of the thesis examines whether tobacco expenditure displaces (or “crowds out”) 
expenditure on other goods and services within Zambian households. In so doing, I make two 
contributions to the literature. Firstly, I use expenditure data from a low-income sub-Saharan African 
country where most households are poor. Secondly, I use the standard instrumental variable used in 
the literature, the adult sex ratio, to instrument for the tobacco smoking status of Zambian 
households. But unlike previous studies, I relax the strict exclusion restriction and allow for the adult 
sex ratio to be correlated with the error term. That is, I allow the instrumental variable to be imperfect. 
I consider the relaxation of the exclusion restriction to be reasonable given that the adult sex ratio is 
just as likely to influence tobacco expenditure as it is to influence expenditure on other goods and 
services. Even after relaxing the exclusion restriction, I, however, confirm many findings in the 
literature. For instance, I find that smoking households allocate less expenditure towards food, 
schooling, clothing, water, electricity, transportation, equipment maintenance and remittances. In 
addition, the crowding out patterns I uncover are in some ways related to the geographical location 
of households which in turn is related to socioeconomic status in Zambia. In sum, the results in this 
part of the thesis show that a broader accounting of tobacco’s costs in Zambia should include other 
costs over and above mortality and morbidity considerations.   
 
We know from several studies that tax and price measures are the single most effective policy tool for 
reducing tobacco consumption. However, most of this evidence is based on studies conducted in 
developed countries with very few published studies on African countries. The second part of my 
thesis, therefore, contributes to the recent literature that uses expenditure data to estimate price and 
expenditure elasticities of demand for tobacco products in Low- and Middle-Income countries. I use 
expenditure data from Uganda and exploit the fact that prices of cigarettes vary across geographical 
space. I also adjust my demand elasticity estimates for measurement error and quality heterogeneity. 
I find price and expenditure elasticities that are in line with international evidence. For instance, I find 
that cigarette demand is expected to decline by between 3% and 4%, at the very least, for every 10% 
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increase in cigarette prices. The authorities in Uganda can, therefore, reduce cigarette consumption 
by increasing excise taxes on cigarettes without reducing tax revenues.  
 
The third and final part of my thesis evaluates the impact on per capita cigarette consumption of South 
Africa’s consistent excise tax increases that began in 1994. The tax rises have overtime translated into 
large increases in the inflation-adjusted price of cigarettes. For instance, the average real price per 
pack increased by 110% between 1994 and 2004. The main challenge in conducting policy evaluations 
is that of creating a credible counterfactual. That is, we want to know what would have happened to 
per capita cigarette consumption in South Africa if the excise tax increases had not occurred. This is 
particularly important in the case of South Africa because per capita cigarette consumption had 
already started declining by the time the tax rises started. I, therefore, use a transparent and data-
driven technique, the Synthetic Control method, to create a credible counterfactual of South Africa’s 
cigarette consumption after 1994. The counterfactual is constructed as a linear combination of the 
per capita cigarette consumption of countries that are similar to South Africa but did not engage in 
large-scale tobacco control efforts over the period 1994 to 2004. I find that per capita cigarette 
consumption would not have continued declining in the absence of the consistent tax rises that began 
in 1994. Specifically, I find that by 2004, per capita cigarette consumption was 36% lower than it would 
have been had the tax increases not occurred. This result is robust to several falsification (or placebo) 
exercises. Based on these results, I conclude that countries in Africa can achieve substantial reductions 
in cigarette consumption and prevent uptake from new smokers by consistently increasing excise 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 100 million people died from tobacco-related 
causes in the 20th Century (WHO, 2008). Another 1 billion people are expected to die in this century if 
current smoking trends continue (ibid.).  
 
This is the background against which the WHO, along with its member states, developed the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The FCTC, which entered into force on 27th 
February 2005, encourages Parties to put into place a wide range of tobacco control measures. 
Currently there are 180 Parties to the treaty including many Low- and Middle-Income countries where 
the burden of the tobacco epidemic is likely to be greatest in the 21st Century (WHO, 2012a).1 Even 
though most of the 47 countries in WHO’s Africa region (also known as AFRO region)2 are Parties to 
the FCTC, the region is yet to make significant progress in fully implementing the treaty.  
 
One of the ways of assessing this is to measure how the region has fared in implementing Article 6 of 
the FCTC which is an important Article that encourages countries to periodically increase prices and 
taxes on tobacco products. The Article derives its importance from decades of research showing the 
primacy of tax and price measures in reducing tobacco consumption (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; 
IARC, 2011). The most recent round of assessments on the implementation of the FCTC showed that 
WHO’s AFRO region achieved an implementation rate of 49% for Article 6 against a global average of 
61% (WHO, 2014a).3 In addition and related to this point, the AFRO region was the only region whose 
excise taxes on cigarettes declined in real terms over the period 2008 to 2012 (see Figure 1.1). The 
                                                          
1 The up-to-date list of Parties to the FCTC can be found here: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IX-4&chapter=9&lang=en.   
2 The WHO is made up of 6 regional groupings. These are AFRO for the African regional group, AMRO for 
countries in the Americas region and EMRO for the Eastern Mediterranean region. Other groups are EURO for 
the European region, SEARO for the South East Asia region and WPRO for the Western Pacific region. The list of 
countries that make up each region can be accessed here: http://www.who.int/about/regions/en/.   
3 Countries are scored on the basis of how many of an Article’s indicators they fully comply with. In this case, 
countries in the AFRO region had by 2014 only complied with 49% of Article 6’s indicators. The indicators on 
which countries are scored for Article 6 are the following: (1) Tax policies to reduce tobacco consumption 
implemented, (2) sales to international travellers of tobacco products prohibited or restricted, (3) tobacco 
imports by international travellers prohibited or restricted. See WHO (2014a, p75) for more details.   
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real excise tax in AFRO declined on average by about 1% per annum over the period 2008 to 2012 
whereas globally, real excise taxes increased by about 4% per annum (Eriksen et al., 2015). Further, 
excise taxes are relatively low in the AFRO region. A measure of the level of excise taxes is the excise 
tax burden, which is calculated as the percentage of the retail selling price that is due to the excise 
tax. The most recent internationally comparable data show that the excise tax burden on cigarettes in 
AFRO was 25% in 2012 against a global average of 39% (WHO, 2013a). This excise tax burden was the 
lowest in all 6 regions (see Figure 1.2) and was well below the 70% target recommended by WHO 
(WHO, 2010).  
 
Figure 1.1: Average annual percentage changes in the real excise tax on cigarettes across WHO 
regions, 2008 to 2012 
 
Notes: The figure shows average annual percentage changes in the real excise tax levied on the most popular brand of 
cigarettes in different WHO regions and the global average over the period 2008 to 2012. AFRO refers to the Africa region, 
AMRO to the Americas region and EMRO to the Eastern Mediterranean region. EURO refers to the European region, SEARO 












Figure 1.2: Excise tax burdens on cigarettes across WHO regions as at 2012 
 
Notes: The figure shows the excise tax burden on cigarettes in different WHO regions and the global average in 2012. The 
excise burden is calculated as the percentage of the average selling price that is due to the excise tax (whether the tax is 
levied as a specific tax or an ad valorem tax or a combination of the two). AFRO refers to the Africa region, AMRO to the 
Americas region and EMRO to the Eastern Mediterranean region. EURO refers to the European region, SEARO to the South 
East Asia region and WPRO to the Western Pacific region. The data are from WHO (2013a).   
 
Currently the AFRO region has the lowest smoking prevalence estimates in all of WHO’s 6 regions (see 
Figure 1.3). Total smoking prevalence for AFRO in 2010, the latest year for which we have 
internationally comparable data, was 15% (WHO, 2015). However, AFRO is only one of two regions 
where total smoking prevalence is projected to increase by 2025 if the current level of implementation 
of tobacco control efforts is maintained (see Figure 1.3). Total smoking prevalence in AFRO is projected 
to increase to 20% by 2025 (Bilano et al., 2015; WHO, 2015). This means that in absolute terms, the 
number of smokers in Africa will double from 71 million people in 2010 to 145 million people in 2025.4 
The only other region projected to experience an increase in smoking prevalence is the Eastern 
Mediterranean region (EMRO) where it is expected to increase from 22% in 2010 to 33% in 2025 
(Bilano et al., 2015; WHO, 2015).  
 
 
                                                          
4 The 2010 estimate for the number of smokers is arrived at by applying adult smoking prevalence estimates 
from WHO (2015) on the population of adult Africans in 2010. The population estimates are from the United 
Nations (2012). The number of smokers for 2025 is similarly calculated using projections for smoking prevalence 
in 2025 (Bilano et al., 2015; WHO, 2015) and projections for Africa’s adult population in 2025 (United Nations, 
2012).    
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Figure 1.3: 2010 and 2025 (projected) total adult smoking prevalence in different WHO regions 
 
Notes: The figure shows 2010 and projected total smoking prevalence for 2025 in different WHO regions. Total smoking 
prevalence is defined as the average of adult male and adult female smoking prevalence estimates. Smoking prevalence is in 
turn defined as the percentage of adults (15 years and above) who currently smoke. AFRO refers to the Africa region, AMRO 
to the Americas region and EMRO to the Eastern Mediterranean region. EURO refers to the European region, SEARO to the 
South East Asia region and WPRO to the Western Pacific region. The method and assumptions behind the projections are 
contained in Bilano et al. (2015). The data are taken from WHO (2015).    
 
The predicted increase in smoking prevalence and in the number of smokers over the next 10 to 15 
years in Africa will coincide with an increase in the burden of diseases associated with tobacco 
consumption. Tobacco use is a leading risk factor for many Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such 
as cardiovascular disease, stroke, diabetes, chronic respiratory disease and lung and other cancers 
(WHO, 2014b). The percentage of deaths due to these diseases in Africa is projected to increase from 
12% in 2002 to 17% in 2030 with the total number of deaths doubling from 1.3 million to 2.5 million 
(Mathers and Loncar, 2006).  
 
Article 20 of the FCTC requires that “Parties undertake to develop and promote national research and 
to coordinate research programmes at the regional and international level in the field of tobacco 
control” (WHO, 2005, p17). The Article further requires that Parties “initiate the conduct of research 
and scientific assessments, and in so doing promote and encourage research that addresses the 
determinants and consequences of tobacco consumption” (ibid., p18). To date, countries in the AFRO 
region have not fared well in implementing this Article. According to the FCTC Secretariat, the AFRO 
region achieved an implementation rate of 33% for Article 20 in their most recent assessment against 
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a global average of 51% (WHO, 2014a).5 This is also reflected in the fact that there is little published 
research focussing on tobacco control in Africa outside of South Africa. For instance, a recent 
comprehensive review of the large literature on price elasticities of demand for tobacco products by 
the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) was only able to count 3 African countries, 
outside of South Africa, as having published elasticity estimates (IARC, 2011). Research that speaks to 
local conditions is vital in building the case for policy action especially in view of the prognosis for the 
tobacco epidemic on the continent as detailed above. This thesis, therefore, aims to fill some gaps in 
our knowledge of the economics of tobacco control, with particular attention paid to Africa.  
 
1.1. Themes of the thesis  
This thesis concerns itself with three broad but related themes in the economics of tobacco control. 
The first theme deals with the quantification of the costs of tobacco consumption and in this way sets 
up the economic justification for policy intervention. The second theme, which is one of the oldest 
research areas in the economics of tobacco control, attempts to quantify the responsiveness of 
tobacco demand to price and/or tax changes. This follows directly from policymakers’ desire to 
influence demand given the costs of tobacco consumption. The last theme concerns itself with 
conducting policy evaluations of countries that have engaged in large-scale tobacco control 
interventions with the aim of drawing wider policy lessons. In what follows, I discuss each one of these 
themes in some detail.  
 
1.1.1.  The economic costs of tobacco consumption 
In economics, particularly neo-classical economics, policy interventions are often justified on market 
failure grounds. A market failure or an externality occurs when the actions of one agent directly affect 
the well-being of another agent (Varian, 1992). When a market failure occurs, policy actions are 
required to correct or to “internalize” the externality. The external costs associated with tobacco 
consumption have traditionally been thought of in terms of mortality and morbidity. When smokers 
fall ill, a portion of their medical costs are met by non-smokers especially in countries with publically 
provided healthcare. By some estimates, healthcare costs attributable to smoking take up between 
6% and 15% of total healthcare costs in high-income countries (Jha et al., 2000). Secondly, premature 
death as a result of tobacco smoking also imposes costs on the wider economy due to productivity 
                                                          
5 See WHO (2014a, p78) for a complete listing of Article 20’s indicators.  
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losses. For instance, in the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services estimates 
that more than USD156 billion is lost per annum in productivity due to premature mortality (United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). It is, however, important to point out that 
some of the productivity losses are borne by smokers themselves. For instance, smokers are known 
to face lower wages in the labour market (Levine et al., 1997; Viscusi and Hersch, 2001; Lye and 
Hirschberg, 2004). External costs also include the mortality and morbidity costs of third parties who 
are exposed to environmental tobacco smoke. Further, new work has pointed to the importance of 
cigarette excise taxes as a self-control device for smokers. That is, in addition to the role that taxes 
play in correcting for externalities, they are useful in helping smokers commit to quitting in the future. 
The theoretical and empirical evidence for this so-called “internalities” argument for cigarette taxes 
has been shown by Gruber and Koszegi (2001, 2004) and Gruber and Mullainathan (2005), among 
others.    
 
Recently, researchers have started to think about the implications of tobacco consumption for intra-
household resource allocation. In many Low- and Middle-Income countries (LMICs), household 
consumption decisions are often made by the head of the household. In contexts where incomes are 
low, the head’s decisions can have far reaching consequences for household consumption patterns. 
That is, in deciding to spend money on cigarettes, the head is choosing to spend less on other goods 
and services. Spending less on, for example, education or health can consign poor households into a 
vicious cycle of poverty (John et al., 2012). These displacement costs are referred to as the 
“opportunity costs” of tobacco consumption in the literature.  
 
The opportunity costs of tobacco consumption can be quite large as demonstrated by Efroymson et 
al. (2001), who were the first researchers to quantify the costs in the context of Bangladesh. They 
found that the average male smoker spent on tobacco more than twice the per capita expenditure on 
clothing, housing, health and education combined. Further, they found that the typical poor smoker’s 
daily cigarette expenditure could easily pay for an additional 500 calories for one or two children in 
Bangladesh. Following on from their study, other researchers have attempted to quantify these 
opportunity costs for Cambodia (John et al., 2012), India (John, 2008b), Indonesia (Block and Webb, 
2009), South Africa (Koch and Tshiswaka-Kashalala, 2008), Taiwan (Pu et al., 2008) and the United 
States (Busch et al., 2004). Even though these later studies have employed more sophisticated 
econometric techniques, their conclusions have largely been in line with what Efromyson et al. (2001) 
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initially found in their landmark study on Bangladesh. That is, tobacco consumption often leads 
households to sacrifice expenditure on desirable goods and services.       
 
1.1.2.  Measuring the responsiveness of cigarette demand to changes in prices   
Of all demand reduction tools that are available to policymakers, raising taxes so that prices rise has 
been found to be the most effective (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; IARC, 2011). This is a consequence 
of the Law of Demand which states that the quantity demanded of a good falls whenever the price of 
the good rises, holding everything else constant. The nature of the relationship between tobacco 
demand and tobacco prices can also be illustrated in the form of a graph. In Figure 1.4, I plot the 
average annual percentage change in per capita cigarette consumption against the average annual 
percentage change in real cigarette prices for 67 countries. The annual percentage changes are 
calculated over the period 1990 to 2009 using a constant growth regression (i.e. 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑡 +
 𝑢𝑡, where 𝑌𝑡 is cigarette consumption per capita or cigarette prices and 𝛽 is the growth rate over the 
period 1990 to 2009). As is clear from the figure, the relationship between the two variables is 
negative. In other words, countries whose cigarette prices have increased over the period 1990 to 
2009, have, on average, experienced a reduction in per capita cigarette consumption over the same 
period. On the other hand, countries whose real cigarette prices have declined, have on average 







                                                          
6 The relationship between changes in cigarette prices and changes in per capita consumption is also influenced 
by other variables, such as the rate of growth in real GDP per capita. For example, cigarette consumption might 
grow in fast growing economies even when real prices are increasing (or consumption could decline in countries 
experiencing an economic slowdown even when real prices are declining). This might explain the presence of 
some countries in the 1st and 3rd quadrants in Figure 1.4.  
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Figure 1.4: Relationship between percentage changes in real prices and percentage changes in per 
capita cigarette consumption 
 
Notes: The figure shows a scatterplot of the percentage change in per capita cigarette consumption against the percentage 
change in real cigarette prices for 67 countries for which I have data. It covers the period 1990 to 2009. The figure also shows 
a fitted line of a regression of changes in consumption on changes in prices. The beta coefficient on the change in price 
variable is -0.425 [p-value = 0.00; confidence interval (-0.226, -0.623); n = 67]. The per capita cigarette consumption data are 
taken from ERC Group (2010) and the cigarette price data are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s World Cost of 
Living Survey. The cigarette price is the price of the cheapest brand (in packs) found in each city in a particular country 
expressed in constant 2000 US dollars (I discuss each data source in detail in Chapter 4). The countries and their symbols are 
Argentina (ARG), Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Brazil (BRA), Cameroon (CAR), Canada (CAN), Chile (CHL), 
China (CHN), Colombia (COL), Costa Rica (CRI), Ivory Coast (CIV), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DEN), Ecuador (ECU), Egypt 
(EGY), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Guatemala (GTM), Hong Kong (HKG), Hungary (HUN), India 
(IND), Indonesia (IDN), Iran (IRN),  Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Jordan (JOR),  Kenya (KEN), South Korea 
(KOR), Kuwait (KWT), Malaysia (MYS), Mexico (MEX), Morocco (MAR), Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Nigeria (NGA), 
Norway (NOR), Pakistan (PAK), Panama (PAN), Paraguay (PRY), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), 
Romania (ROU), Russia (RUS), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Senegal (SEN), Singapore (SGP), South Africa (ZAF), Spain (ESP), Sri Lanka 
(LKA), Sweden (SWD), Switzerland (CHE), Thailand (THA), Tunisia (TUN), Turkey (TUR), United Arab Emirates (UAE), United 
Kingdom (GBP), United States of America (USA), Uruguay (URY), Venezuela (VEN) and Viet Nam (VNM).      
 
On the other hand, excise taxes are often an important source of revenue. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) estimates that governments across the globe collected at least USD145 billion in 
tobacco excise taxes for the 2012 fiscal year (WHO, 2013a). Governments understandably worry that 
as tobacco consumption falls in response to tax hikes, tax revenues might fall along with it. One of the 
biggest achievements in the economics of tobacco control has been to point out that a contradiction 
does not necessarily exist between public health goals, on the one hand, and tax revenue goals, on 
the other. It turns out that tobacco demand decreases less than proportionately to a price increase. 
And the parameter that has been crucial in driving home this point has been the price elasticity of 




Economists working in tobacco control have spent the last three decades or so estimating price 
elasticities of demand for tobacco products. These estimates give us a sense of the nature of the 
relationship between tobacco demand and tobacco prices. This work has focussed on the demand for 
cigarettes rather than on other forms of tobacco simply because data and prices for cigarettes are 
readily available. Secondly, cigarettes are a standardized product and thus allow researchers to easily 
conduct cross-country comparisons.  
 
For example, an estimate of the price elasticity of demand can be obtained using the data in Figure 
1.4. This is done by running a regression of the percentage change in per capita cigarette consumption 
on the percentage change in cigarette prices. The coefficient on the change in price variable is the 
estimate of the price elasticity of demand (i.e. the slope of the line in Figure 1.4 is the estimate of the 
price elasticity of demand). The regression coefficient on the change in price variable is -0.425 (p-value 
= 0; 95% confidence interval [-0.226, -0.623], n = 67). This suggests that for the data in Figure 1.4, a 
1% increase in prices results, on average, in a 0.425% reduction in per capita cigarette consumption.7  
 
The predominant approach in the literature has been to use time series data and appropriate time 
series techniques to estimate elasticities with most elasticity estimates coming from developed 
countries. For instance, a sizable number of the studies reviewed in the comprehensive literature 
surveys by Chaloupka and Warner (2000) and by the International Agency for Research on Cancer 
(2011) were in this tradition. The reasons for this were largely practical: during the time that 
researchers were beginning to estimate price elasticities of demand for tobacco products, time series 
econometrics was the dominant way of doing empirical economics. Furthermore, Low-and-Middle 
Income Countries (LMICs) often did not maintain time series records of a time span long enough to 
justify the use of time series estimation techniques. On the other hand, these datasets have been in 
abundance in developed countries.   
 
                                                          
7 This regression is underpinned by the following simplifying assumptions: (1) changes in per capita GDP (or some 
other variable) do not influence per capita cigarette consumption and (2) there is no reverse causation from per 
capita consumption to prices. One of the preoccupations of the academic work on estimating price elasticities 
of demand has been to figure out how best to control for these confounding factors. Interestingly, however, 
even with these caveats, this elasticity estimate (and its confidence interval) is well within the range of estimates 
in the literature (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the literature).   
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The last decade or two has seen an increase in the number of household budget surveys or household 
expenditure surveys across LMICs. This, combined with theoretical, econometric and computer 
advances in using household surveys has led to an increase in the number of researchers interested 
in estimating price elasticities for LMICs. There are now a lot more estimates of the price elasticity of 
demand for cigarettes in, for example, China (Lance et al., 2004; Bishop et al., 2007; Chen and Xing, 
2011) and India (John, 2005; John, 2008a; Guindon et al., 2011) than 20 years ago. These estimates 
are generally in line with those from developed countries, namely that cigarette demand responds 
less than proportionately to price increases.  
 
Even though we now have abundant datasets and the necessary econometric tools, only a handful of 
countries in Africa have estimated price elasticities of demand. The IARC (2011) Handbook on the 
Effectiveness of Tax and Price Policies for Tobacco Control, the most comprehensive up-to-date review 
of the literature, was only able to find elasticity estimates for the following African countries: Egypt, 
Morocco, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Two of these countries (Egypt and Morocco) are not part of 
WHO’s AFRO region.   
 
1.1.3.  Evaluating tobacco control initiatives  
As is clear from Figure 1.4, some countries have been particularly successful at reducing per capita 
cigarette consumption over the period 1990 to 2009. For instance, France, where real cigarette prices 
increased by about 7% per annum over the period 1990 to 2009, experienced a halving of consumption 
over the same period (Jha and Peto, 2014). This substantial decline in cigarette consumption coincided 
with a 50% reduction in the lung cancer death rate among French men (Hill, 2013). Another country 
which has been very successful in reducing tobacco use is the United States (US), which pioneered 
tobacco control policies in a number of dimensions following the 1964 Surgeon-General’s report.  
According to Figure 1.4, the US experienced a 3% average increase in real prices with consumption 
declining by about 3% per annum over the 1990 to 2009 period. Over a longer time horizon (1964 to 
2012), US smoking prevalence declined from 42% to 18%, with much of this attributable to an 
aggressive tax policy (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). Much of the 
decline in prevalence in the United States has been attributed to increases in taxes at the state rather 
than at the federal level and the declines have, consequently, been uneven across states (Peterson et 




Some Low- and Middle-Income countries (LMICs) have also had their fair share of success with tobacco 
control. South Africa, which was one of the first LMICs to adopt an aggressive tobacco control policy 
in the 1990s, saw aggregate cigarette consumption decline by a third between 1994 and 2004 (Van 
Walbeek, 2005). According to Figure 1.4, real cigarette prices increased at the rate of 5% per annum 
during most of this time. Thailand managed to reduce smoking prevalence from 24% in 1991 to 15% 
in 2007 (Sangthong et al., 2012). During most of this time, real cigarette prices in Thailand increased 
at the average rate of 2% per annum (see Figure 1.4).    
 
Given that a sizable number of countries have been implementing tobacco control measures over the 
last couple of decades, the interest of some researchers has shifted to evaluating the effectiveness of 
these interventions. The 2008 publication of the International Agency for Research on Cancer’s (IARC) 
handbook on the Methods for Evaluating Tobacco Control Policies is testament to this. The overriding 
focus of this research agenda is the construction of policy counterfactuals. That is, the research tries 
to figure out what the world would have looked like in the absence of tobacco control measures. The 
success (or lack thereof) of any intervention is arrived at by comparing outcomes under tobacco 
control with outcomes under a counterfactual scenario.  
 
Warner (1977) was one of the first to tackle this problem. He predicted what cigarette consumption 
patterns would have been in the US if anti-smoking measures had not been introduced in the 1960s 
by using regression coefficients from the pre-smoking campaign period. Comparing predicted to actual 
consumption data, he calculated that per capita cigarette consumption was about 30% lower in 1975 
than it would have been had the anti-smoking campaign measures not been implemented. 
Fichtenberg and Glantz (2000) and Holford et al. (2014) have used versions of Warner (1977) in 
evaluating tobacco control initiatives in California and the entire United States respectively. Recent 
research attention has, however, shifted to methods that rule out the possibility that the treatment 
effects identified in, for instance, Warner (1977) or Fichtenberg and Glantz (2000) did not happen by 
coincidence. That is, the aim of this research is to rule out the possibility that the decline in cigarette 
consumption would have happened even in the absence of tobacco control measures. For example, 
the Synthetic Control method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and applied in the context 




1.2. Outline of the thesis  
This thesis comprises of three main chapters in line with the themes outlined above. I discuss each 
chapter’s main arguments below.   
 
Chapter 2 uses data from the 2006 edition of Zambia’s Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS), a 
household expenditure survey, to investigate whether tobacco consumption influences household 
expenditure patterns in Zambia. Previous research has approached this problem by estimating a 
system of conditional demand functions (or conditional Engel curves) where the demand for each 
expenditure item is estimated as a function of a household’s expenditure on tobacco (or a household’s 
tobacco smoking status). That is, conceptually households are thought of as initially allocating 
expenditure to tobacco before allocating expenditure to other items. However, since there is likely to 
be reverse causation from, say, expenditure on food to whether a household smokes or not (or indeed 
even simultaneity bias), researchers have had to employ instrumental variable techniques to obtain 
consistent estimates. The instrumental variable of choice in the literature for tobacco expenditure (or 
a household’s tobacco smoking status) has been the adult male to adult female ratio (or adult sex 
ratio). That is, the adult sex ratio is a good predictor of whether a household has at least one smoker 
because adult males are more likely than adult females to smoke in LMICs. I argue in the chapter that 
even though the adult sex ratio is informative about the endogenous regressor (that is, it predicts 
smoking status), it is likely to violate the exclusion restriction in the sense that it also influences the 
left-hand side variables. For example, a household with more males relative to females might spend 
less on health care. I, therefore, use the adult sex ratio as per the literature but allow for it to violate 
the exclusion restriction in the manner suggested by Nevo and Rosen (2012). This allows me to obtain 
consistent estimates of the effect of tobacco expenditure on a household’s expenditure patterns in 
the presence of an imperfect instrumental variable. A previous version of this Chapter was published 
in 2014 as an Economic Research Southern Africa (ERSA) Working Paper (Chelwa and Van Walbeek, 
2014).  
 
In Chapter 3, I use the 2005 and 2009 editions of Uganda’s National Panel Survey (UNPS), a household 
expenditure survey, to estimate price and expenditure elasticities of demand for cigarettes in Uganda 
using a method developed by Deaton (1988). Given that the UNPS does not contain cigarette price 
data, I construct a measure of price as a ratio of household expenditure on cigarettes to total quantity 
of cigarettes purchased over a reference period. Deaton refers to this measure of price as a “unit 
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value”. I show that unit values vary across geographical space in Uganda and use this fact to obtain 
price and expenditure elasticities of demand that are largely free of reverse causation or simultaneity 
bias concerns. Deaton’s method also allows one to correct the elasticity estimates for measurement 
error and cigarette quality differences. This is the first study to apply Deaton’s method in estimating 
price and expenditure elasticities of demand for tobacco products in the context of an African country.  
 
In tobacco control, South Africa is often held up as an exemplar country. Between 1994 and 2004, the 
average real price per pack of cigarettes in South Africa increased by 110% owing largely to consistent 
tax increases by the government. During the same period, per capita cigarette consumption declined 
by 46% (Van Walbeek, 2005). However, comparing 1994’s per capita cigarette consumption with the 
2004 number is not particularly useful for evaluating policy. Many other factors, aside from the price 
rises, could have influenced cigarette consumption during the period 1994 to 2004. Furthermore, per 
capita cigarette consumption had already started declining by the time the tax started increasing. In 
Chapter 4, I create a counterfactual per capita cigarette consumption trend line for South Africa for 
the period 1994 to 2004 using the method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). That is, I 
create what per capita cigarette consumption would have looked like in South Africa had the tax 
increases not happened. In addition, I conduct several falsification (or placebo) exercises to verify that 
I am not incorrectly attributing the changes in cigarette consumption to changes in cigarette prices.  
 
Chapter 5 concludes by giving a summary of the main findings of the thesis and discusses ideas for 
future research.  
 
1.3. Some comments on the choice of countries 
Ideally, one would want to conduct the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 on the same country. That is, one 
chapter would establish the economic case for policy intervention while the other chapter would give 
policymakers an idea of what the pattern of demand responses would look like should they choose to 
intervene. I had initially started off with the idea of writing chapters 2 and 3 exclusively on Zambia. 
Unfortunately, none of the available household expenditure surveys in Zambia contain the quantity 
variable for cigarettes, which is crucial if one wants to use Deaton’s (1988) method. On the other hand, 
Uganda is a good substitute. For one thing, the first two rounds of the Uganda National Panel Survey 
(UNPS) contain all the relevant variables. Secondly, Uganda, from a context point of view, is sufficiently 
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similar to Zambia, and to many other sub-Saharan African countries, to allow for some generalization 
of the results. Lastly, Uganda is itself in the process of implementing several tobacco control measures 
including increasing the excise tax on cigarettes.  
 
The choice of South Africa for Chapter 4 follows from the fact that it is one of the few countries in sub-
Saharan Africa that has consistently increased taxes over a sufficiently long time span to allow for a 




















CHAPTER 2: DOES TOBACCO EXPENDITURE INFLUENCE 
HOUSEHOLD SPENDING PATTERNS? EVIDENCE FROM ZAMBIA 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Tobacco use is the leading cause of premature death in the world. According to the World Health 
Organization (WHO), nearly 6 million people die per annum from tobacco related deaths (WHO, 
2014c) including about 600,000 from passive smoking (Oberg, et al., 2010). There is another aspect to 
the cost of tobacco use that is separate from mortality and morbidity costs, namely that tobacco 
expenditure tends to crowd out the consumption of other commodities within the household. This 
chapter adds to the literature on the crowding out effect of tobacco expenditure in two ways. Firstly, 
the chapter uses expenditure data from a low income sub-Saharan African country, Zambia, where 
most of the households are poor. Aside from the work by Koch and Tshiswaka-Kashalala (2008) on 
South Africa, I am unaware of studies that investigate this issue in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Secondly, in identifying the causal impact of tobacco expenditure I use the standard instrumental 
variable from the literature, the adult sex ratio, but unlike previous work, I allow for this instrument 
to be correlated with the error term. I consider this approach to be plausible given that intra-
household resource allocations, and as a consequence household expenditure patterns, often display 
biases related to gender (Senauer et al., 1988; Deaton et al., 1989; Thomas, 1990, 1994; Deaton, 1997; 
Duflo, 2003; Doss, 2013). Therefore, excluding the adult sex ratio from structural demand equations 
is likely to result in biased estimates of the impact of tobacco expenditure on household decision 
making.  
 
My results, even after allowing for a correlation between the instrumental variable and the error term, 
confirm many of the findings in the literature. For instance, I find that households with at least one 
smoker allocate less expenditure towards food, schooling, clothing and water. Other expenditure 
categories that are crowded out include transportation, equipment maintenance, entertainment and 
remittances. I also find some evidence that the crowding out of food is more pronounced for poorer 
households. But unlike previous studies, I do not find that spending on tobacco leads households to 
allocate more expenditure towards alcohol. My empirical analysis, which is based on less restrictive 
assumptions on the instrumental variable, leads to the conclusion that the positive association 
between tobacco and alcohol found in previous work is more likely a correlational relationship than a 
causal relationship.  
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The results in this chapter show that the costs of tobacco consumption in Zambia are more than the 
direct costs associated with mortality and morbidity. I agree with Wang et al. (2006), Block and Webb 
(2009) and John et al. (2012) who conclude that by displacing expenditure categories like food, 
education and the maintenance of equipment, households in poor countries are likely to be trapped 
in a cycle of poverty.  
  
My interest in studying the impact of tobacco consumption on household decision making in Zambia 
is motivated by the fact that per capita cigarette consumption has recently started rising after 
declining over much of the 1990s (Chelwa, 2012). For the period 1990 to 2001, per capita cigarette 
consumption declined by 75%. During this period, real GDP per capita declined at the average rate of 
1% per year.8 Further, the 1990s were a period of great economic hardship as the country 
implemented a series of austerity measures including a controversial privatization programme that 
resulted in thousands of job losses (Muuka, 1997; Craig, 2000). From 2002 to 2009, per capita cigarette 
consumption increased by 37% largely supported by the recovery in the economy’s performance 
(Chelwa, 2012). Growth in real GDP per capita averaged 4% per year during the previous decade. There 
is an expectation that per capita cigarette consumption will continue to increase in the current decade 
(ERC, 2010). This suggests that tobacco is increasingly becoming an important part of the expenditure 
decisions of most households in Zambia. Given that households in general face a budget constraint, 
it, therefore, becomes important to investigate which goods and services tobacco displaces, if at all 
any, in the household’s budget.   
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 gives an overview of the relevant literature. 
Section 2.3 discusses the conceptual framework of how crowding out might occur. Section 2.4 
discusses the empirical strategy and the data is described in section 2.5. The empirical results are 
presented in Sections 2.6 and 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes.    
 
 
                                                          
8 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed December 2015)  
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2.2. Literature review 
The costs associated with household tobacco consumption are often conceptualised in one of two 
ways: (1) costs on the macroeconomy attributed to smoking via death, increased healthcare 
expenditure and lost productivity (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; Kang et al., 2003; Max et al., 2004; 
Liu et al., 2006) and those related to the displacement of some commodities by tobacco in the 
household. My review of the literature focusses on the latter as it bears directly on the focus of this 
chapter.  
 
Efroymson, et al. (2001) was one of the first studies to highlight the potential crowding out effect of 
tobacco consumption using several datasets from Bangladesh. Theirs was not so much an econometric 
study as a simple comparison of the expenditure profiles of smoking versus non-smoking households. 
One of the study’s main findings was that male cigarette smokers spent more than twice as much on 
cigarettes as on clothing, housing, health and education combined. Further, the typical smoker could 
add more than 500 calories to the diet of one or two children with the money spent on cigarette 
purchases. Since their analysis was not econometric in nature, it did not account for observable 
confounders, variables that were likely, alongside tobacco, to influence expenditure allocations 
between the two types of households. Further, Efroymson et al. did not account for the possibility 
that the decision to allocate expenditure towards tobacco might be determined endogenously within 
the household. If observable and unobservable confounders are not accounted for, then it becomes 
unclear whether reducing a smoking household’s expenditure on tobacco will elevate that 
household’s consumption profile to that of a non-smoking household.  
 
Busch et al. (2004) and Wang et al. (2006) added to the literature by estimating demand systems that 
adequately controlled for social, demographic and geographic variables likely to impact expenditure 
decisions. The former estimated an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) using the Consumption and 
Expenditure Survey from the United States and found that tobacco crowded out food and clothing. 
The latter used data from rural China and found that tobacco crowded out expenditure on education, 
agriculture equipment maintenance and savings. Wang et al. also found that tobacco smoking 
households were likely to spend more money on alcohol, further exacerbating the negative 




The next generation of studies in this literature attempted to address the issue of endogeneity which 
had not been adequately dealt with up to that point. John (2008b), using data from India’s National 
Sample Survey was the first to use instrumental variables to account for the possible endogeneity of 
tobacco use in the demand system. His choice of instrument was the adult sex ratio motivated by the 
fact that smoking in India was mainly done by adult males. In addition, John’s analysis controlled for 
possible preference differences between smoking and non-smoking households using a method 
introduced by Vermeulen (2003). John found that tobacco expenditure crowded out food, education 
and entertainment while crowding in expenditure on health, clothing and fuels. Pu et al. (2008) using 
John’s (2008b) method and expenditure data from Taiwan found that tobacco crowded out clothing, 
medical care and transportation amongst others. Pu et al.’s contribution was to treat alcohol and 
tobacco as complements in the demand system, which allowed them to separately study the impact 
of both on household expenditure decisions. Koch and Tshiswaka-Kashalala (2008) added to the 
literature by using a different instrument for tobacco expenditure. Their preferred instrument was a 
composite smoking prevalence measure based on prevalence estimates for South Africa computed in 
Van Walbeek (2002). Their results showed that tobacco crowded out expenditure on education, fuel, 
clothing, healthcare and transportation for the full sample of smoking households. On the other hand, 
spending on tobacco was associated with increased expenditure on housing, food, entertainment and 
alcohol in some data specifications. 
 
More recently Block and Webb (2009), lacking appropriate instrumental variables, have used an 
indirect approach to identify the causal impact of tobacco expenditure on household’s expenditure 
decisions in Indonesia. The authors estimate a series of reduced form equations for food, tobacco and 
child height against a common set of covariates. The basic idea is that if a common set of covariates 
reduces the allocation to food and reduces child height but at the same time increases the allocation 
to tobacco, then this is suggestive of crowding out. Their indirect empirical strategy “demonstrate[s] 
that the same exogenous covariates that are associated with improved dietary quantity and quality 
are also associated with reduced allocation of household resources to tobacco” (ibid., p. 18). 
 
My approach in this chapter is closely aligned with the most recent generation of empirical studies on 
the crowding out impact of tobacco consumption. This chapter’s main contribution is to use the 
standard instrumental variable used in the literature, the adult sex ratio, while making less stringent 
assumptions about the behaviour of this instrumental variable. 
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2.3. Conceptual framework 
Following the theoretical framework laid out in John (2008b), I assume that each household seeks to 
maximize a single utility function in the manner made precise in Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1974, 
1981). The need to make this assumption is driven by the limitations in my dataset that make it difficult 
to incorporate intra-household interactions in the analysis. The household’s utility maximization 
problem results, in general, in a set of 𝑛 household Marshallian demand functions of the form 
𝑥𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , … , 𝑝𝑛; 𝑌; 𝒂), where 𝑥𝑖 is the quantity purchased of the 𝑖th commodity, 𝑝𝑖  is the price of the 𝑖th 
commodity, 𝒂 is a vector of household characteristics and 𝑌 is total household income.  
 
The model assumes that a household that spends on tobacco, in the sense that at least one household 
member is a smoker, first decides on the quantity of tobacco to be purchased before deciding on the 
quantities of the other commodities. In such a situation, the household’s utility maximization problem 
results in a set of conditional demand functions of the form 𝑥𝑖 =  𝑔𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , … , 𝑝𝑛; 𝑀; 𝒂;  𝑑), where 𝑑 is 
an indicator variable for whether the household spends on tobacco and 𝑀 is the remainder of 
household income after spending on tobacco. That is, the household’s demand for commodity 𝑖 is 
conditional on the household’s smoking status. Pollak (1969) formally introduced and discussed the 
properties of conditional demand functions and showed that they obeyed the theory of demand.  
 
In this chapter, I seek to estimate and compare Marshallian demand functions for non-smoking 
households with conditional demand functions for households with at least one smoker for a common 
set of commodities. If, on average, the quantity demanded of a commodity for the typical non-
smoking household is less than the quantity demanded of the same commodity for a typical smoking 








2.4. Empirical strategy 
I conduct my empirical analysis in two parts. In the first part, I compare the mean expenditure shares 
for various commodity groups between smoking and non-smoking households. In particular, the 
comparisons are conducted for the following commodities: food, alcohol, healthcare, schooling, 
water, housing, electricity, alternative energy sources, transportation, equipment maintenance 
(boats, cars, motor bikes and bicycles), telephone usage, entertainment, house care, personal care 
and “other”.9    
 
The second part of my empirical strategy formally tests the crowding out hypothesis of tobacco 
expenditure for the commodities listed in the previous paragraph. To do so, I estimate Engel curves 
using the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) developed by Banks, et al. (1997). The 
QUAIDS has the advantage of not only being consistent with utility theory but also nesting the popular 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) and further allows 
commodities to be modelled as luxuries at some income levels and necessities at others. John (2008b), 
Pu et al. (2008), Koch and Tshiswaka-Kashalala (2008) and John et al. (2012) have used the QUAIDS to 
conduct similar analyses. I assume that the household is a single utility maximizer and therefore 
estimate a system of household-level Engel curves with each one taking the following form: 
 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼1𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑖𝑑𝑗  + 𝛼3𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑗 + 𝛼4𝑖(ln𝑀)𝑗
2 + 𝛼5𝑖𝐹𝐸 + 𝛾𝑖𝒂𝑗 +  𝑢𝑖𝑗   (2.1) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is the monthly expenditure share of expenditure category 𝑖 in household 𝑗 after deducting 
the expenditure on tobacco. 𝑑𝑗 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if household 𝑗 reports 
positive monthly expenditure on tobacco and zero otherwise. ln𝑀𝑗 is the natural logarithm of total 
monthly expenditure (in Zambian Kwacha) in household 𝑗 excluding expenditure on tobacco. ( ln𝑀)𝑗
2 
is the square of 𝑙𝑛𝑀 in household 𝑗. Equation (2.1) is the empirical implementation of the Marshallian 
and conditional demand functions discussed in Section (2.3).  
 
                                                          
9 The category with “other” contains goods and services that are difficult to classify or too small to stand alone.  
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Ordinarily, budget share equations such as those in equation (2.1) should be estimated with price as 
an explanatory variable. In the absence of price data, I augment the Engel curves with cluster-level 
fixed effects (𝐹𝐸) under the assumption that households within the same cluster (or the same village) 
face the “same” price (or face the same relative prices). This assumption has empirical support 
especially in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) where transportation costs are significant 
determinants of prices and the isolated nature of markets prevents the exploitation of arbitrage 
opportunities (see Deaton, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1997; Deaton and Grimard 1992).10 𝐹𝐸 is exogenous in 
my specification because an individual household’s demand is too small to influence the 
determination and structure of cluster-level prices  (see previous list of references). The 𝐹𝐸 can also 
be thought of as controlling for tastes which are likely to be the same within clusters but different 
across clusters. 
 
 𝒂𝑗 is a vector of household-specific characteristics that includes the natural logarithms of household 
size, age of household head, average age of adults in a household, average age of children in a 
household, years of schooling of the household head and years of schooling of the most educated  
member of the household. Other household characteristics in  𝒂 include the proportion of adults in a 
household, the number of employed persons in the household and a dummy variable for whether the 
household head receives a wage income or not. I define adults as those who are 18 years old or older. 
𝒂 also includes a number of indicator variables for the type of household as classified by the local 
authority in which the household is located. In some data specifications, namely those that span both 
rural and urban households, I include a dummy variable in 𝒂 for whether the household is located in 
an urban or rural area. I also include in 𝒂 a dummy variable for whether the household grows tobacco. 
The controls in 𝒂 are the standard ones used in the literature on the crowding out effect of tobacco 
(John, 2008b; Pu et al. 2008; John et al. 2012). 𝑢𝑖𝑗 is the usual error term which is assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean zero. I conduct the empirical analysis on the full sample, urban 
households, rural households and by expenditure category. Crowding out is established if 𝛼2𝑖 (the 
coefficient on 𝑑) in equation (2.1) is negative and statistically significant.  
 
𝑑, ln𝑀 and (ln𝑀)2 in equation (2.1) are likely endogenous, in the sense that they are each correlated 
with the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑗. Such a situation would preclude my giving a causal interpretation to the 
regression coefficients in my demand system. In this case, it is desirable to use instrumental variables 
                                                          
10 This point is explored further in the context of Uganda in Chapter 3.  
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to ensure consistent estimates. John (2008b) and Pu et al. (2008) instrument for tobacco expenditure 
using the adult sex ratio in a household. I follow their approach and instrument for 𝑑 using the adult 
sex ratio. This choice of instrument is motivated by the fact that adult males are more likely than adult 
females to consume tobacco in Zambia. According to the 2007 round of the Zambia Demographic and 
Health Survey (ZDHS, 2007), whose timing coincides with the expenditure survey I use in this chapter, 
smoking prevalence among adult males was estimated at 24% while among adult females it was 
estimated at 0.7% (for the 2002 round of the survey, adult male and adult female smoking prevalence 
were estimated at 15% and 0.5% respectively). The fact that adult males are more likely to smoke than 
adult females has also been shown by Pampel (2008). I expect the adult sex ratio to explain a sizable 
proportion of the variation in 𝑑 (I formally test this assertion in section 2.6.2). I also assume that the 
adult sex ratio is not correlated with unobservables that are contained in the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑗. It is almost 
impossible to test this assumption in a just-identified case, such as I have here, where the number of 
instruments is equal to the number of endogenous regressors. I believe, however, that any 
determinants of 𝑤𝑖𝑗 that are not contained in my specification of equation (2.1) are unlikely to be 
correlated in a significant way with my choice of instrument for 𝑑. 11 In any case, I relax this 
assumption, formally known as the exclusion restriction, in section 2.7.  
 
I instrument for ln𝑀  and (ln𝑀)2 using the logarithm of the value of total household assets and the 
square of this logarithm respectively. I expect that these two variables explain a significant proportion 
of the variation in ln𝑀 and (ln𝑀)2. Recent work has shown that household assets often predict 
household income or household expenditure in Africa (Sahn and Stifel, 2003; Young, 2012).12 After all, 
                                                          
11 Following Koch and Tshiswaka-Kashalala (2008), I constructed a cluster-level tobacco prevalence estimate 
calculated from the previous (2002) round of Zambia’s Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) as a possible 
instrument for households’ tobacco smoking status in 2006 (I use the 2006 edition of the LCMS in this chapter). 
This is an attractive instrument because it is unlikely to be correlated with the error term in the individual 
households since it is calculated at the cluster level using the previous round’s cross-sectional survey (the 
probability that a household appears in two consecutive cross-sectional surveys is very small). Whereas the 
direction of the relationship between this instrument and 𝑑 was positive, the relationship was not strong enough 
to overcome the problem of identification with weak instruments (Stock, et al., 2002).   
12 An alternative approach would be to use total household expenditure (and its square) as instruments for ln𝑀 
and (ln𝑀)2 respectively. One challenge to this approach is that household expenditure is also likely endogenous 
in the sense that it appears in the denominator on the Left-Hand Side (LHS) of equation (2.1). Recall that in 
obtaining the shares on the LHS, I need to subtract expenditure on tobacco from total household expenditure. 
Total household expenditure is, therefore, implicit in the denominator.   
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one of the defining characteristics of assets is that they can generate a flow of income for the holder. 
In any case, in Section 2.6.2 I formally test the extent to which household assets explain the variation 
in residual household expenditure. In addition, the value of total household assets satisfies the 
exclusion restriction, the assumption of no correlation with the error term, since demand functions 
are rarely, if ever, specified with the value of total household assets as an explanatory variable.  
 
Since 𝑑 is dichotomous, the first-stage regression relationship between 𝑑 and its instrument is likely 
to be non-linear, best estimated by, for example, a probit. In addition, estimating a first-stage probit 
ensures that the predicted values for 𝑑, ?̂?, are bounded between zero and one. This is not assured 
with a linear estimation. Estimating a first-stage probit, however, introduces the complication of the 
so-called forbidden regression (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p190-192) whereby predicted values from 
a non-linear first-stage are directly applied to a linear second-stage regression. Doing so would risk a 
non-zero correlation between the first-stage residuals and ?̂? (ibid.). A way around this is to use the 
predicted values from the first-stage probit regression, ?̂? in my case, as an instrument for 𝑑 (Heckman, 
1978; Wooldridge, 2002; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This is the approach I adopt in this chapter. 
 
To implement the instrumental variables technique outlined above, I estimate the system in equation 
(2.1) by Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) combined with Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE).13 
The SURE allows me to account for any within-household correlation of error terms by exploiting the 
structure of the covariance matrix of the errors (see Zellner, 1962). In addition, in estimating the 
system by 3SLS/SURE, one is required to arbitrarily drop one of the demand equations in the system 
otherwise the covariance matrix of error terms is singular and therefore not invertible (Takada, et al., 
1995). I opt to drop the equation for “other” goods14. I estimate the system using the ireg optional 
command in Stata which provides maximum likelihood estimates and ensures that my estimated 
coefficients are not sensitive to the choice of equation that is dropped.  
 
                                                          
13 In effect, the demand system I estimate is a four-stage least squares procedure since the first two stages 
involve estimating a probit function for 𝑑 and using this function to generate predicted values, ?̂?, which are in 
turn used as instruments for 𝑑 in the third-stage. The fourth stage corrects the standard errors associated with 
my regression coefficients for within-household correlation of error terms using the SURE method.       
14 John (2008b), Pu et al. (2008) and John et al. (2012) use a similar procedure.   
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John (2008b), in estimating the system in equation (2.1), controlled for possible differences in 
preferences between smoking and non-smoking households using a method introduced by Vermeulen 
(2003). The way the demand system is set-up in equation (2.1) does not allow me to control for 
preference differences in the manner of John (2008b). In any case, the instrumental variables 
approach that I adopt should allow me to obtain consistent estimates even in the presence of an 
omitted variable that captures any differences in preferences between the two types of households.  
 
2.5. Description of the data 
The data for this chapter come from the 2006 round of the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) 
conducted by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) in Zambia. The survey was nationally representative 
and used a two-stage stratified cluster sample design whereby 988 clusters were selected in the first 
stage. The second stage saw the selection of 18,662 households from the 988 clusters distributed as 
9,530 households in urban areas and 9,132 households in rural areas. Data collection took place in its 
entirety over a single month in December 2006. Urban households were classified as low-cost, 
medium-cost or high-cost according to the local authority’s classification of residential areas. In rural 
areas, households were classified as either small-scale, medium-scale, large-scale or non-agriculture 
households. The survey collected a rich set of data on the living conditions of households in the areas 
of education, health, economic activities and employment, child nutrition, death in the households, 
income sources, income levels, food production, household consumption expenditure, access to clean 
water and more.15  The household expenditure section of the survey asked each household to recall 
and report on the total expenditure allocated to a particular commodity over a reference period. In 
most cases the reference period was the month prior to the survey but for some commodities, such 
as expenditure on health care or schooling, the recall period was a year. In such cases, I converted 
annual expenditure to monthly expenditure by dividing it by 12.  As stated in section 2.4, I focus on 
the following commodities: food, alcohol, healthcare, schooling, water, housing, electricity, 
alternative energy sources, transportation, equipment maintenance, telephone usage, 
entertainment, house care, personal care and “other”. Table 2.1 shows some summary statistics from 
the sample.  
 
As reported in Table 2.1, a total of 18622 households are in the full sample, of which 9530 (51%) are 
urban and 9132 (49%) are rural.  The expenditure criteria (top 50% vs bottom 50%) split the sample 
                                                          
15 Additional information on the Survey can be accessed here: http://catalog.ihsn.org/index.php/catalog/2258 
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into two equally populated samples. Poverty in the sample has a geographic profile: the bottom 50% 
of households are mainly of composed of rural households whereas the top 50% of households are 
mainly urban households. Urban households report spending five times as much on average per 
month than rural households (see line 7 in Table 2.1).   
 
9% of households in the sample report spending on tobacco in the month prior to the survey. This 
crude measure of prevalence also exhibits regional and expenditure category differences: rural 
households and those in the bottom 50% have a higher prevalence than those in urban areas and the 
top 50% respectively. The average smoking household reports spending USD3.34 per month on 
tobacco products. This also has a regional and expenditure category profile: urban households and 
households in the top 50% spend on average five times as much on tobacco products than rural and 
households in the bottom 50% respectively.  
 
The most important expenditure item in the sample is food, which was allocated 48% of total monthly 
expenditure for the sample as a whole. Lower income households (bottom 50%) and those in rural 















Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics from the 2006 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 
Line Statistic Full Sample Urban Rural Top 50% Bot. 50% 
1 
Number of households 18 662 9 530 9 132 9 331 9 331 
2 
Percentage of households in Urban areas 51.00% 100.00% N/A 81.00% 21.00% 
3 
Percentage of households in Rural areas 49.00% N/A 100.00% 19.00% 79.00% 
4 
Average monthly tobacco expenditure16 USD 3.34 USD 5.00 USD 1.60 USD 5.00 USD 1.12 
5 
Percent of households reporting positive tobacco expenditure 9.45% 7.00% 12.00% 8.00% 11.00% 
6 
Tobacco share among tobacco spending households 4.37% 3.81% 4.95% 3.34% 6.38% 
7 
Monthly household expenditure USD 132.00 USD 217.00 USD 45.00 USD 221.00 USD 22.00 
8 
Percentage of adult females 53.00% 52.00% 54.00% 51.00% 55.00% 
9 
Average household size 5.25 5.30 5.20 5.70 4.74 
10 
Percentage of adults in household 57.00% 59.00% 54.00% 57.00% 56.00% 
11 
Average age of household head 41.00 40.00 43.00 40.00 42.00 
12 
Average age of adults in household 34.00 33.00 36.00 33.00 36.00 
13 
Average age of children in household 8.55 8.90 8.20 9.00 8.00 
14 
Average years of schooling for household head 8.53 10.00 7.00 11.00 6.80 
15 
Average schooling years for most educated household member 9.53 11.00 8.00 11.00 7.40 
16 
Average number of employed people in household 1.50 1.40 1.60 1.50 1.50 
17 
Percentage of household heads with wage(regular) income 31.00% 50.00% 11.00% 53.00% 8.34% 
18 
Percentage of small-scale agriculture households  37.00% N/A 75.00% 11.00% 62.00% 
19 
Percentage of medium-scale agricultural households 5.14% N/A 11.00% 4.00% 6.00% 
20 
Percentage of large-scale agricultural households  0.20% N/A 0.42% 0.32% 0.09% 
21 
Percentage of fish farming households 7.00% N/A 14.00% 3.00% 11.00% 
22 
Percentage of non-Agriculture households 34.00% 67.00% N/A 51.00% 18.00% 
23 
Percentage of low-cost households 10.00% 19.00% N/A 17.00% 2.00% 
24 
Percentage of medium cost households 7.00% 14.00% N/A 13.00% 1.00% 
Line Average Budget Share of Non-Tobacco Expenditure Full Sample Urban Rural Top 50% Bot. 50%  
25 
Food  48.00% 47.00% 50.00% 45.00% 56.00% 
25 
Alcohol  2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 
27 
Health  1.05% 0.80% 1.31% 0.80% 1.25% 
28 
School  5.72% 6.14% 5.29% 7.12% 4.32% 
29 
Clothing  9.20% 6.17% 12.37% 6.65% 11.76% 
30 
Housing  3.00% 5.70% 0.20% 5.42% 0.60% 
31 
Water  0.98% 1.79% 0.14% 1.60% 0.40% 
32 
Electricity 1.32% 2.40% 0.20% 2.48% 0.10% 
33 
Alternative Energy  4.36% 4.17% 4.55% 3.27% 5.45% 
34 
Daily Transport  1.80% 2.75% 0.8% 3.30% 0.30% 
35 
Other Transport  1.95% 1.99% 1.90% 2.78% 1.10% 
36 
Equipment Maintenance  0.71% 0.4% 1.03% 0.60% 0.80% 
37 
Entertainment  0.56% 0.90% 0.20% 0.90% 0.08% 
38 
Telephone  2.17% 3.57% 0.70% 4.08% 0.20% 
39 
Remittance  0.70% 0.90% 0.50% 1.10% 0.30% 
40 
House Care  0.88% 1.43% 0.30% 1.56% 0.20% 
41 
Personal Care  10.92% 9.81% 12.08% 9.81% 12.03% 
42 
Households per cluster 19 25 15 11 19 
43 
Number of clusters 988 383 605 838 987 
                                                          
16 Zambian Kwacha converted to United States Dollar using the end-of-year exchange rate in 2006 obtained from 




      
 
2.6. Empirical results 
I present the results of my empirical analysis in two parts: part one conducts difference of means tests 
for expenditure shares between smoking and non-smoking households.  In the second part, I present 
the results of the econometric implementation of equation (2.1).  
 
2.6.1.  Differences in expenditure shares between smoking and non-smoking households 
Table 2.2 contains my motivation for investigating whether the decision to spend on tobacco 
influences households’ spending decisions. The table reports differences in expenditure shares 
between smoking and non-smoking households expressed as percentage points. A positive 
percentage point difference implies that smoking households on average allocate a greater share to 
that category than non-smoking households. While a negative percentage point difference implies 
that smoking households allocate a smaller share. The actual expenditure shares from which the 
differences are calculated are reported in Appendix A as Table A1. In the sequel, I present the results 
for the full, urban, rural, upper and lower income samples. I, however, limit the discussion of the 
results to the latter four samples to make it easier to follow.  
 
Table 2.2 shows that there are statistically significant differences in expenditure allocations between 
smoking and non-smoking households. Food constitutes the biggest expenditure item for the two 
types of households. The table shows that on average, non-smoking households allocate a greater 
share of expenditure towards food than smoking households with the differences being statistically 
significant. Upper income households17 are the exception: the difference between the two types of 
households is not statistically different from zero. Differences between the two types of households 
are largest for rural and poorer households; non-smoking households allocate between 5 and 7 
percentage points more to food than smoking households. This pattern combined with the geographic 
nature of poverty noted in Table 2.1 is suggestive of binding constraints faced by poorer households 
in Zambia.  
                                                          
17 In the rest of this chapter, I refer to the top 50% of households in terms of household expenditure as upper 
income households and the bottom 50% as lower income households.  
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Non-smoking households allocate, on average, 2 percentage points more to schooling than smoking 
households in all four sample types. The data on Telephone expenses and expenditure on personal 
care shows that non-smoking households allocate significantly more towards those expenditure 
categories than smoking households.  
 
The other expenditure categories exhibit a mixed pattern. For instance, for urban and upper income 
samples, non-smoking households allocate more towards housing than smoking households. The 
differences are not significant for rural and lower income households. This is not a surprising finding 
as rural and lower income households are unlikely to pay explicit rentals as they mostly reside in their 
own houses. For clothing, non-smoking households in the rural and lower income samples allocate 
more expenditure towards this item. The difference, though, for lower income households is only 
significant at 10%. When it comes to electricity, urban and upper income non-smoking households 
allocate a bigger share than smoking households. Lower income and rural households with at least 
one smoker, on the other hand, allocate more towards alternative energy sources (kerosene and 
firewood) which are cheaper than electricity. It appears as though these households are trading-off 
an expensive energy source for a cheaper one given that tobacco is an additional expenditure item for 
them.  
 
Non-smoking households allocate significantly more of their monthly budget towards water than 
smoking households. This is true in all data specifications except rural areas. This is not surprising given 
that rural households are more likely than not to obtain their water “free of charge” from streams and 
water wells. Water is, therefore, not an explicit expenditure item in rural areas. The data on house 
care shows statistically significant differences in favour of non-smoking households for urban and 
upper income households were spending on home improvements is likely to be important.  
 
On the other hand, smoking households spend significantly more on alcohol than non-smoking 
households. In all four samples, smoking households allocate between 5 and 7 percentage points more 
towards alcohol than non-smoking households. Smoking households allocate more of their monthly 
expenditure towards entertainment in all four samples. The differences, however, are only 
statistically significant for rural households and lower income households. There are no statistically 




In summary, the information in Table 2.2 shows that there are differences in the way that smoking 
and non-smoking households allocate their monthly expenditure for most of the items. In the rest of 
the chapter, I interrogate whether the patterns in Table 2.2 can be given a causal interpretation.  
 
Table 2.2: Differences in expenditure shares between smoking and non-smoking households 
Share on: Full Sample  Urban Rural Top 50% Bottom 50% 
Food -3.46***  -1.97*** -5.99*** -0.40 -7.62*** 
Alcohol 5.99***  5.19*** 6.64*** 5.10*** 6.68*** 
Health 0.04  0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0.04 
School -2.15***  -2.30*** -1.88*** -2.19*** -1.69*** 
Clothing 0.07  -0.02 -1.29*** 0.02 -0.72* 
Housing -1.43***  -1.70*** 0.00 -2.35*** 0.02 
Water -0.49***  -0.59*** -0.05 -0.69*** -0.14** 
Electricity -0.81***  -1.15*** -0.07 -1.26*** -0.10* 
Alternative Energy 0.14  0.49** -0.18 0.46*** -0.46* 
Daily Transport -0.54***  -0.32 -0.24 -0.43 -0.14 
Other Transport 0.03  0.21 -0.08 0.36 0.05 
Equipment Maintenance 0.16**  0.11 0.05 0.19* 0.10 
Entertainment 0.03  0.12 0.12** 0.04 0.15*** 
Telephone -0.82***  -0.66*** -0.27*** -0.91*** -0.13** 
Remittances -0.15**  -0.09 -0.13 -0.13 -0.04 
House Care -0.25***  -0.31*** 0.05 -0.35*** 0.05 
Personal Care -1.05***  -1.37*** -1.36*** -1.22*** -1.29*** 
Other  0.20**  0.50*** -0.07 0.48*** -0.11 
       
Notes: The numbers reported in the table are differences in mean expenditure shares between smoking and non-smoking 
households expressed as percentage points. A positive percentage point difference implies that smoking households report 
a higher expenditure share than non-smoking households. The actual shares from which the differences in the table are 
calculated are reported in Appendix A as Table A1. *, **, *** implies that the percentage point difference is statistically 











2.6.2.  Econometric results 
This section investigates whether the differences discussed in Section 2.6.1 can be given a causal 
interpretation. That is, are the expenditure share differences between smoking and non-smoking 
households caused by a household allocating some of its expenditure towards tobacco?  
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)  
It is possible that the expenditure share patterns observed in Table 2.2 are the result of confounding 
variables. That is, there might be some characteristics of the household, other than tobacco smoking 
status, such as household structure or the household’s socio-economic status that influences the 
results in Table 2.2. I can control for possible observable confounders by using OLS to regress 
expenditure shares on the household’s smoking status and a number of control variables representing 
household structure and measures of a household’s socio-economic status. In essence, this involves 
estimating equation (2.1) by OLS. I report the results of such an exercise in Table 2.3. (The table only 
reports the results of the coefficient on 𝑑 in equation (2.1). The full set of results for the OLS estimation 
are contained in Tables A2 to A6 in Appendix A).  
 
In Table 2.3, a negative coefficient on 𝑑 implies that smoking households allocate less expenditure to 
the category in question when compared with non-smoking households after controlling for 
observables. The table largely reproduces the results in Table 2.2 at least in a qualitative sense. Food 
is given a smaller expenditure allocation by smoking households in all data specifications excluding 
upper income households (although the difference for urban households is only statistically significant 
at 10%). Even though the expenditure differences are now smaller in absolute terms, expenditure 
differences for food between smoking and non-smoking households are still largest for low income 
and rural households, a pattern noted in Table 2.2. Similarly, the coefficient on the schooling variable 
is negative in all specifications. Smoking households allocate, on average, between 1 and 2 percentage 
points less towards schooling than non-smoking households. The findings with regards to housing and 
water are similar to those in Table 2.2: smoking households in urban and upper income samples 
allocate a smaller share to the two expenditure categories than non-smoking households. The findings 
on electricity and personal care are also largely reproduced: smoking households allocate a smaller 




Table 2.3: Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for the coefficient on d 
Coefficient 
on d in: 














  (0.479) (0.638) (0.708) (0.608) (0.742) 
Alcohol 5.817*** 4.841*** 6.496*** 5.026*** 6.499*** 
  (0.163) (0.219) (0.242) (0.211) (0.251) 
Health -0.058 -0.021 -0.080 -0.128 -0.001 
  (0.010) (0.121) (0.157) (0.106) (0.172) 
School -1.698*** -1.374*** -1.980*** -1.391*** -1.898*** 
  (0.259) (0.374) (0.364) (0.389) (0.343) 
Clothing -0.177 0.205 -0.496 -0.271 -0.124 
  (0.254) (0.274) (0.415) (0.269) (0.435) 
Housing -0.683*** -1.583*** -0.062 -1.538*** 0.107 
  (0.208) (0.431) (0.065) (0.388) (0.122) 
Water -0.181** -0.352** -0.042 -0.365*** 0.030 
  (0.078) (0.162) (0.033) (0.137) (0.072) 
Electricity -0.329*** -0.673*** -0.039 -0.496*** -0.040 
  (0.104) (0.206) (0.071) (0.191) (0.071) 
Alt. Energy 0.125 0.203 0.064 -0.006 0.063 
  (0.163) (0.224) (0.235) (0.185) (0.268) 
Daily Tport -0.133 -0.143 -0.175 -0.235 -0.172* 
  (0.175) (0.306) (0.190) (0.326) (0.104) 
Other Tport 0.065 0.492** -0.206 0.293 -0.129 
  (0.187) (0.244) (0.280) (0.300) (0.219) 
Equipment  0.069 0.171* -0.023 0.163 -0.055 
  (0.082) (0.102) (0.127) (0.123) (0.109) 
Entertain. 0.107 0.104 0.075 0.105 0.060 
  (0.080) (0.160) (0.051) (0.152) (0.039) 
Telephone -0.144 0.015 -0.233* 0.004 -0.141* 
  (0.136) (0.253) (0.127) (0.253) (0.086) 
Remittance -0.081 0.021 -0.153 -0.050 -0.109 
  (0.076) (0.114) (0.102) (0.127) (0.080) 
House Care 0.004 -0.135 0.098 -0.106 0.119** 
  (0.065) (0.122) (0.060) (0.120) (0.048) 
Personal  -0.807*** -1.032*** -0.617 -0.866*** -0.718* 
  (0.264) (0.339) (0.402) (0.312) (0.431) 
Sample 
size 
13,679 7,275 6,404 7,501 6,178 
 
Notes: The results shown above are only for the coefficient on 𝑑 in equation (2.1). The full set of OLS results are contained 
in tables A2 to A6 in Appendix A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** implies that the coefficient on 𝑑 is 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. Tport is an abbreviation for transport. Alt is an 









The coefficients on 𝑑 in the alcohol equation in Table 2.3 also show the same pattern as in Table 2.2, 
namely smoking households allocate a larger expenditure share to alcohol than non-smoking 
households even after controlling for other observable variables that might confound the analysis. 
The magnitudes of the expenditure differences for alcohol are similar to those in Table 2.2. 
 
For most of the remaining expenditure categories, the patterns in Table 2.2 do not hold out after 
controlling for observable confounders. For instance, whereas Table 2.2 shows statistically significant 
differences in the allocation of expenditure shares for telephone expenses in all 4 samples, Table 2.3 
shows that the differences are only statistically significant in 2 subsamples (rural and low income 
households) and only at the 10% level.  
 
Three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
As highlighted in Section 2.4, it is likely that 𝑑 in equation (2.1) is endogenous. For example, a 
household might only decide to spend on tobacco after other household expenses have been made. 
Alternatively, some other variable, not explicitly specified in equation (2.1) and therefore contained 
in the error term, might simultaneously influence a household’s decision to spend on tobacco and the 
decision to spend on other commodities. The OLS procedure in the previous section assumes that 𝑑 is 
exogenous, i.e. 𝑑 and the error term are not correlated. Further, ln𝑀 and (ln𝑀)2 are also likely to be 
endogenous in a similar manner. In Table A14 in Appendix A, I report the chi-square statistics 
associated with a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity. The null hypothesis that the three 
variables are exogenous is rejected for most of the expenditure categories. Previous work (Vermeulen, 
2003; John, 2008b; Pu et al., 2008) has also shown that the decision to spend on tobacco and, as a 
consequence, the residual expenditure ln𝑀 [and (ln𝑀)2 ] are endogenous.  
 
This section, therefore, uses the method of instrumental variables to account for the endogeneity of 
𝑑, ln𝑀 and (ln𝑀)2 in equation (2.1). The method proceeds in a series of steps: In the first step, I 
estimate the first-stage (or reduced form) regressions involving the endogenous variables and the 
candidate instruments. Recall that I use the adult sex ratio as an instrument for 𝑑 and the logarithm 
of the value of assets within a household and its square as instruments for ln𝑀 and (ln𝑀)2 
respectively. In the second stage, the predicted values from the first stage regression are substituted 
for the endogenous variables in an OLS estimation of equation (2.1). 
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The first-stage probit results for the regression of 𝑑 on the adult sex ratio (the instrumental variable) 
alongside the other covariates for all four samples are reported in Table A7 in Appendix A. In all the 
five samples, the instrumental variable is a strong predictor of whether a household reports spending 
on tobacco or not after controlling for other variables. The F statistics associated with the coefficient 
on this variable are equal to 78, 50, 27, 26 and 44 in the full, urban, rural, upper and lower income 
samples respectively. These F statistics satisfy the standard rule of thumb that an instrument be 
considered “strong” if its associated F statistic is equal to or greater than 10 (Stock, et al., 2002). Tables 
A8 and A9 in Appendix A repeat this exercise for ln𝑀 and (ln𝑀)2 using the logarithm of household 
assets and its square, respectively, as instruments. I find that the two instruments explain a substantial 
proportion of the variation in ln𝑀 and (ln𝑀)2 . The F statistics associated with the coefficient on the 
instrumental variable for 𝑙𝑛𝑀 (the logarithm of the value of household assets) are equal to 3364, 1971, 
1127, 1444 and 560 in the full, urban, rural, upper and lower income samples respectively. For (ln𝑀)2, 


















Table 2.4: Three stage least squares (3LS) estimates for the coefficient on d 
Coefficient 
on d in: 














  (1.634) (2.543) (2.250) (2.504) (2.234) 
Alcohol 9.696*** 8.656*** 10.060*** 8.672*** 8.989*** 
  (0.668) (1.019) (0.928) (1.068) (0.956) 
Health 0.012 0.267 -0.064 0.769* -0.113 
  (0.337) (0.434) (0.507) (0.447) (0.505) 
School -1.975** -2.925* -1.662 -0.735 -2.096** 
  (0.863) (1.523) (1.084) (1.608) (0.935) 
Clothing -2.665*** -2.751** -2.836** 0.661 -3.174** 
  (0.890) (1.194) (1.328) (1.143) (1.411) 
Housing -0.366 -1.829 0.134 -2.760* 0.571** 
  (0.675) (1.666) (0.177) (1.611) (0.269) 
Water -0.795*** -2.228*** -0.119 -2.187*** -0.095 
  (0.273) (0.679) (0.111) (0.600) (0.209) 
Electricity -0.479 -2.164*** 0.132 -1.684* 0.114 
  (0.341) (0.813) (0.221) (0.874) (0.083) 
Alt. Energy 1.788*** 1.251 2.205*** -3.045*** 2.204*** 
  (0.554) (0.943) (0.733) (0.843) (0.774) 
Daily Tport 0.177 0.256 0.305 0.388 -0.325 
  (0.586) (1.264) (0.563) (1.363) (0.227) 
Other Tport -0.661 -0.249 -0.761 0.191 1.504** 
  (0.652) (1.032) (0.884) (1.269) (0.635) 
Equipt. 0.405 1.038** 0.195 1.949*** -1.136*** 
  (0.294) (0.449) (0.423) (0.520) (0.373) 
Entertain. 0.398 0.817 0.220 0.451 0.174 
  (0.260) (0.620) (0.157) (0.636) (0.134) 
Telephone 0.687 2.099* 0.061 3.861*** -0.218 
  (0.487) (1.111) (0.410) (1.199) (0.338) 
Remittance 0.627** 1.490*** 0.279 2.050*** 0.196 
  (0.261) (0.497) (0.303) (0.573) (0.226) 
House Care 0.213 -0.417 0.390** -1.114** 0.464*** 
  (0.222) (0.492) (0.192) (0.522) (0.155) 
Personal  -1.566* -1.788 -1.116 -3.148** -0.518 
  (0.872) (1.310) (1.227) (1.246) (1.318) 
Sample 
size  
8,555 4,545 4,010 4,092 3,212 
Notes: The results shown above are only for the coefficient on 𝑑 in equation (2.1). The full set of 3LS results are contained in 
tables A10 to A13 Appendix A. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** signifies that the coefficient on 𝑑 is 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Tport is an abbreviation for transport. Alt is an abbreviation 









Table 2.4 presents the results of the three-stage least squares (3SLS) implementation of equation (2.1). 
The table only reports estimates of the coefficient on 𝑑 (the full set of the 3LS results are reported in 
tables A9 to A12 in Appendix A). A negative coefficient on 𝑑 implies that smoking households allocate 
a smaller percentage of household expenditure to that particular category after accounting for 
observable confounders and the possible endogeneity of 𝑑, ln𝑀 and (ln𝑀)2. 
 
The 3SLS procedure confirms the OLS estimates for food, namely that smoking households spend a 
smaller proportion of their expenditure on this expenditure category. The results are significant for 
rural and lower income samples at 1% and marginally so for upper income households (at 10%) but 
not for urban households. The 3SLS estimates for food are generally larger in absolute terms implying 
that OLS underestimates the difference in expenditure allocations for food between the two types of 
households.  
 
The 3SLS estimates in the schooling equation are in general larger than the OLS estimates. For urban 
and lower income samples, smoking households allocate significantly less expenditure to schooling 
than non-smoking households. For urban households, the difference is only statistically significant at 
the 10% level. In the OLS regression, the differences in expenditure allocation between the two types 
of households were statistically significant in all four samples. For water, the qualitative pattern of the 
coefficient estimates in Table 2.4 is similar to that in Table 2.3, namely that smoking households 
allocate less expenditure than non-smoking households. Further, the 3SLS estimates are larger in 
absolute terms. 
 
The 3SLS coefficient estimates for clothing, housing and alternative energy tell a different story to the 
OLS estimates presented in Table 2.3. In Table 2.3, the expenditure allocations to clothing were not 
significantly different between smoking and non-smoking households. In Table 2.4, the 3SLS estimates 
show that non-smoking households allocate significantly more expenditure to clothing. Among upper 
income households, share allocations between smoking and non-smoking households for clothing are 
not statistically significant. For housing, significant differences in expenditure allocations are only 
observed for upper income and lower income households using the 3SLS procedure: for upper income 
households, non-smoking households allocate significantly more and the reverse is true for lower 
income households. With alternative energy, significant differences in expenditure allocations exist 
for three of the four samples. For rural and lower income samples, smoking households allocate more 
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to alternative energy than non-smoking households whereas the reverse is true for richer households. 
This again suggests some sort of substitution where lower income smokers substitute cheaper energy 
sources for more expensive energy sources. A pattern noted in Table 2.2.    
 
The qualitative patterns with alcohol in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are reproduced in Table 2.4. Smoking 
households allocate more of their expenditure towards alcohol than non-smoking households. The 
3SLS estimates are bigger than the OLS estimates. Other categories that result in smoking households 
allocating a larger share of their expenditure are telephone and remittances. For the two categories, 
the 3SLS estimates are, in almost all cases, the direct opposite of the OLS estimates. For urban and 
upper income households, smoking households allocate a significantly larger share of expenditure 
towards the two categories than non-smoking households.  
 
The discussion of the results given above holds even when the OLS sample is restricted to the sample 
used under the 3SLS procedure (see Table A16 in Appendix A). 
 
2.7. Relaxing the exclusion restriction 
The previous sub-section utilised the method of instrumental variables (IV) to identify the causal 
impact of a household’s tobacco smoking status on its expenditure decisions. One important 
requirement underpinning the IV procedure is that the instrumental variable should not be correlated 
with the error term in equation (2.1).18 In other words, the instrument should only influence the 
outcome through its influence on the endogenous variable. Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether this requirement, referred to as the exclusion restriction in the IV literature, holds especially 
in the just-identified case such as I have in this chapter.19 In the just-identified case, the researcher 
                                                          
18 Another requirement is that the instrumental variable be relevant (or informative). That is, the instrumental 
variable should explain a substantial proportion of the variation in the endogenous regressor. I believe that the 
instrumental variables in this chapter satisfy this requirement based on the results in tables A6 to A8 in Appendix 
A and in the discussion in the previous section.   
19 In the just-identified case, the number of instruments is equal to the number of endogenous variables. In the 
alternative case where the number of instruments is greater than the number of endogenous variables, one can 




needs to motivate that the exclusion restriction holds. Whereas I am confident that the total value of 
household assets, the instrument for the residual expenditure, satisfies the exclusion restriction, I am 
less so about the adult sex ratio. As highlighted in Section 2.4, demand equations are rarely specified, 
if ever, with the logarithm of household assets as an explanatory variable. In other words, the 
logarithm of household assets is often excluded from demand equations.  
 
In the same way the sex ratio influences expenditure on tobacco, it might also influence expenditure 
on other goods and services within the household. It is known that women have a preference for 
spending on welfare enhancing goods and services like food, schooling and healthcare (Senauer et al., 
1988; Deaton, et al., 1989; Thomas, 1990, 1994; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Lundberg et al., 1997; 
Duflo, 2003; Gitter and Barham, 2008; Doss, 2013). A preponderance of women over men might, 
therefore, tilt household expenditure towards these goods and services. Deaton (1997) goes over 
much of the empirical and theoretical literature that explains and documents the existence of gender 
biases in the allocation of resources within the household. Excluding the adult sex ratio from structural 
demand equations might, therefore, result in biased coefficient estimates.  
 
This section of the chapter uses the method introduced by Nevo and Rosen (2012) to test the 
robustness of my 3SLS estimates by allowing the adult sex ratio to be correlated with the error term. 
In other words, Nevo and Rosen’s method allows for the instrumental variable to be imperfect and 
thus imposes a less restrictive assumption than the standard IV approach.  
 
The method in Nevo and Rosen (2012) relies on two assumptions. The first assumption is that the 
direction of the correlation between the imperfect instrumental variable and the error term should 
be the same as that between the error term and the endogenous variable.20 I am confident that this 
assumption holds because my instrumental variable is positively correlated with the endogenous 
variable (see the results in Table A6 in Appendix A). Therefore, the direction of correlation with the 
error term must be the same for the two variables. In other words, if the instrumental variable and 
the endogenous regressor are positively correlated, as they are in this chapter, and if, say, the 
endogenous regressor is positively correlated with the error term, then the instrumental variable must 
                                                          
20 Formally, letting 𝑍 denote the imperfect instrumental variable, this assumption can be represented as: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑍, 𝑢) 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑢)  ≥ 0 (i.e. the product of the two correlations should be positive).   
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also be positively correlated with the error term. The second assumption requires that the magnitude 
of the correlation between the error term and the endogenous variable should, in absolute terms, be 
greater than the magnitude of the correlation between the imperfect instrument and the error term.21 
In other words, this assumption requires the imperfect instrumental variable to be “less endogenous” 
than the endogenous regressor.  This assumption likely holds for the following reasons:  One of the 
variables that I suspect to be in the error term is the rate of time preference as measured by the 
discount rate. Field and laboratory experiments show that smokers have higher discount rates than 
non-smokers (Chabris et al., 2008; Harrison et al., 2010). In addition, there is evidence that the 
discount rate influences expenditure decisions on some of the goods and services on the left-hand 
side (Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer, 2003; Chabris et al., 2008). On the other hand, there appears to be 
no significant differences in discount rates between men and women (Harrison et al., 2002; Harrison 
et al., 2005; Andersen, et al., 2010). To the extent that one can define a household-level discount rate, 
consistent with my assumption of a unitary model of household decision making, then the foregoing 
suggests that the correlation between 𝑑 and 𝑢 is likely to be at least greater than the correlation 
between the adult sex ratio and 𝑢. One possible challenge to this assumption is that not all goods and 
services on the left-hand side are influenced by the discount rate. For instance, how might the discount 
rate, ceteris paribus, influence a household’s expenditure on water? Whereas there might be some 
goods and services where the relationship is not obvious, I believe that the discount rate is important 
in most of the goods and services that I study (at least those that are generally considered important 
such as food and schooling) to give credence to this assumption.  
 
Nevo and Rosen (2012) propose a synthetic instrumental variable, 𝑉, formally defined as 𝑉 (𝜆) =
 𝜎𝑑  𝑍 −  𝜆𝜎𝑧𝑑, where 𝑍 is the imperfect instrument and 𝑑 is the endogenous regressor; 𝜎𝑑 and 𝜎𝑧 are 
respectively the standard deviations of 𝑑 and 𝑍; and 𝜆 is some parameter defined as the ratio of the 
correlation between 𝑍 and 𝑢 to the correlation between 𝑑 and 𝑢.22 For 𝜆∗, 𝑉(𝜆∗) satisfies the exclusion 
restriction allowing us to consistently identify the causal impact of 𝑑 on households’ spending 
decisions. I do not, however, observe 𝜆∗ but given the assumptions above, I know that it must lie in 
                                                          
21 Formally, and using the notation in footnote 20, this assumption requires: | 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑢) |  ≥ | 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑍, 𝑢)|.  






the [0,1] interval.23 By varying 𝜆 in the [0,1] interval, I can construct bounds within which the true 
causal impact lies given the presence of endogeneity and an imperfect instrumental variable.24  
 
Nevo and Rosen further show that one can only compute one-sided bounds if the empirical 
relationship (correlation) between the imperfect instrumental variable and endogenous regressor is 
positive such as I have here (this relationship/correlation is positive given the results in Table A6  in 
Appendix A) . Otherwise one can obtain two-sided bounds. The choice of bound (whether it is the 
causal impact associated with 𝑍 or with 𝑉) and whether the bound is an upper or lower bound 
depends on the assumptions made about the direction of correlation between the error term and the 
endogenous regressor25 (I motivate below why I think this correlation is positive). The method of 
constructing bounds in this way has been used to shed light on empirical debates around the causal 
impact of teen pregnancy on school completion rates (Reinhold and Woutersen, 2011) and on whether 
there is a causal relationship between financial hardship and obesity (Averett and Smith, 2014). 
Kortelainen and Saarimaa (2015) have also employed the method in studying whether increasing 
homeownership rates benefits urban neighbourhoods. Recently, Aragon and Rud (2015) have used 
the method to study the relationship between industrial pollution and agricultural productivity in 
Ghana.  
 
As stated in the previous paragraph, whether the bound is a lower or upper bound depends on the 
assumption made about the correlation between 𝑑 and the error term, 𝑢. I assume that this 
correlation is positive in all equations in my demand system. This assumption follows quite naturally 
from the discussion above on the experimental evidence on the relationship between smoking and 
the rate of time preference (the discount rate). This assumption implies upper-bound estimates for 
the causal impact of 𝑑 on households’ spending decisions and by consequence a lower bound of -∞  
(see footnote 23). Table 2.5, therefore, reports upper bound estimates for the causal impact of 𝑑 in 
                                                          
23 Since 𝜆 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑍,𝑢)
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑑,𝑢)
 , then for 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑍, 𝑢) = 0, 𝜆 = 0. For 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑍, 𝑢) = 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑑, 𝑢), 𝜆 = 1.   
24 To see this, note that if 𝜆 = 0, 𝑉 is equal to the imperfect instrument 𝑍 multiplied by a scalar. Whereas if 𝜆 =
1, 𝑉 =  𝜎𝑑  𝑍 − 𝜎𝑧𝑑. The fact that 𝑉 varies in this way results in the construction of a set within which the true 
causal impact must lie.  
25 Formally, proposition 2 in Nevo and Rosen (2012) states: if 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑢) < 0, then 𝛽 ≥ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝛽𝑍, 𝛽𝑉} and if 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑑, 𝑢) > 0, then 𝛽 ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝛽𝑍, 𝛽𝑉}. 𝛽 is the true effect, 𝛽𝑍 is the coefficient associated with the 
imperfect instrument and 𝛽𝑉 is the coefficient associated with the synthetic instrument evaluated at 𝜆 = 1.       
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all the four data specifications that I consider. For the purposes of making inference, bounds that do 
not overlap zero imply that the underlying causal effect is statistically significant. 26 Such bounds are 
in bold in Table 2.5. 
 
After relaxing the exclusion restriction, I end up with the finding that in no expenditure category do 
tobacco smoking households allocate a greater share of total household expenditure. This is also true 
for alcohol which in Tables 2.2 to 2.4 showed a strong positive association with the tobacco smoking 
status of a household. This association is more likely a correlation than a causal one.  
 
By and large, most of the qualitative findings in Table 2.4 hold up with some differences. For instance, 
smoking households allocate a smaller share of expenditure to food in only rural and lower income 
households. This is suggestive of the fact that budget constraints are more likely to be binding for low 
income households given the geographic nature of poverty documented in Table 2.1. With regards to 
schooling, in only upper income and lower income samples do smoking households allocate a smaller 
and statistically significant share. As for clothing, the results are in line with those in Table 2.4, namely 
smoking households significantly allocate less expenditure in all samples except for upper income 
households. The qualitative results for water are also reproduced: smoking households allocate a 
smaller share to water for urban and upper income samples. The result with regards to water is 
confirmation of the pattern noted in Section 2.6.1, namely that water is likely obtained “free of 
charge” for households residing in rural and poorer parts of the country. In this way, water is not 
purchased formally in a market place and is, therefore, not susceptible to being crowded out or 
crowded in for these types of households.   
  
For electricity and alternative energy, the differences are only statistically significant in one of the data 
subsamples: urban households where electricity is crowded out for smoking households and upper 
income households where alternative energy is crowded out. In either case, the differences were 
statistically significant in more than one subsample with the 3SLS procedure.  
                                                          
26 Technically, the upper bounds in Table 2.5 are the bootstrapped upper bounds of a 95% confidence interval 
around either 𝛽𝑍 or 𝛽𝑉. This is a much more stringent approach to making inferences than just looking at 𝛽𝑍 or 
𝛽𝑉 [Reinhold and Woutersen (2011) and Kortelainen and Saarimaa (2015) use a similar procedure for making 
inferences].   
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Table 2.5: Estimates of bounds for the causal effect of d 
 
Notes: The table shows estimates of bounds for the causal effect of 𝑑 using the method in Nevo and Rosen (2012). Bounds 
in bold imply that the causal effect of 𝑑 is statistically significant since such bounds do not overlap zero.   
 
The findings that are entirely different to those in Table 2.4 are for daily transportation, equipment 
maintenance, entertainment and remittances. For daily transportation, smoking households allocate 
less expenditure than non-smoking households in only urban and upper income subsamples were this 
expenditure item is likely important. For the rest, the findings in Table 2.5 point in the opposite 
direction to those reported in Table 2.4, namely smoking households allocate significantly less 
expenditure. For equipment maintenance, this pattern is observed for rural andlower income 
samples; for entertainment it is in the urban and upper income households and for remittances it is 
for rural and upper income households. 
 
Category Full Sample Urban Rural Top 50% Bottom 50% 
Food (-∞, -1.958)  (-∞, 0.305) 
 
(-∞, -2.677) (-∞, 0.633) (-∞, -0.194) 
Alcohol (-∞,  5.389) 
 
 (-∞, 4.435) (-∞, 6.280) 
 
(-∞, 4.50) (-∞, 6.472) 




(-∞, 0.928) (-∞, -0.037) (-∞, 0.877) 
School (-∞, -0.284) (-∞, 0.060) (-∞, 0.462) (-∞, -0.010) (-∞, -0.263) 
Clothing (-∞, -0.920) 
 
 (-∞, -0.412) (-∞, -0.233) (-∞, 0.256) (-∞, -0.408) 
Housing (-∞,  0.958) 
 
(-∞, 1.437) (-∞, 0.263) (-∞, 0.398) (-∞, 0.444) 
Water (-∞, -0.261) 
 
(-∞, -0.898) (-∞, 0.098) (-∞, -1.010) (-∞, 0.314) 
Electricity (-∞ , 0.189) 
 
(-∞, -0.571 (-∞, 0.221) (-∞, 0.028) (-∞, 0.186) 

























(-∞, -0.255) (-∞, 0.145) (-∞, -0.405) 




(-∞, 0.185) (-∞, -0.022) (-∞, 0.124) 
Telephone (-∞,  0.070) 
 
 (-∞, 0.518) 
 
(-∞, 0.160) ( -∞, 0.584)  
 
(-∞, 0.443) 
Remittance (-∞, -0.092) 
 
 (-∞, 0.068) 
 
(-∞, -0.050) (-∞, -0.036) (-∞, 0.078) 
House Care (-∞,  0.303) 
 





(-∞, 0.780) (-∞, 1.290) (-∞, -0.707) (-∞, 2.066) 
Sample size                  8,555                        4,545 4,010 4,092 3,212 
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2.8. Summary and conclusion 
This chapter adds to the literature on the crowding out effect of tobacco expenditure in two ways. In 
the first instance I use data from a low income sub-Saharan African country, Zambia, where most of 
the households are poor. Secondly, in identifying the causal impact of tobacco expenditure, I use the 
method of instrumental variables, which is the standard method in the literature, but instead use less 
stringent assumptions on the behaviour of the instrument. My econometric analysis shows that 
tobacco expenditure negatively impacts household expenditure on food, schooling, clothing and 
water. Other expenditure categories that are negatively impacted include transportation, equipment 
repair, entertainment and remittances. My analysis shows that the patterns and the magnitudes of 
crowding out are in some instances related to the household’s geographical location and/or socio-
economic status. For instance, food is more likely to be displaced by tobacco in lower income 
households than upper income households. I, therefore, confirm many of the findings in the literature. 
On the other hand, I am unable to find instances where tobacco crowds in expenditure on alcohol. 
The econometric analysis in this chapter, supported by what I consider to be plausible assumptions on 
the instrumental variable, leads to the conclusion that the positive association between tobacco and 
alcohol is more likely to be a correlational one than a causal one.   
 
This chapter’s main limitation is that it uses cross-sectional data where, with an exhaustive list of 
controls, one can compare the expenditure profiles of two households that are identical in every 
respect except for tobacco smoking status. Unfortunately, there are unmeasurable sources of 
heterogeneity between the two types of households that cannot be accounted for making it difficult 
to draw definitive causal statements. Panel datasets are ideal in the sense that they allow for one to 
compare the expenditure profile of the same household at different points in time and in this way 
control for fixed unobserved heterogeneity. Unfortunately, Zambia does not as yet collect panel data. 
In any case, using instrumental variables, along with less stringent assumptions, can substitute for 
some advantages of panel data.   
 
The work in this chapter shows that a broader accounting of tobacco’s consumption costs in Zambia 
should, for example, include the costs associated with under nutrition and under investment in 
education and in equipment maintenance by households. As pointed out by Wang et al. (2006), Block 
and Webb (2009) and John et al. (2012), under nutrition, which can affect the cognitive development 
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of children, under investment in education and underinvestment in the maintenance of income-
generating equipment are likely to trap households in a cycle of poverty.
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APPENDIX A   
Table A 1: Mean expenditure shares in percentages between smoking and non-smoking 
households 
Share on: Full Sample Urban Rural Top 50% Bottom 50% 
Food (50.67, 47.21) (47.29, 45.32) (54.41, 48.42) (44.56, 44.13) (57.05, 49.43) 
Alcohol (1.35, 7.34) (1.43, 6.61) (1.26, 7.80) (1.52, 6.62) (1.17, 7.86) 
Health (1.03, 1.08) (0.78, 0.82) (1.32, 1.24) (0.83,0.79) (1.24, 1.29) 
School (5.93, 3.78) (6.30, 4.00) (5.51, 3.63) (7.29, 5.10) (4.51, 2.83) 
Clothing (9.19, 9.26) (6.17, 6.15) (12.52, 11.22) (6.65, 6.67) (11.84, 11.12) 
Housing (3.15, 1.72) (5.83, 4.12) (0.20, 0.20) (5.60, 3.25) (0.60, 0.62) 
Water (1.03, 0.54) (1.83, 1.25) (0.14, 0.10) (1.66, 0.97) (0.38, 0.24) 
Electricity (1.38, 0.57) (2.49, 1.34) (0.16, 0.08) (2.59, 1.32) (0.13, 0.03) 
Alternative (4.34, 4.48) (4.14, 4.62) (4.57, 4.39) (3.24, 3.70) (5.50, 5.04) 
Daily Transport (1.84, 1.30) (2.77, 2.46) (0.81, 0.57) (3.33, 2.90) (2.85, 0.15) 
Other Transport (1.95, 1.97) (1.97, 2.18) (1.91, 1.84) (2.76, 3.12) (1.10, 1.15) 
Equipt Maintenance (0.71, 0.86) (0.42, 0.53) (1.02, 1.07) (0.61, 0.80) (0.81, 0.91) 
Entertainment (0.50, 0.53) (0.84, 0.97) (0.13, 0.26) (0.93, 0.97) (0.06, 0.21) 
Telephone (2.23, 1.41) (3.62, 2.96) (0.70, 0.43) (4.15, 3.24) (0.23, 0.10) 
Remittance (0.71, 0.56) (0.86, 0.77) (0.55, 0.42) (1.11, 0.97) (0.30, 0.26) 
House Care (0.89, 0.64) (1.45, 1.14) (0.27, 0.33) (1.58, 1.24) (0.17, 0.21) 
Personal Care (11.02, 9.97) (9.91, 8.54) (12.24, 10.87) (9.91, 8.69) (12.17, 10.88) 
Other  (2.07, 2.27) (1.89, 2.40) (2.26, 2.19) (1.70, 2.18) (2.45, 2.34) 
 
Notes: The pairs in each cell refer to the mean expenditure shares in percentages reported by smoking and non-smoking 
households. In each pair, the mean expenditure share for non-smoking households is reported first followed by that of the 















  Table A 2: Ordinary Least Squares results, Full Sample 
Variable Food Alc Health Sch Clothing Housing Water Electricity Alt. Energ Daily Tprt Other Tprt Equpt Ent Tele Remit Hse Care Pers. Cre
d -2.100*** 5.817*** -0.0577 -1.698*** -0.177 -0.683*** -0.181** -0.329*** 0.125 -0.133 0.0649 0.0685 0.107 -0.144 -0.0811 0.00449 -0.807***
(0.479) (0.163) (0.0999) (0.259) (0.254) (0.208) (0.0781) (0.104) (0.163) (0.175) (0.187) (0.0823) (0.0799) (0.136) (0.0756) (0.0653) (0.264)
LnM 45.20*** 0.614 -1.082*** -4.690*** -11.31*** -3.786*** 0.319 -0.546 4.565*** -17.07*** 1.639*** -2.767*** -4.557*** -4.033*** -1.356*** -2.384*** -1.027
(1.564) (0.533) (0.326) (0.847) (0.828) (0.679) (0.255) (0.341) (0.532) (0.572) (0.610) (0.269) (0.261) (0.445) (0.247) (0.213) (0.863)
LnM2 -2.000*** -0.00970 0.0431*** 0.212*** 0.391*** 0.196*** -0.0113 0.0334** -0.239*** 0.781*** -0.00983 0.123*** 0.204*** 0.213*** 0.0726*** 0.115*** -0.00760
(0.0631) (0.0215) (0.0132) (0.0342) (0.0334) (0.0274) (0.0103) (0.0138) (0.0215) (0.0231) (0.0246) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.0180) (0.00996) (0.00861) (0.0348)
Adult prop -1.082 0.900** 0.284 0.670 0.000281 -0.901* 0.606*** 0.970*** -0.442 0.558 -1.090** 0.388* -0.200 0.437 -0.781*** 0.120 -0.780
(1.222) (0.417) (0.255) (0.662) (0.648) (0.531) (0.199) (0.267) (0.416) (0.447) (0.477) (0.210) (0.204) (0.348) (0.193) (0.167) (0.674)
loghhsize -1.642*** -0.159 0.186* 3.715*** 1.146*** -1.997*** 0.0731 0.259** 0.100 -0.0840 -0.874*** 0.525*** -0.262*** -0.123 -0.365*** -0.302*** -0.260
(0.506) (0.173) (0.106) (0.274) (0.268) (0.220) (0.0826) (0.110) (0.172) (0.185) (0.198) (0.0870) (0.0844) (0.144) (0.0799) (0.0690) (0.279)
Head Sch -0.251 -0.219 -0.203* 0.855*** -0.00185 0.132 0.159** 0.322*** -0.292* -0.201 -0.246 0.143* -0.0465 0.278** -0.0629 0.0184 -0.357
(0.497) (0.169) (0.104) (0.269) (0.263) (0.216) (0.0811) (0.109) (0.169) (0.182) (0.194) (0.0855) (0.0830) (0.142) (0.0785) (0.0678) (0.274)
Head w age -0.792** 0.170 -0.246*** 0.225 -0.406** 1.834*** -0.145** 0.120 -0.480*** -0.887*** -0.603*** -0.513*** 0.0866 0.659*** 0.182*** 0.0790 1.068***
(0.355) (0.121) (0.0741) (0.192) (0.188) (0.154) (0.0579) (0.0775) (0.121) (0.130) (0.139) (0.0610) (0.0592) (0.101) (0.0560) (0.0484) (0.196)
Hhold Emp -0.00192 0.137** 0.0247 -0.875*** 0.246*** -0.0911 -0.0683** -0.184*** 0.0542 0.135** 0.0404 0.0330 0.0540* 0.0951* 0.116*** 0.0542** 0.170*
(0.172) (0.0587) (0.0359) (0.0932) (0.0912) (0.0748) (0.0281) (0.0376) (0.0586) (0.0630) (0.0672) (0.0296) (0.0287) (0.0490) (0.0272) (0.0235) (0.0949)
Adult Age 2.805** 0.719* 0.932*** -8.238*** 0.457 0.905* -0.120 -0.438 0.657 0.952** -0.0371 0.548** 0.283 0.459 0.0999 0.359** -0.587
(1.253) (0.427) (0.262) (0.679) (0.664) (0.544) (0.204) (0.273) (0.427) (0.458) (0.489) (0.215) (0.209) (0.357) (0.198) (0.171) (0.691)
Child age -0.493** -0.184** 0.00162 2.413*** -0.474*** -0.380*** 0.0336 0.193*** -0.288*** -0.0974 -0.123 -0.0359 -0.0125 0.0553 -0.0989*** 0.0359 -0.385***
(0.227) (0.0774) (0.0474) (0.123) (0.120) (0.0987) (0.0371) (0.0496) (0.0773) (0.0831) (0.0886) (0.0390) (0.0379) (0.0647) (0.0358) (0.0310) (0.125)
Head Age -2.294** -1.145*** -0.454* 10.08*** -2.683*** -2.175*** 0.641*** 0.888*** -0.182 -0.799* 0.651 -0.599*** -0.323* -0.823** -0.145 -0.253* -0.0499
(1.123) (0.383) (0.235) (0.609) (0.595) (0.488) (0.183) (0.245) (0.382) (0.411) (0.438) (0.193) (0.187) (0.320) (0.177) (0.153) (0.620)
Most Edu -2.080*** -0.207 -0.0995 0.463 0.639* -0.195 0.0938 0.453*** -0.271 -0.431* -0.127 -0.131 0.00717 0.505*** 0.312*** 0.181** 0.731**
(0.640) (0.218) (0.134) (0.347) (0.339) (0.278) (0.104) (0.140) (0.218) (0.234) (0.250) (0.110) (0.107) (0.182) (0.101) (0.0873) (0.353)
2.stratum -3.033*** -0.801*** 0.105 1.503*** 0.985*** 0.119 -0.233** -0.348** -0.139 1.236*** 0.0573 0.519*** -0.192* 0.214 0.143 0.129 -0.404
(0.642) (0.219) (0.134) (0.348) (0.340) (0.279) (0.105) (0.140) (0.218) (0.235) (0.250) (0.110) (0.107) (0.183) (0.101) (0.0875) (0.354)
3.stratum -3.471 -2.146** -0.394 0.384 -1.739 0.254 -0.434 -0.497 0.906 5.951*** -3.688*** 2.389*** -0.600 3.409*** 1.554*** 0.913** -2.859*
(2.861) (0.975) (0.597) (1.550) (1.515) (1.243) (0.467) (0.624) (0.974) (1.046) (1.116) (0.492) (0.477) (0.815) (0.452) (0.390) (1.578)
4.stratum 6.328*** -0.778*** 0.340** -0.901** -2.239*** -0.889*** 0.107 0.0499 0.245 0.0818 0.411 -0.562*** -0.120 -0.0261 -0.173* -0.00383 -1.655***
(0.655) (0.223) (0.137) (0.355) (0.347) (0.285) (0.107) (0.143) (0.223) (0.240) (0.256) (0.113) (0.109) (0.187) (0.103) (0.0893) (0.361)
5.stratum 1.121* 0.425** 0.180 -0.702** -4.297*** 0.519** -1.365*** -1.231*** 2.425*** 1.324*** 1.086*** -0.176* 0.0489 0.0265 -0.420*** -1.149*** -0.924***
(0.602) (0.205) (0.126) (0.326) (0.211) (0.262) (0.0829) (0.131) (0.136) (0.220) (0.235) (0.104) (0.0847) (0.172) (0.0630) (0.0822) (0.332)
6.stratum 0.658 0.0332 0.157 0.212 -4.223*** 0.691** Omitted -0.192 1.558*** 0.169 0.823*** -0.282** -0.0441 -0.722*** -1.073*** -0.266
(0.677) (0.231) (0.141) (0.367) (0.312) (0.294) (0.148) (0.201) (0.248) (0.264) (0.116) (0.193) (0.0931) (0.0923) (0.373)
7.stratum Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted -4.400*** Omitted -0.272** Omitted 1.898*** Omitted Omitted Omitted 0.815*** Omitted -0.666*** Omitted Omitted
(0.366) (0.110) (0.236) (0.113) (0.109)
Cluster 0.000732 -0.000280 0.000107 0.00184*** 0.000261 0.000119 6.70e-05 -0.000537*** -0.00126*** 0.000139 -0.000373* -0.000322*** 0.000135 0.000482*** 0.000127 -0.000189*** -0.00141***
(0.000501) (0.000171) (0.000105) (0.000271) (0.000265) (0.000217) (8.17e-05) (0.000109) (0.000170) (0.000183) (0.000195) (8.61e-05) (8.35e-05) (0.000143) (7.90e-05) (6.83e-05) (0.000276)
2.region 2.795*** -1.155*** -0.344** -0.986*** Omitted 2.372*** 2.505*** 2.151*** Omitted -1.958*** -2.784*** -0.797*** -0.279*** 0.338* Omitted 1.301*** -0.545
(0.692) (0.236) (0.144) (0.375) (0.301) (0.0962) (0.151) (0.253) (0.270) (0.119) (0.0984) (0.197) (0.0944) (0.382)
Tobacco -1.263 -0.286 0.0909 0.450 1.806* 0.0753 -0.108 -0.517 -0.617 0.269 -0.482 0.563* 0.711** -0.378 -0.0581 -0.215 -0.106
(1.879) (0.640) (0.392) (1.018) (0.995) (0.816) (0.306) (0.410) (0.640) (0.687) (0.733) (0.323) (0.313) (0.535) (0.297) (0.256) (1.036)
Cons -193.5*** -1.703 6.415*** 10.51* 96.85*** 26.84*** -4.794*** -1.876 -15.28*** 93.29*** -14.94*** 16.07*** 25.92*** 17.86*** 6.921*** 12.01*** 29.00***
(10.11) (3.445) (2.110) (5.475) (5.353) (4.390) (1.649) (2.206) (3.441) (3.697) (3.944) (1.738) (1.686) (2.879) (1.595) (1.378) (5.575)
Obs. 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679 13,679




      
 Table A 3: Ordinary Least Squares results, Urban Sample            
Variable Food Alc Health Sch Clothing Housing Water Electricity Alt. Energ Daily Tprt Other Tprt Equpt Ent Tele Remit Hse Care Pers. Cre
d -1.226* 4.841*** -0.0205 -1.374*** 0.205 -1.583*** -0.352** -0.673*** 0.203 -0.144 0.492** 0.171* 0.104 0.0149 0.0212 -0.135 -1.032***
(0.638) (0.219) (0.121) (0.374) (0.274) (0.431) (0.162) (0.206) (0.224) (0.306) (0.244) (0.102) (0.160) (0.253) (0.114) (0.122) (0.339)
LnM 40.47*** 1.875* -0.133 -10.58*** -9.695*** 6.434*** 2.467*** 7.008*** -0.185 -27.96*** 1.589 -6.083*** -9.032*** 4.042*** -1.321** -1.555*** 3.383**
(2.965) (1.018) (0.564) (1.736) (1.271) (2.000) (0.753) (0.955) (1.040) (1.422) (1.135) (0.475) (0.743) (1.176) (0.529) (0.567) (1.573)
LnM2 -1.833*** -0.0547 0.00873 0.426*** 0.344*** -0.160** -0.0944*** -0.254*** -0.0621 1.184*** -0.0230 0.245*** 0.376*** -0.0915** 0.0687*** 0.0849*** -0.166***
(0.112) (0.0384) (0.0213) (0.0655) (0.0479) (0.0754) (0.0284) (0.0360) (0.0392) (0.0536) (0.0428) (0.0179) (0.0280) (0.0443) (0.0200) (0.0214) (0.0593)
Adult prop 2.080 1.043** 0.192 -0.743 -1.527** -1.321 0.895** 1.339*** -0.696 0.786 -0.883* 0.103 -0.382 0.187 -0.844*** -0.0543 -0.193
(1.395) (0.479) (0.265) (0.817) (0.598) (0.941) (0.354) (0.449) (0.489) (0.669) (0.534) (0.223) (0.349) (0.553) (0.249) (0.267) (0.740)
loghhsize 2.220*** -0.144 0.0760 3.159*** 0.0103 -3.253*** 0.00224 0.406** 0.182 -0.504* -0.753*** 0.165* -0.492*** -0.297 -0.542*** -0.463*** 0.240
(0.597) (0.205) (0.114) (0.350) (0.256) (0.403) (0.152) (0.192) (0.209) (0.286) (0.229) (0.0957) (0.150) (0.237) (0.107) (0.114) (0.317)
Head Sch -0.704 -0.276 -0.409*** 1.056*** 0.278 0.471 0.287 0.485** -0.965*** -0.326 0.142 0.215* -0.117 0.567** -0.0226 -0.196 -0.166
(0.698) (0.240) (0.133) (0.409) (0.299) (0.471) (0.177) (0.225) (0.245) (0.335) (0.267) (0.112) (0.175) (0.277) (0.125) (0.133) (0.370)
Head w age -1.143*** 0.241** -0.216*** 0.230 -0.0730 1.883*** -0.217** -0.0352 -0.336*** -0.681*** -0.548*** -0.318*** 0.140 0.419*** 0.120* -0.00102 0.862***
(0.357) (0.122) (0.0679) (0.209) (0.153) (0.241) (0.0906) (0.115) (0.125) (0.171) (0.137) (0.0572) (0.0894) (0.141) (0.0637) (0.0682) (0.189)
Hhold Emp -0.278 0.243*** 0.00219 -0.815*** 0.425*** -0.291** -0.0588 -0.291*** -0.00956 0.150 0.0656 0.0632* 0.0654 0.322*** 0.185*** 0.0855** 0.0281
(0.215) (0.0739) (0.0409) (0.126) (0.0922) (0.145) (0.0547) (0.0693) (0.0755) (0.103) (0.0824) (0.0345) (0.0539) (0.0853) (0.0384) (0.0411) (0.114)
Adult Age 4.289*** 0.816 0.888*** -7.749*** -0.432 0.380 0.1000 -0.393 1.071** 0.591 0.178 0.145 0.260 0.558 0.0598 0.582** -1.529*
(1.506) (0.517) (0.286) (0.882) (0.646) (1.016) (0.383) (0.485) (0.528) (0.722) (0.576) (0.241) (0.377) (0.597) (0.269) (0.288) (0.799)
Child age -0.634** -0.111 -0.0617 2.389*** -0.130 -0.758*** 0.0440 0.256*** -0.305*** 0.00255 -0.181* 0.0123 0.0204 0.0569 -0.0818* 0.00919 -0.428***
(0.266) (0.0914) (0.0507) (0.156) (0.114) (0.180) (0.0677) (0.0858) (0.0934) (0.128) (0.102) (0.0427) (0.0667) (0.106) (0.0475) (0.0509) (0.141)
Head Age -4.398*** -1.405*** -0.198 9.139*** -0.717 -3.645*** 1.287*** 1.562*** 0.237 -0.726 0.747 -0.0529 -0.425 -1.021* -0.0448 -0.406 0.439
(1.330) (0.456) (0.253) (0.779) (0.570) (0.897) (0.338) (0.428) (0.466) (0.638) (0.509) (0.213) (0.333) (0.527) (0.237) (0.254) (0.705)
Most Edu -2.011** -0.309 0.416** 1.032* -0.280 -1.036 0.485** 1.420*** -1.249*** -0.331 -0.666* -0.169 0.219 1.066*** 0.452*** 0.681*** 0.404
(0.939) (0.322) (0.179) (0.550) (0.403) (0.634) (0.239) (0.302) (0.329) (0.450) (0.359) (0.150) (0.235) (0.372) (0.168) (0.180) (0.498)
6.stratum -0.317 -0.448*** -0.0923 0.985*** -0.156 0.0776 1.292*** 0.934*** -0.634*** -1.034*** -0.0306 -0.141** -0.130 -0.210 -0.295*** 0.0570 0.566**
(0.444) (0.152) (0.0845) (0.260) (0.190) (0.300) (0.113) (0.143) (0.156) (0.213) (0.170) (0.0712) (0.111) (0.176) (0.0793) (0.0849) (0.236)
7.stratum -0.896* -0.466** -0.252** 0.691** -0.435* -0.730** 1.066*** 1.253*** -0.227 -1.430*** -0.695*** 0.0898 0.546*** 0.0209 -0.206** 1.125*** 0.841***
(0.528) (0.181) (0.100) (0.309) (0.226) (0.356) (0.134) (0.170) (0.185) (0.253) (0.202) (0.0846) (0.132) (0.209) (0.0942) (0.101) (0.280)
Cluster -0.000141 -0.000364* 0.000161 0.00201*** 0.000784*** 0.000180 1.40e-05 -0.000941*** -0.000783*** -0.000343 -0.000210 -1.43e-05 0.000210 0.00101*** 0.000253** -0.000347*** -0.00167***
(0.000594) (0.000204) (0.000113) (0.000348) (0.000255) (0.000401) (0.000151) (0.000191) (0.000208) (0.000285) (0.000227) (9.51e-05) (0.000149) (0.000235) (0.000106) (0.000113) (0.000315)
Tobacco -5.799 -1.604 -0.0988 -0.578 -0.706 2.726 -0.362 -2.003 -0.447 7.981*** 0.186 1.466* 2.726** -0.925 -0.454 -1.302 -0.991
(5.177) (1.777) (0.985) (3.031) (2.219) (3.493) (1.315) (1.667) (1.816) (2.482) (1.981) (0.829) (1.297) (2.053) (0.924) (0.989) (2.746)
Cons -160.0*** -10.52 -1.405 50.49*** 78.30*** -30.83** -21.75*** -55.63*** 19.51*** 167.3*** -14.82* 37.20*** 55.21*** -36.65*** 6.247* 6.012 -1.818
(19.93) (6.839) (3.790) (11.67) (8.542) (13.44) (5.062) (6.417) (6.988) (9.554) (7.625) (3.193) (4.992) (7.901) (3.557) (3.809) (10.57)
Obs. 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275




Table A 4: Ordinary Least Squares, Rural Sample             
                 
Variable Food Alc Health Sch Clothing Housing Water Electricity Alt. Energ Daily Tprt Other Tprt Equpt Ent Tele Remit Hse Care Pers. Cre
d -2.614*** 6.496*** -0.0801 -1.980*** -0.496 -0.0617 -0.0420 -0.0393 0.0641 -0.175 -0.206 -0.0232 0.0747 -0.233* -0.153 0.0980 -0.617
(0.708) (0.242) (0.157) (0.364) (0.415) (0.0653) (0.0328) (0.0714) (0.235) (0.190) (0.280) (0.127) (0.0508) (0.127) (0.102) (0.0600) (0.402)
LnM 47.84*** 1.145 -0.455 -5.487*** -7.228*** -0.707** -0.227 -2.660*** 1.188 -14.84*** -6.296*** -2.753*** -0.645*** -6.657*** -2.479*** -1.727*** 1.703
(3.010) (1.026) (0.665) (1.545) (1.765) (0.277) (0.139) (0.303) (0.999) (0.806) (1.189) (0.539) (0.216) (0.538) (0.433) (0.255) (1.707)
LnM2 -2.103*** -0.0350 0.0143 0.253*** 0.203*** 0.0366*** 0.0124** 0.125*** -0.0862** 0.694*** 0.350*** 0.126*** 0.0321*** 0.322*** 0.123*** 0.0836*** -0.135*
(0.130) (0.0444) (0.0288) (0.0669) (0.0764) (0.0120) (0.00603) (0.0131) (0.0432) (0.0349) (0.0514) (0.0233) (0.00934) (0.0233) (0.0187) (0.0110) (0.0739)
Adult prop -6.025*** 0.634 0.376 2.634** 2.347* 0.226 0.169* 0.317 0.232 0.131 -1.223 0.748** -0.0171 0.746** -0.715** 0.347* -1.798
(2.113) (0.720) (0.467) (1.085) (1.239) (0.195) (0.0978) (0.213) (0.701) (0.566) (0.835) (0.379) (0.152) (0.378) (0.304) (0.179) (1.199)
loghhsize -6.287*** -0.201 0.279 4.642*** 2.400*** -0.100 0.0187 -0.0572 -0.0168 0.359 -1.017*** 0.905*** 0.0270 0.0815 -0.183 -0.100 -0.931*
(0.844) (0.288) (0.187) (0.433) (0.495) (0.0778) (0.0391) (0.0851) (0.280) (0.226) (0.333) (0.151) (0.0606) (0.151) (0.121) (0.0715) (0.479)
Head Sch -0.0733 -0.180 -0.106 0.866** -0.142 -0.0418 0.0159 0.0895 0.183 -0.0787 -0.440 0.133 0.0230 0.0828 -0.0843 0.132** -0.572
(0.713) (0.243) (0.158) (0.366) (0.418) (0.0658) (0.0330) (0.0719) (0.237) (0.191) (0.282) (0.128) (0.0512) (0.127) (0.103) (0.0605) (0.405)
Head w age 0.948 -0.0647 -0.342* -0.0772 -0.963** 0.775*** 0.0376 0.199** -0.286 -1.068*** -1.078*** -0.944*** 0.194*** 0.736*** 0.281** 0.237*** 1.711***
(0.812) (0.277) (0.179) (0.417) (0.476) (0.0749) (0.0376) (0.0819) (0.270) (0.218) (0.321) (0.146) (0.0583) (0.145) (0.117) (0.0688) (0.461)
Hhold Emp 0.373 0.0469 0.0467 -1.026*** 0.0679 -0.0187 -0.0378*** -0.0198 0.114 0.0538 0.0370 -0.0134 0.00522 -0.0670 0.0609 0.0185 0.360**
(0.270) (0.0922) (0.0597) (0.139) (0.159) (0.0249) (0.0125) (0.0273) (0.0897) (0.0724) (0.107) (0.0484) (0.0194) (0.0483) (0.0389) (0.0229) (0.153)
Adult Age 2.085 0.520 1.029** -9.334*** 1.740 0.0271 -0.00345 0.0757 0.637 0.941* -0.0974 0.908** 0.0644 0.318 0.120 0.0696 0.582
(2.043) (0.696) (0.451) (1.049) (1.198) (0.188) (0.0945) (0.206) (0.678) (0.547) (0.807) (0.366) (0.147) (0.365) (0.294) (0.173) (1.159)
Child age -0.418 -0.262** 0.0764 2.476*** -0.792*** 0.0920*** 0.00859 0.0905** -0.267** -0.199** -0.0838 -0.0720 -0.0263 0.0350 -0.126** 0.0654** -0.365*
(0.377) (0.129) (0.0834) (0.194) (0.221) (0.0348) (0.0175) (0.0381) (0.125) (0.101) (0.149) (0.0676) (0.0271) (0.0674) (0.0543) (0.0320) (0.214)
Head Age -0.923 -0.789 -0.730* 11.26*** -4.551*** -0.303* -0.0351 -0.0370 -0.740 -0.568 0.476 -1.041*** -0.0410 -0.606* -0.196 -0.0583 -0.802
(1.854) (0.632) (0.410) (0.952) (1.087) (0.171) (0.0858) (0.187) (0.615) (0.497) (0.732) (0.332) (0.133) (0.331) (0.267) (0.157) (1.052)
Most Edu -1.833** -0.137 -0.340* 0.0643 1.108** 0.101 -0.0569 0.0346 0.0497 -0.437* 0.0473 -0.0838 -0.0491 0.192 0.221* -0.0989 1.027**
(0.900) (0.307) (0.199) (0.462) (0.528) (0.0829) (0.0416) (0.0907) (0.299) (0.241) (0.355) (0.161) (0.0645) (0.161) (0.129) (0.0762) (0.510)
2.stratum -2.105*** -0.712*** 0.167 1.021*** 1.193*** -0.177** -0.0936*** -0.0986 -0.447* 1.021*** -0.448 0.382*** -0.113** 0.240* 0.0572 0.161** 0.0479
(0.754) (0.257) (0.167) (0.387) (0.442) (0.0695) (0.0349) (0.0760) (0.250) (0.202) (0.298) (0.135) (0.0541) (0.135) (0.108) (0.0639) (0.427)
3.stratum -1.328 -1.968* -0.191 -0.780 -0.877 0.547* -0.237 -0.230 -0.153 5.730*** -5.850*** 2.010*** 0.0555 3.054*** 1.209** 1.088*** -1.385
(3.319) (1.131) (0.733) (1.704) (1.946) (0.306) (0.154) (0.335) (1.101) (0.889) (1.311) (0.595) (0.238) (0.593) (0.477) (0.281) (1.883)
4.stratum 5.349*** -0.720*** 0.383** -0.699* -2.116*** 0.148** 0.0199 -0.0359 -0.0207 0.187 0.249 -0.502*** -0.0164 -0.0376 -0.196* 0.0424 -1.724***
(0.758) (0.258) (0.167) (0.389) (0.444) (0.0698) (0.0351) (0.0764) (0.252) (0.203) (0.299) (0.136) (0.0544) (0.135) (0.109) (0.0642) (0.430)
Cluster 0.00152* -0.000153 9.15e-05 0.00157*** -0.000110 0.000110 0.000202*** 5.90e-05 -0.00196*** 0.000536** -0.000643** -0.000664*** 4.31e-05 2.13e-05 -1.22e-05 7.57e-06 -0.00108**
(0.000823) (0.000281) (0.000182) (0.000423) (0.000483) (7.59e-05) (3.81e-05) (8.30e-05) (0.000273) (0.000220) (0.000325) (0.000148) (5.91e-05) (0.000147) (0.000118) (6.98e-05) (0.000467)
Tobacco -0.158 -0.148 0.0981 0.409 1.670 -0.119 -0.0643 -0.167 -0.750 -0.600 -0.557 0.295 0.396** -0.409 -0.0628 -0.0660 0.181
(2.249) (0.767) (0.497) (1.155) (1.319) (0.207) (0.104) (0.227) (0.747) (0.602) (0.888) (0.403) (0.161) (0.402) (0.323) (0.191) (1.276)
Cons -204.8*** -4.899 3.656 12.35 74.71*** 4.092** 1.125 13.48*** 3.934 77.84*** 29.71*** 15.32*** 3.198** 34.24*** 13.36*** 8.666*** 14.05
(18.03) (6.145) (3.983) (9.255) (10.57) (1.661) (0.834) (1.818) (5.982) (4.827) (7.119) (3.230) (1.293) (3.221) (2.592) (1.528) (10.23)
Obs. 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404
R-squared 0.099 0.111 0.008 0.199 0.069 0.052 0.012 0.046 0.031 0.140 0.057 0.037 0.015 0.140 0.040 0.054 0.025
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Table A 5: Ordinary Least Squares, Top 50%              
Variable Food Alc Health Sch Clothing Housing Water Electricity Alt. Energ Daily Tprt Other Tprt Equpt Ent Tele Remit Hse Care Pers. Cre
d -0.399 5.026*** -0.128 -1.391*** -0.271 -1.538*** -0.365*** -0.496*** -0.00643 -0.235 0.293 0.163 0.105 0.00432 -0.0501 -0.106 -0.866***
(0.608) (0.211) (0.106) (0.389) (0.269) (0.388) (0.137) (0.191) (0.185) (0.326) (0.300) (0.123) (0.152) (0.253) (0.127) (0.120) (0.312)
LnM 18.50*** 7.110*** -0.459 -6.857* -6.134** 15.34*** 4.250*** 20.89*** -16.59*** -44.25*** 3.527 -8.044*** -14.89*** 21.53*** 2.608** -0.0103 12.48***
(6.251) (2.172) (1.092) (3.999) (2.770) (3.988) (1.407) (1.960) (1.905) (3.350) (3.086) (1.261) (1.563) (2.600) (1.311) (1.233) (3.203)
LnM2 -1.055*** -0.238*** 0.0195 0.283* 0.208** -0.490*** -0.158*** -0.751*** 0.531*** 1.787*** -0.0884 0.321*** 0.583*** -0.720*** -0.0690 0.0276 -0.490***
(0.226) (0.0785) (0.0395) (0.144) (0.100) (0.144) (0.0508) (0.0708) (0.0689) (0.121) (0.112) (0.0456) (0.0565) (0.0940) (0.0474) (0.0446) (0.116)
Adult prop -0.721 0.372 0.492** 0.146 -1.332** -0.607 0.972*** 1.303*** -0.420 1.077 -1.052 0.294 -0.441 0.420 -1.141*** 0.0889 0.283
(1.402) (0.487) (0.245) (0.897) (0.621) (0.895) (0.316) (0.440) (0.427) (0.751) (0.692) (0.283) (0.351) (0.583) (0.294) (0.277) (0.718)
loghhsize 1.332** -0.371* 0.00119 3.729*** 0.118 -3.008*** 0.0870 0.272 0.262 -0.0581 -1.022*** 0.349*** -0.457*** -0.282 -0.630*** -0.530*** 0.206
(0.589) (0.205) (0.103) (0.377) (0.261) (0.376) (0.133) (0.185) (0.180) (0.316) (0.291) (0.119) (0.147) (0.245) (0.124) (0.116) (0.302)
Head Sch -0.392 -0.604** -0.516*** 1.958*** -0.446 0.368 0.218 0.529** -0.772*** -0.280 0.0499 0.192 -0.0484 0.483* -0.0832 -0.0136 -0.372
(0.683) (0.237) (0.119) (0.437) (0.303) (0.436) (0.154) (0.214) (0.208) (0.366) (0.337) (0.138) (0.171) (0.284) (0.143) (0.135) (0.350)
Head w age -0.514 0.176 -0.169*** 0.223 0.0818 1.767*** -0.197** -0.179 -0.375*** -0.635*** -0.839*** -0.458*** 0.218** 0.313** 0.107 0.00597 0.839***
(0.361) (0.126) (0.0632) (0.231) (0.160) (0.231) (0.0813) (0.113) (0.110) (0.194) (0.178) (0.0729) (0.0904) (0.150) (0.0758) (0.0713) (0.185)
Hhold Emp -0.190 0.148** 0.0278 -0.878*** 0.221** -0.0969 -0.0915** -0.237*** 0.101 0.137 0.0770 0.0634 0.0607 0.225*** 0.182*** 0.0825** 0.0937
(0.204) (0.0710) (0.0357) (0.131) (0.0906) (0.130) (0.0460) (0.0641) (0.0623) (0.110) (0.101) (0.0413) (0.0511) (0.0850) (0.0429) (0.0403) (0.105)
Adult Age 2.597* 0.461 1.146*** -9.039*** 0.623 0.524 0.270 0.207 0.583 1.390* 0.0605 0.503* 0.109 0.319 -0.0468 0.497* -0.472
(1.502) (0.522) (0.263) (0.961) (0.666) (0.958) (0.338) (0.471) (0.458) (0.805) (0.742) (0.303) (0.376) (0.625) (0.315) (0.296) (0.770)
Child age -0.830*** -0.325*** -0.0416 2.596*** -0.350*** -0.616*** 0.0627 0.254*** -0.117 -0.0512 -0.113 0.00317 0.0104 0.0421 -0.141** 0.0131 -0.253*
(0.278) (0.0966) (0.0486) (0.178) (0.123) (0.177) (0.0626) (0.0872) (0.0848) (0.149) (0.137) (0.0561) (0.0696) (0.116) (0.0583) (0.0549) (0.143)
Head Age -3.247** -0.956** -0.158 10.71*** -0.886 -3.438*** 1.005*** 1.157*** -0.185 -1.419** 0.696 -0.249 -0.278 -1.328** -0.0817 -0.299 -0.801
(1.314) (0.456) (0.230) (0.840) (0.582) (0.838) (0.296) (0.412) (0.400) (0.704) (0.649) (0.265) (0.328) (0.546) (0.275) (0.259) (0.673)
Most Edu -1.662* -0.264 0.490*** 0.250 0.245 -1.179** 0.413** 1.116*** -0.771*** -0.886* -0.680 -0.276 0.219 1.163*** 0.598*** 0.581*** 0.510
(0.934) (0.325) (0.163) (0.598) (0.414) (0.596) (0.210) (0.293) (0.285) (0.501) (0.461) (0.189) (0.234) (0.389) (0.196) (0.184) (0.479)
2.stratum -4.975*** -0.729** 0.149 1.627*** 1.039*** 0.728 -0.399** -0.535* -0.459* 3.275*** -0.541 1.035*** -0.200 0.538 0.0523 0.309* -0.770*
(0.881) (0.306) (0.154) (0.564) (0.390) (0.562) (0.198) (0.276) (0.269) (0.472) (0.435) (0.178) (0.220) (0.367) (0.185) (0.174) (0.451)
3.stratum -6.651** -2.088** -0.300 -0.0955 -1.303 1.535 -0.490 -0.467 0.401 7.923*** -4.971*** 3.380*** -0.540 4.099*** 1.797*** 1.344** -3.486**
(2.785) (0.968) (0.487) (1.782) (1.234) (1.777) (0.627) (0.873) (0.849) (1.493) (1.375) (0.562) (0.696) (1.159) (0.584) (0.549) (1.427)
4.stratum 4.105*** -0.396 0.0523 -2.788*** -0.818 -1.526** 0.138 -0.111 0.526 0.145 1.234** -0.0887 -0.105 0.100 -0.240 0.0966 -0.721
(1.155) (0.401) (0.202) (0.739) (0.512) (0.737) (0.260) (0.362) (0.352) (0.619) (0.570) (0.233) (0.289) (0.480) (0.242) (0.228) (0.592)
5.stratum 3.348*** 0.487** 0.242** -2.477*** -3.722*** 3.671*** 1.106*** -1.319*** 1.808*** 1.865*** -2.754*** -0.669*** 0.0829 -0.122 -0.647*** -0.0590 -0.373
(0.544) (0.192) (0.0967) (0.348) (0.241) (0.347) (0.122) (0.174) (0.166) (0.297) (0.269) (0.110) (0.118) (0.230) (0.114) (0.0931) (0.284)
6.stratum 3.822*** -0.00836 0.137 -1.885*** -3.596*** 3.795*** 2.401*** -0.389** 1.054*** 0.596* -2.851*** -0.843*** Omitted -0.346 -0.985*** Omitted 0.0346
(0.660) (0.213) (0.107) (0.422) (0.293) (0.421) (0.149) (0.192) (0.201) (0.328) (0.326) (0.133) (0.254) (0.138) (0.313)
7.stratum 3.106*** Omitted Omitted -1.790*** -3.881*** 3.183*** 2.287*** Omitted 1.255*** Omitted -3.556*** -0.642*** 0.693*** Omitted -0.919*** 1.124*** Omitted
(0.732) (0.468) (0.324) (0.467) (0.165) (0.223) (0.361) (0.148) (0.153) (0.154) (0.121)
Cluster -0.000783 -0.000152 8.49e-05 0.00188*** 5.79e-05 0.000501 -0.000132 -0.000841*** 6.47e-05 0.000200 -0.000530* 0.000121 0.000216 0.000865*** 0.000307** -0.000197* -0.00175***
(0.000593) (0.000206) (0.000104) (0.000380) (0.000263) (0.000379) (0.000134) (0.000186) (0.000181) (0.000318) (0.000293) (0.000120) (0.000148) (0.000247) (0.000124) (0.000117) (0.000304)
Tobacco -0.101 -1.347 0.0435 0.176 1.254 1.011 -0.279 -0.946 -0.877 0.703 -0.280 0.459 1.083* -0.403 -0.211 -0.388 0.0650
(2.615) (0.909) (0.457) (1.673) (1.159) (1.668) (0.588) (0.820) (0.797) (1.401) (1.291) (0.528) (0.654) (1.088) (0.548) (0.516) (1.340)
Cons -5.952 -45.76*** -0.0315 25.79 56.72*** -96.77*** -34.65*** -152.8*** 131.1*** 277.0*** -24.62 49.86*** 96.13*** -156.0*** -20.27** -4.952 -63.85***
(43.11) (14.98) (7.534) (27.58) (19.10) (27.50) (9.701) (13.52) (13.14) (23.10) (21.28) (8.700) (10.78) (17.93) (9.040) (8.504) (22.09)
Obs. 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501 7,501
R-squared 0.259 0.089 0.014 0.200 0.077 0.125 0.093 0.099 0.164 0.191 0.035 0.079 0.092 0.087 0.043 0.100 0.023
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 Table A 6: Ordinary Least Squares, Bottom 50% 
Variable Food Alc Health Sch Clothing Housing Water Electricity Alt. Energ Daily Tprt Other Tprt Equpt Ent Tele Remit Hse Care Pers. Cre
d -3.564*** 6.499*** -0.00107 -1.898*** -0.124 0.107 0.0304 -0.0402 0.0625 -0.172* -0.129 -0.0549 0.0599 -0.141* -0.109 0.119** -0.719*
(0.742) (0.251) (0.172) (0.343) (0.435) (0.122) (0.0718) (0.0714) (0.268) (0.104) (0.219) (0.109) (0.0388) (0.0855) (0.0795) (0.0475) (0.431)
LnM 32.58*** -0.111 -2.847** -7.516*** -8.352*** -3.350*** -0.101 -0.196 0.628 -2.195*** -4.528*** 2.160*** -0.208 -2.283*** -0.738 -0.0921 1.788
(5.237) (1.771) (1.212) (2.420) (3.068) (0.864) (0.507) (0.504) (1.887) (0.734) (1.547) (0.767) (0.274) (0.603) (0.561) (0.335) (3.041)
LnM2 -1.383*** 0.0217 0.128** 0.343*** 0.251* 0.166*** 0.00749 0.00787 -0.0605 0.114*** 0.255*** -0.101*** 0.0121 0.114*** 0.0409 0.00731 -0.139
(0.240) (0.0812) (0.0556) (0.111) (0.141) (0.0396) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0866) (0.0337) (0.0709) (0.0352) (0.0125) (0.0277) (0.0257) (0.0154) (0.139)
Adult prop -2.989 1.797** 0.0202 1.039 2.510** -0.538 0.0126 0.476** -0.453 -0.203 -0.957 0.519* 0.0790 0.429* -0.262 0.169 -2.150*
(2.133) (0.721) (0.493) (0.985) (1.249) (0.352) (0.206) (0.205) (0.769) (0.299) (0.630) (0.312) (0.111) (0.246) (0.228) (0.136) (1.238)
loghhsize -5.553*** 0.137 0.341* 3.678*** 2.454*** -0.442*** -0.0577 0.137 -0.180 -0.0415 -0.650** 0.719*** 0.0425 0.0998 0.00317 0.00234 -0.833*
(0.869) (0.294) (0.201) (0.401) (0.509) (0.143) (0.0841) (0.0836) (0.313) (0.122) (0.257) (0.127) (0.0454) (0.100) (0.0930) (0.0556) (0.504)
Head Sch -0.167 0.0340 -0.0381 0.131 0.217 -0.00205 0.0328 -0.00532 0.166 -0.00624 -0.378* 0.131 0.00505 0.0790 -0.0253 0.0240 -0.411
(0.730) (0.247) (0.169) (0.337) (0.427) (0.120) (0.0706) (0.0702) (0.263) (0.102) (0.216) (0.107) (0.0381) (0.0840) (0.0781) (0.0467) (0.424)
Head w age -0.523 0.114 -0.429** -0.108 -1.812*** 0.915*** -0.0815 0.0995 0.401 0.0349 -0.327 -0.237* 0.0113 0.177* 0.137 0.0984* 1.329***
(0.877) (0.297) (0.203) (0.405) (0.514) (0.145) (0.0849) (0.0844) (0.316) (0.123) (0.259) (0.128) (0.0458) (0.101) (0.0939) (0.0561) (0.509)
Hhold Emp 0.173 0.127 0.0194 -0.852*** 0.285* -0.0951** -0.0216 -0.0595** -0.0146 0.0232 0.0418 -0.0172 0.00518 -0.00216 0.0393 0.0148 0.305*
(0.287) (0.0971) (0.0664) (0.133) (0.168) (0.0473) (0.0278) (0.0276) (0.103) (0.0402) (0.0848) (0.0420) (0.0150) (0.0331) (0.0307) (0.0184) (0.167)
Adult Age 3.123 0.873 0.826* -7.094*** 1.161 -0.0984 -0.145 -0.459** 0.883 -0.0938 0.0700 0.677** 0.154 0.476** 0.136 0.105 -0.796
(2.094) (0.708) (0.484) (0.967) (1.227) (0.345) (0.203) (0.201) (0.755) (0.293) (0.618) (0.307) (0.109) (0.241) (0.224) (0.134) (1.216)
Child age -0.0610 -0.0351 0.0508 2.211*** -0.535** -0.219*** -0.00228 0.0870** -0.403*** -0.0744 -0.190* -0.0477 -0.00874 -0.0176 -0.0687* 0.0469** -0.565***
(0.365) (0.124) (0.0846) (0.169) (0.214) (0.0603) (0.0354) (0.0352) (0.132) (0.0512) (0.108) (0.0535) (0.0191) (0.0421) (0.0391) (0.0234) (0.212)
Head Age -1.819 -1.354** -0.719 9.143*** -4.677*** -0.345 0.200 0.340* -0.233 0.433 0.448 -0.886*** -0.149 -0.421* -0.178 -0.102 0.684
(1.909) (0.646) (0.442) (0.882) (1.118) (0.315) (0.185) (0.184) (0.688) (0.267) (0.564) (0.280) (0.0997) (0.220) (0.204) (0.122) (1.108)
Most Edu -1.776* -0.289 -0.427** 0.744* 0.570 0.0377 -0.0355 0.128 0.0458 -0.00513 -0.0206 0.0148 -0.0523 0.0684 0.105 -0.0547 0.881*
(0.914) (0.309) (0.212) (0.422) (0.536) (0.151) (0.0885) (0.0880) (0.330) (0.128) (0.270) (0.134) (0.0478) (0.105) (0.0979) (0.0585) (0.531)
2.stratum -1.899** -0.758** 0.136 0.911** 1.308** 0.0233 -0.0680 -0.0541 -0.342 0.00552 -0.0807 0.292** -0.0465 0.0162 0.136 0.0965 0.243
(0.964) (0.326) (0.223) (0.445) (0.565) (0.159) (0.0933) (0.0927) (0.347) (0.135) (0.285) (0.141) (0.0504) (0.111) (0.103) (0.0617) (0.560)
3.stratum 3.787 -1.351 0.0881 -0.639 0.329 0.119 -0.166 -0.0910 0.348 -0.495 -1.791 -0.742 -0.163 0.942 0.0209 -0.139 0.681
(7.409) (2.506) (1.714) (3.423) (4.341) (1.222) (0.717) (0.713) (2.670) (1.038) (2.189) (1.085) (0.387) (0.853) (0.793) (0.474) (4.303)
4.stratum 6.561*** -0.833*** 0.455** -0.422 -2.546*** -0.167 0.0444 0.0265 -0.0239 0.264** 0.00468 -0.683*** -0.0381 -0.0839 -0.149 0.0144 -1.944***
(0.856) (0.289) (0.198) (0.395) (0.501) (0.141) (0.0828) (0.0823) (0.308) (0.120) (0.253) (0.125) (0.0447) (0.0985) (0.0916) (0.0547) (0.497)
5.stratum 5.386*** -0.243 -0.261 0.00160 -0.589 0.737* -1.723*** -0.689*** 0.811 0.120 -0.213 0.0666 -0.00719 -0.0608 -0.169 0.0973 -8.009***
(1.815) (0.614) (0.420) (1.204) (1.527) (0.430) (0.176) (0.175) (0.654) (0.254) (0.536) (0.266) (0.136) (0.209) (0.279) (0.116) (1.513)
6.stratum Omitted Omitted Omitted 4.094*** -1.703 0.215 Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted -0.0635 Omitted -0.339 Omitted -6.728***
(1.419) (1.800) (0.507) (0.161) (0.329) (1.784)
7.stratum -4.032 0.257 -0.420 Omitted Omitted Omitted -2.031*** 0.551* 1.345 -0.204 -0.173 0.0507 Omitted -0.0926 Omitted 0.216 Omitted
(3.072) (1.039) (0.711) (0.297) (0.296) (1.107) (0.430) (0.907) (0.450) (0.354) (0.197)
Cluster 0.00244*** -0.000454 0.000176 0.00173*** 0.000500 -0.000224 0.000337*** -0.000123 -0.00285*** 5.54e-05 -0.000242 -0.000834*** 5.11e-05 4.83e-05 -8.60e-05 -0.000137** -0.00108**
(0.000834) (0.000282) (0.000193) (0.000385) (0.000489) (0.000138) (8.07e-05) (8.03e-05) (0.000301) (0.000117) (0.000246) (0.000122) (4.36e-05) (9.61e-05) (8.93e-05) (5.34e-05) (0.000484)
Tobacco -2.090 0.431 0.132 0.481 2.248 -0.225 0.0588 -0.0396 -0.787 -0.272 -0.663 0.572 0.402*** -0.243 0.0522 -0.0783 -0.0155
(2.719) (0.920) (0.629) (1.256) (1.593) (0.448) (0.263) (0.262) (0.980) (0.381) (0.803) (0.398) (0.142) (0.313) (0.291) (0.174) (1.579)
Cons -128.4*** 1.298 16.89** 25.97* 82.68*** 19.82*** 0.0166 0.899 5.747 9.452** 20.55** -10.50** 0.849 10.55*** 3.651 0.166 13.48
(28.93) (9.785) (6.695) (13.37) (16.95) (4.771) (2.800) (2.784) (10.43) (4.054) (8.546) (4.237) (1.512) (3.332) (3.098) (1.851) (16.80)
Obs. 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178 6,178
R-squared 0.054 0.110 0.009 0.168 0.103 0.119 0.090 0.032 0.053 0.012 0.024 0.039 0.005 0.017 0.009 0.011 0.024
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Notes: The table shows results of estimating a probit model for the tobacco smoking status of a household. The dependent 
variable in the probit is 𝒅 (the tobacco smoking status of a household). The independent variables include the instrument 
for 𝒅, the adult sex ratio, alongside other control variables as discussed in Section 2.4. I do not report the coefficient results 
for the cluster fixed effects because of space considerations. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *, **, *** signify statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  In all data specifications, the adult sex ratio is a strong predictor of 
whether the household spends on tobacco or not. The F statistic associated with the instrumental variable are equal to 78,  
50, 27, 26 and 44 in the full, urban, rural, top 50% and bottom 50% samples respectively. 
 
 
Coefficient on: Full 
Sample 
Urban Rural Top 50% Bottom 
50% 
 



































































































































Household Type 5 -0.507 
(0.757) 




















Region Omitted N/A N/A Omitted Omitted 










Observations 8619 4567 4052 4099 3251 
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Notes: The table shows results of an OLS regression of ln𝑀 on its instrumental variable the logarithm of assets and other 
control variables as discussed in Section 2.4. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *, **, *** signify statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. I also report the F test for the joint significance of the cluster fixed effects.  In all data 
specifications, the logarithm of the value of household assets explains a substantial proportion of the variation in ln𝑀. The 
F statistics associated with the instrumental variable are equal to 3364, 1971, 1127, 1444 and 560 in the full, urban, rural, 
top 50% and bottom 50% samples respectively.   
 
 
Coefficient on: Full 
Sample 
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50% 




























































































































Household Type 5 Omitted N/A N/A Omitted Omitted 
 
Household Type 6 Omitted Omitted N/A Omitted Omitted 
 
Household Type 7 1.160*** 
(0.215) 






Omitted N/A N/A Omitted Omitted 






F =  
4.200*** 
F =  
5.000*** 










Sample size 13661 7276 6385 7510 6151 
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Notes: The table shows results of an OLS regression of (ln𝑀)2 on its instrumental variable, the square of the logarithm of 
assets and other control variables as discussed in Section 2.4. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *, **, *** signify statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. I also report the F test for the joint significance of the cluster fixed 
effects.  In all data specifications, the square of the logarithm of the value of household assets explains a substantial 
proportion of the variation in (ln𝑀)2. The F statistics associated with the instrumental variable are equal to 3,136 1866, 
1444, 2162 and 697 in the Full, urban, rural, top 50% and bottom 50% samples respectively.   
   
Coefficient on: Full 
Sample 
Urban Rural Top 50% Bottom 
50% 




























































































































Household Type 5 Omitted N/A N/A Omitted Omitted 
 
Household Type 6 Omitted Omitted N/A Omitted Omitted 
 
Household Type 7 32.270*** 
(5.250) 






Omitted N/A N/A Omitted Omitted 




F =  
5.600*** 
F =  
4.200*** 
F =  
5.000*** 




















Sample size 13661 7276 6385 7510 6151 
64 
 
Table A 10: Three-stage Least Squares, Full Sample 
Variable Food Alc Health Sch Clothing Housing Water Electricity Alt. Energ Daily Tprt Other Tprt Equpt Ent Tele Remit Hse Care Pers. Cre
d -5.061*** 9.696*** 0.0118 -1.975** -2.665*** -0.366 -0.795*** -0.479 1.788*** 0.177 -0.661 0.405 0.398 0.687 0.627** 0.213 -1.566*
(1.634) (0.668) (0.337) (0.863) (0.890) (0.675) (0.273) (0.341) (0.554) (0.586) (0.652) (0.294) (0.260) (0.487) (0.261) (0.222) (0.872)
LnM 26.55*** -5.832** -1.624 -3.557 10.50*** 5.881** -0.754 -4.396*** 9.116*** -28.57*** 8.146*** -2.838** -6.110*** 0.361 -0.219 -5.036*** -10.06***
(6.477) (2.647) (1.334) (3.420) (3.528) (2.676) (1.081) (1.350) (2.195) (2.324) (2.583) (1.165) (1.032) (1.929) (1.034) (0.882) (3.455)
LnM2 -1.360*** 0.214** 0.0619 0.195 -0.429*** -0.232** 0.0424 0.233*** -0.435*** 1.241*** -0.279*** 0.157*** 0.266*** 0.0806 0.0380 0.230*** 0.330**
(0.250) (0.102) (0.0515) (0.132) (0.136) (0.103) (0.0417) (0.0521) (0.0847) (0.0897) (0.0997) (0.0450) (0.0398) (0.0745) (0.0399) (0.0340) (0.133)
Adult prop -3.056* 0.960 0.259 1.307 1.422* 0.726 0.425 -0.241 0.00894 0.911 -0.431 -0.147 -0.168 -0.140 -1.018*** -0.349 -1.620*
(1.587) (0.648) (0.327) (0.838) (0.864) (0.656) (0.265) (0.331) (0.538) (0.569) (0.633) (0.285) (0.253) (0.473) (0.253) (0.216) (0.846)
loghhsize -0.436 -0.0387 0.242* 3.334*** 0.746** -1.192*** -0.0609 -0.349** -0.0305 -0.0468 -0.566** 0.166 -0.241** -0.557*** -0.504*** -0.414*** -0.308
(0.673) (0.275) (0.139) (0.355) (0.366) (0.278) (0.112) (0.140) (0.228) (0.241) (0.268) (0.121) (0.107) (0.200) (0.107) (0.0916) (0.359)
Head Sch -0.0615 -0.144 -0.205 1.007*** -0.233 0.521** 0.0512 0.145 -0.281 -0.139 -0.183 0.0811 -0.0557 0.0505 0.0796 -0.170** -0.415
(0.616) (0.252) (0.127) (0.325) (0.336) (0.255) (0.103) (0.128) (0.209) (0.221) (0.246) (0.111) (0.0982) (0.184) (0.0984) (0.0839) (0.329)
Head w age 0.172 0.563*** -0.161 0.160 -0.684*** 2.075*** -0.214*** -0.419*** -0.0296 -1.125*** -0.506*** -0.911*** -0.0266 0.168 -0.0235 -0.0524 1.369***
(0.482) (0.197) (0.0992) (0.254) (0.262) (0.199) (0.0804) (0.100) (0.163) (0.173) (0.192) (0.0867) (0.0767) (0.143) (0.0769) (0.0656) (0.257)
Hhold Emp 0.195 0.0849 0.0227 -0.815*** 0.347*** -0.130 -0.0879** -0.189*** 0.0261 0.0205 0.0264 0.0201 0.0511 0.0152 0.127*** 0.0264 0.231**
(0.215) (0.0880) (0.0444) (0.114) (0.117) (0.0890) (0.0359) (0.0449) (0.0730) (0.0773) (0.0859) (0.0387) (0.0343) (0.0642) (0.0344) (0.0293) (0.115)
Adult Age 3.111* -0.0858 0.728** -8.060*** 0.582 1.098* -0.158 -0.632* 0.592 1.080* 0.228 0.501* 0.399 0.442 -0.205 0.306 -0.620
(1.598) (0.653) (0.329) (0.844) (0.870) (0.660) (0.267) (0.333) (0.541) (0.573) (0.637) (0.287) (0.255) (0.476) (0.255) (0.218) (0.852)
Child age -0.514* -0.136 0.0591 2.314*** -0.682*** -0.420*** 0.00827 0.0746 -0.141 -0.0248 -0.0418 -0.0993* -0.0211 -0.0132 -0.0881* -0.0117 -0.290*
(0.290) (0.119) (0.0597) (0.153) (0.158) (0.120) (0.0484) (0.0604) (0.0983) (0.104) (0.116) (0.0522) (0.0462) (0.0864) (0.0463) (0.0395) (0.155)
Head Age -2.565* -1.031* -0.338 10.30*** -2.379*** -2.286*** 0.650*** 0.973*** 0.00349 -1.138** 0.588 -0.458* -0.404* -0.683 0.0955 -0.149 -0.392
(1.417) (0.579) (0.292) (0.748) (0.772) (0.585) (0.236) (0.295) (0.480) (0.508) (0.565) (0.255) (0.226) (0.422) (0.226) (0.193) (0.756)
Most Edu 0.577 0.797** -0.0221 -0.383 -0.855* 0.333 -0.0856 -0.348* -0.0197 -0.376 -0.131 -0.711*** 0.112 -0.210 -0.0589 0.188 1.239***
(0.859) (0.351) (0.177) (0.453) (0.468) (0.355) (0.143) (0.179) (0.291) (0.308) (0.342) (0.154) (0.137) (0.256) (0.137) (0.117) (0.458)
2.stratum -1.009 -0.364 0.118 0.919** 0.278 0.223 -0.378** -0.845*** 0.102 1.315*** -0.0134 0.190 -0.126 -0.396 -0.00863 0.167 -0.143
(0.882) (0.360) (0.182) (0.466) (0.480) (0.364) (0.147) (0.184) (0.299) (0.316) (0.352) (0.159) (0.140) (0.263) (0.141) (0.120) (0.470)
3.stratum 0.767 -1.696 -0.300 -1.769 -3.910* 0.996 -0.967 -2.668*** 2.099 6.046*** -3.165** 1.927*** -1.346** 2.346** 2.757*** -0.0135 -1.751
(3.819) (1.561) (0.787) (2.017) (2.080) (1.578) (0.637) (0.796) (1.294) (1.370) (1.523) (0.687) (0.608) (1.138) (0.610) (0.520) (2.037)
4.stratum 7.446*** -1.224*** 0.275 -0.732* -2.829*** -0.591* 0.0315 -0.148 0.411 0.0621 0.441 -0.608*** -0.0599 -0.183 -0.171 0.00814 -1.892***
(0.837) (0.342) (0.172) (0.442) (0.456) (0.346) (0.140) (0.175) (0.284) (0.300) (0.334) (0.151) (0.133) (0.249) (0.134) (0.114) (0.447)
5.stratum 6.829*** 0.723** -0.203 -2.089*** -0.994** 3.436*** 0.788*** 0.469** -0.225 2.423*** 0.0315 0.533*** -0.188* -0.521** 0.286** 0.0197 -1.167***
(0.683) (0.364) (0.141) (0.360) (0.485) (0.282) (0.114) (0.186) (0.302) (0.320) (0.355) (0.128) (0.109) (0.203) (0.142) (0.0929) (0.364)
6.stratum 7.302*** 0.491 -0.303 -1.621*** -0.599 4.419*** 1.894*** 1.026*** -0.665** 0.460 -0.0577 Omitted -0.486*** -0.952*** -0.197 -0.0341 -0.0473
(0.939) (0.384) (0.194) (0.496) (0.512) (0.388) (0.157) (0.196) (0.318) (0.337) (0.375) (0.150) (0.280) (0.150) (0.128) (0.501)
7.stratum 7.473*** Omitted -0.373* -2.226*** Omitted 3.440*** 1.226*** Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted 0.186 0.584*** -0.513 Omitted 0.944*** -0.648
(1.051) (0.217) (0.555) (0.434) (0.175) (0.169) (0.167) (0.313) (0.143) (0.561)
Cluster 4.06e-05 -0.000462* -2.43e-05 0.00151*** 0.00106*** -0.000324 3.16e-05 -0.000465*** -0.000915*** 8.13e-05 -0.000322 -0.000212* 0.000205* 0.000948*** 8.82e-05 -0.000210** -0.00148***
(0.000660) (0.000270) (0.000136) (0.000348) (0.000359) (0.000273) (0.000110) (0.000138) (0.000224) (0.000237) (0.000263) (0.000119) (0.000105) (0.000197) (0.000105) (8.99e-05) (0.000352)
Tobacco -1.426 -0.302 0.146 0.198 2.374* 0.416 -0.152 -0.657 -1.174 0.349 -0.316 0.659 0.562 -0.603 -0.107 -0.359 0.470
(2.310) (0.944) (0.476) (1.220) (1.258) (0.954) (0.385) (0.482) (0.783) (0.829) (0.921) (0.416) (0.368) (0.688) (0.369) (0.315) (1.232)
Cons -70.59* 42.64** 10.27 -0.0729 -43.03* -31.07* 1.586 19.84** -43.19*** 164.8*** -55.74*** 14.00* 35.22*** -12.98 -0.713 27.78*** 89.40***
(41.34) (16.90) (8.517) (21.83) (22.52) (17.08) (6.897) (8.617) (14.01) (14.83) (16.48) (7.436) (6.585) (12.31) (6.599) (5.628) (22.05)
Obs. 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555 8,555




Table A 11: Three-stage Least Squares, Urban Sample  
 
Variable Food Alc Health Sch Clothing Housing Water Electricity Alt. Energ Daily Tprt Other Tprt Equpt Ent Tele Remit Hse Care Pers. Cre
d -0.728 8.656*** 0.267 -2.925* -2.751** -1.829 -2.228*** -2.164*** 1.251 0.256 -0.249 1.038** 0.817 2.099* 1.490*** -0.417 -1.788
(2.543) (1.019) (0.434) (1.523) (1.194) (1.666) (0.679) (0.813) (0.943) (1.264) (1.032) (0.449) (0.620) (1.111) (0.497) (0.492) (1.310)
LnM 32.17** -7.443 -0.222 -1.429 10.06 16.23* 3.475 13.02*** -12.97*** -53.64*** 6.456 -16.27*** -13.08*** 27.71*** 1.528 -6.976*** 4.414
(13.38) (5.362) (2.283) (8.011) (6.279) (8.763) (3.569) (4.274) (4.960) (6.651) (5.429) (2.363) (3.259) (5.841) (2.616) (2.587) (6.891)
LnM2 -1.558*** 0.270 0.00811 0.123 -0.387* -0.615* -0.115 -0.406** 0.368** 2.156*** -0.228 0.652*** 0.530*** -0.926*** -0.0273 0.300*** -0.212
(0.497) (0.199) (0.0849) (0.298) (0.233) (0.326) (0.133) (0.159) (0.184) (0.247) (0.202) (0.0878) (0.121) (0.217) (0.0972) (0.0962) (0.256)
Adult prop -2.786 1.330* 0.698** 0.291 0.134 1.452 0.755 -0.0159 -0.400 0.824 -0.326 -0.481 -0.433 0.246 -0.910** -0.718** -0.327
(1.811) (0.726) (0.309) (1.085) (0.850) (1.187) (0.483) (0.579) (0.672) (0.901) (0.735) (0.320) (0.441) (0.791) (0.354) (0.350) (0.933)
loghhsize 0.986 0.100 0.181 3.019*** 0.194 -1.775*** -0.193 -0.499** 0.555* -0.416 -0.171 -0.0819 -0.432** -0.862** -0.701*** -0.517*** 0.316
(0.772) (0.310) (0.132) (0.463) (0.363) (0.506) (0.206) (0.247) (0.286) (0.384) (0.313) (0.136) (0.188) (0.337) (0.151) (0.149) (0.398)
Head Sch -1.508* -0.0825 -0.471*** 0.958* 0.332 1.443** 0.0185 0.148 -0.801** -0.340 0.629* 0.175 -0.121 0.195 -0.0876 -0.581*** 0.334
(0.861) (0.345) (0.147) (0.515) (0.404) (0.564) (0.230) (0.275) (0.319) (0.428) (0.349) (0.152) (0.210) (0.376) (0.168) (0.166) (0.443)
Head w age -0.768 0.492*** -0.130 0.280 -0.219 2.004*** -0.245* -0.521*** 0.345* -0.647*** -0.592*** -0.452*** 0.0257 -0.197 -0.0925 -0.0259 1.009***
(0.476) (0.191) (0.0812) (0.285) (0.223) (0.312) (0.127) (0.152) (0.176) (0.236) (0.193) (0.0840) (0.116) (0.208) (0.0930) (0.0920) (0.245)
Hhold Emp 0.184 0.174 0.0414 -0.779*** 0.489*** -0.265 -0.0769 -0.277*** -0.147 -0.0529 0.0510 -0.0193 0.0458 0.212* 0.167*** 0.0323 0.134
(0.269) (0.108) (0.0458) (0.161) (0.126) (0.176) (0.0717) (0.0858) (0.0996) (0.134) (0.109) (0.0475) (0.0654) (0.117) (0.0525) (0.0520) (0.138)
Adult Age 2.425 0.291 1.220*** -7.071*** -0.0215 1.228 -0.00510 -0.805 0.793 0.0707 1.009 -0.335 0.276 0.748 -0.0703 0.438 -0.811
(1.944) (0.779) (0.332) (1.164) (0.912) (1.273) (0.519) (0.621) (0.721) (0.966) (0.789) (0.343) (0.473) (0.849) (0.380) (0.376) (1.001)
Child age -0.669** -0.0655 0.0734 2.247*** -0.251 -0.852*** 0.00567 0.0854 -0.179 0.0955 -0.0574 8.93e-05 0.00127 -0.0397 -0.0607 -0.0442 -0.335*
(0.339) (0.136) (0.0578) (0.203) (0.159) (0.222) (0.0903) (0.108) (0.126) (0.168) (0.137) (0.0598) (0.0825) (0.148) (0.0662) (0.0655) (0.174)
Head Age -1.943 -1.515** -0.494* 9.218*** -1.012 -4.080*** 1.285*** 1.685*** 0.614 -0.959 0.108 0.185 -0.471 -0.978 0.0495 -0.295 -0.466
(1.663) (0.666) (0.284) (0.996) (0.780) (1.089) (0.444) (0.531) (0.616) (0.827) (0.675) (0.294) (0.405) (0.726) (0.325) (0.322) (0.857)
Most Edu 0.642 0.935* 0.632*** -0.614 -1.957*** 0.501 -0.0719 -1.022** 0.572 0.399 -0.506 -0.577** 0.376 -0.945 0.0981 0.923*** 0.208
(1.320) (0.529) (0.225) (0.791) (0.620) (0.865) (0.352) (0.422) (0.490) (0.656) (0.536) (0.233) (0.322) (0.577) (0.258) (0.255) (0.680)
6.stratum 0.605 -0.194 -0.145 0.418 -0.177 0.867** 1.017*** 0.314 -0.00861 -1.496*** 0.0535 -0.456*** -0.338** -0.736*** -0.459*** -0.0121 0.998***
(0.609) (0.244) (0.104) (0.364) (0.286) (0.399) (0.162) (0.194) (0.226) (0.303) (0.247) (0.108) (0.148) (0.266) (0.119) (0.118) (0.314)
7.stratum 0.969 -0.667** -0.194 -0.208 0.188 -0.0293 0.474** -0.335 0.349 -2.444*** 0.157 -0.584*** 0.510*** 0.217 -0.238 0.946*** 0.794**
(0.780) (0.313) (0.133) (0.467) (0.366) (0.511) (0.208) (0.249) (0.289) (0.388) (0.317) (0.138) (0.190) (0.341) (0.153) (0.151) (0.402)
Cluster -6.31e-05 -0.000805** -6.62e-05 0.00223*** 0.00132*** -0.000579 -9.52e-05 -0.000744*** -0.00141*** -0.000657 -0.000180 -0.000111 0.000306 0.00202*** 0.000340** -0.000424*** -0.000835**
(0.000814) (0.000326) (0.000139) (0.000488) (0.000382) (0.000534) (0.000217) (0.000260) (0.000302) (0.000405) (0.000331) (0.000144) (0.000198) (0.000356) (0.000159) (0.000158) (0.000420)
Tobacco -5.535 -2.021 -0.0399 0.139 0.204 5.689 -0.282 -2.401 -0.0952 8.740*** -0.0992 0.924 -1.625 -0.789 -0.570 -1.648 -0.596
(5.483) (2.198) (0.936) (3.283) (2.573) (3.592) (1.463) (1.752) (2.033) (2.726) (2.225) (0.968) (1.335) (2.394) (1.072) (1.060) (2.824)
Cons -102.5 53.77 -1.252 -15.47 -51.80 -91.47 -28.46 -98.24*** 106.6*** 337.3*** -46.53 103.2*** 81.30*** -197.1*** -13.23 40.99** -7.869
(89.15) (35.73) (15.21) (53.38) (41.84) (58.40) (23.79) (28.48) (33.05) (44.32) (36.18) (15.75) (21.71) (38.92) (17.43) (17.24) (45.92)
Obs. 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545 4,545
R-squared 0.308 0.016 0.012 0.199 -0.024 0.074 -0.000 -0.016 0.139 0.149 0.011 -0.052 0.079 0.017 -0.004 0.107 0.018
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 Table A 12: Three-stage Least Squares, Rural Sample             
 
 
Variable Food Alc Health Sch Clothing Housing Water Electricity Alt. Energ Daily Tprt Other Tprt Equpt Ent Tele Remit Hse Care Pers. Cre
d -7.086*** 10.06*** -0.0644 -1.662 -2.836** 0.134 -0.119 0.132 2.205*** 0.305 -0.761 0.195 0.220 0.0606 0.279 0.390** -1.116
(2.250) (0.928) (0.507) (1.084) (1.328) (0.177) (0.111) (0.221) (0.733) (0.563) (0.884) (0.423) (0.157) (0.410) (0.303) (0.192) (1.227)
LnM 29.76** -5.094 -1.309 -7.040 29.17*** -0.363 -0.680 -7.627*** 10.64** -27.50*** 3.892 1.252 -0.300 -9.989*** -2.699 -5.397*** -17.28**
(13.60) (5.612) (3.062) (6.555) (8.029) (1.072) (0.670) (1.337) (4.434) (3.405) (5.346) (2.557) (0.948) (2.477) (1.833) (1.158) (7.420)
LnM2 -1.509*** 0.186 0.0479 0.334 -1.253*** 0.0169 0.0316 0.342*** -0.455** 1.243*** -0.0827 0.00403 0.0184 0.483*** 0.142* 0.248*** 0.627**
(0.562) (0.232) (0.127) (0.271) (0.332) (0.0443) (0.0277) (0.0553) (0.183) (0.141) (0.221) (0.106) (0.0392) (0.102) (0.0758) (0.0479) (0.307)
Adult prop -3.440 0.352 -0.307 3.064** 3.230* 0.0386 0.137 0.108 -0.145 0.0463 -0.456 -0.251 -0.100 0.404 -1.044*** 0.0162 -2.989*
(2.801) (1.156) (0.631) (1.350) (1.654) (0.221) (0.138) (0.275) (0.913) (0.701) (1.101) (0.527) (0.195) (0.510) (0.378) (0.238) (1.528)
loghhsize -2.397** -0.211 0.252 4.012*** 1.381** -0.111 0.0335 -0.0745 -0.904** 0.163 -0.928** 0.314 -0.0553 -0.0476 -0.304* -0.272*** -1.012
(1.160) (0.479) (0.261) (0.559) (0.685) (0.0914) (0.0571) (0.114) (0.378) (0.290) (0.456) (0.218) (0.0809) (0.211) (0.156) (0.0987) (0.633)
Head Sch 0.714 -0.178 -0.0753 1.131*** -0.499 -0.0411 0.0187 0.0716 0.0457 0.000993 -0.630* 0.0611 0.00795 -0.0596 0.172 0.0699 -0.900*
(0.889) (0.367) (0.200) (0.429) (0.525) (0.0701) (0.0438) (0.0874) (0.290) (0.223) (0.350) (0.167) (0.0620) (0.162) (0.120) (0.0757) (0.485)
Head w age 3.689*** 0.752 -0.307 -0.453 -0.961 0.694*** -0.0221 -0.429*** -0.179 -2.103*** -0.542 -1.816*** 0.161* 0.155 0.0611 -0.145 1.802***
(1.239) (0.511) (0.279) (0.597) (0.732) (0.0977) (0.0610) (0.122) (0.404) (0.310) (0.487) (0.233) (0.0864) (0.226) (0.167) (0.105) (0.676)
Hhold Emp 0.308 0.0113 0.0145 -0.919*** 0.201 -0.0324 -0.0424** -0.0141 0.142 -0.0194 -0.00448 -0.00382 0.0204 -0.104* 0.0853* 0.0111 0.415**
(0.345) (0.142) (0.0777) (0.166) (0.204) (0.0272) (0.0170) (0.0339) (0.112) (0.0864) (0.136) (0.0649) (0.0241) (0.0628) (0.0465) (0.0294) (0.188)
Adult Age 4.534* -0.505 0.268 -9.295*** 1.276 -0.189 0.0615 0.140 0.781 1.447** -0.389 1.049** 0.168 0.366 -0.349 0.127 -0.0461
(2.594) (1.070) (0.584) (1.250) (1.532) (0.204) (0.128) (0.255) (0.846) (0.649) (1.020) (0.488) (0.181) (0.473) (0.350) (0.221) (1.415)
Child age -0.454 -0.229 0.0464 2.425*** -1.036*** 0.0906** 0.00217 0.0621 -0.124 -0.162 -0.0376 -0.180** -0.0172 -1.71e-05 -0.125* 0.0258 -0.288
(0.482) (0.199) (0.109) (0.232) (0.285) (0.0380) (0.0238) (0.0474) (0.157) (0.121) (0.190) (0.0907) (0.0336) (0.0879) (0.0650) (0.0411) (0.263)
Head Age -3.800 -0.467 -0.0967 11.46*** -3.467** -0.184 -0.0692 -0.112 -0.778 -0.958 0.968 -0.856* -0.0900 -0.540 0.188 -0.00158 -0.650
(2.360) (0.974) (0.531) (1.138) (1.393) (0.186) (0.116) (0.232) (0.769) (0.591) (0.928) (0.444) (0.165) (0.430) (0.318) (0.201) (1.288)
Most Edu 0.383 0.734 -0.349 -0.351 -0.210 0.199** -0.0624 -0.0818 -0.232 -0.645** 0.0767 -0.660*** 0.0235 0.0154 -0.157 -0.192* 1.772***
(1.189) (0.491) (0.268) (0.573) (0.702) (0.0937) (0.0586) (0.117) (0.388) (0.298) (0.467) (0.224) (0.0829) (0.217) (0.160) (0.101) (0.649)
2.stratum -0.329 -0.360 0.183 0.678 1.218** -0.0920 -0.140*** -0.363*** -0.405 0.441* -0.266 -0.118 -0.106 -0.0838 -0.101 0.0790 0.0723
(1.022) (0.422) (0.230) (0.493) (0.604) (0.0806) (0.0504) (0.101) (0.333) (0.256) (0.402) (0.192) (0.0713) (0.186) (0.138) (0.0870) (0.558)
3.stratum 3.143 -1.660 -0.161 -2.600 0.947 -0.163 -0.380 -1.697*** 0.561 3.621*** -4.558** 1.460 -0.396 2.008** 2.252*** -0.265 -2.215
(4.897) (2.021) (1.103) (2.360) (2.891) (0.386) (0.241) (0.481) (1.596) (1.226) (1.925) (0.921) (0.341) (0.892) (0.660) (0.417) (2.672)
4.stratum 6.490*** -1.250*** 0.306 -0.497 -2.670*** 0.232*** 0.0320 -0.0190 0.0312 0.119 0.282 -0.543*** 0.00700 -0.0707 -0.185 0.0480 -1.990***
(0.978) (0.403) (0.220) (0.471) (0.577) (0.0771) (0.0482) (0.0961) (0.319) (0.245) (0.384) (0.184) (0.0682) (0.178) (0.132) (0.0832) (0.534)
Cluster 0.000155 -0.000148 0.000110 0.000732 0.00120* 8.32e-05 0.000257*** 0.000160 -0.000872** 0.000311 -0.000583 -0.000476** 6.53e-05 0.000269 -0.000166 -2.49e-05 -0.00203***
(0.00110) (0.000454) (0.000248) (0.000530) (0.000649) (8.67e-05) (5.42e-05) (0.000108) (0.000359) (0.000275) (0.000432) (0.000207) (7.67e-05) (0.000200) (0.000148) (9.36e-05) (0.000600)
Tobacco -0.476 0.00740 0.196 0.0420 2.289 -0.0673 -0.0486 -0.0584 -1.489 -1.058 -0.428 0.319 0.730*** -0.445 -0.0619 -0.133 0.782
(2.852) (1.177) (0.642) (1.375) (1.684) (0.225) (0.140) (0.280) (0.930) (0.714) (1.121) (0.536) (0.199) (0.520) (0.384) (0.243) (1.556)
Cons -86.05 37.97 9.890 19.81 -148.1*** 2.999 3.715 42.16*** -55.06** 150.7*** -30.94 -13.04 0.836 51.66*** 14.14 29.34*** 133.4***
(81.69) (33.71) (18.39) (39.37) (48.23) (6.439) (4.024) (8.031) (26.63) (20.45) (32.11) (15.36) (5.695) (14.88) (11.01) (6.954) (44.57)
Obs. 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010 4,010
R-squared 0.040 0.055 0.010 0.211 -0.013 0.046 0.013 -0.004 -0.022 0.095 0.053 -0.053 0.012 0.111 0.052 0.023 0.035
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Table A 13: Three-stage Least Squares, Top 50%              
Variable Food Alc Health Sch Clothing Housing Water Electricity Alt. Energ Daily Tprt Other Tprt Equpt Ent Tele Remit Hse Care Pers. Cre
d -4.275* 8.672*** 0.769* -0.735 0.661 -2.760* -2.187*** -1.684* -3.045*** 0.388 0.191 1.949*** 0.451 3.861*** 2.050*** -1.114** -3.148**
(2.504) (1.068) (0.447) (1.609) (1.143) (1.611) (0.600) (0.874) (0.843) (1.363) (1.269) (0.520) (0.636) (1.199) (0.573) (0.522) (1.246)
LnM -55.32 -32.12* -4.884 34.84 45.86*** 24.40 9.749 71.36*** -83.32*** -100.2*** 27.83 -22.37*** -15.31 117.1*** 22.85*** -12.56 7.759
(38.68) (16.50) (6.907) (24.84) (17.65) (24.88) (9.270) (13.49) (13.01) (21.04) (19.60) (8.026) (9.826) (18.52) (8.853) (8.067) (19.24)
LnM2 1.572 1.152* 0.176 -1.199 -1.663*** -0.931 -0.335 -2.488*** 2.887*** 3.849*** -1.003 0.882*** 0.607* -4.127*** -0.788** 0.501* -0.331
(1.392) (0.594) (0.249) (0.894) (0.636) (0.896) (0.334) (0.486) (0.468) (0.758) (0.706) (0.289) (0.354) (0.667) (0.319) (0.290) (0.693)
Adult prop -4.022** -0.0406 0.664* 0.619 0.00958 2.163* 0.857* 0.422 -0.295 1.320 -0.615 -0.174 -0.494 0.479 -1.273*** -0.655 0.477
(1.950) (0.832) (0.348) (1.253) (0.890) (1.255) (0.468) (0.680) (0.656) (1.061) (0.988) (0.405) (0.496) (0.934) (0.446) (0.407) (0.970)
loghhsize 0.992 -0.314 0.0912 3.792*** -0.341 -1.582*** -0.133 -0.498* 0.926*** -0.145 -0.889** 0.0886 -0.520** -0.653* -0.784*** -0.576*** 0.407
(0.822) (0.351) (0.147) (0.528) (0.375) (0.529) (0.197) (0.287) (0.276) (0.447) (0.416) (0.171) (0.209) (0.393) (0.188) (0.171) (0.409)
Head Sch -0.587 -0.275 -0.558*** 2.103*** -0.121 1.342** -0.300 0.0292 -0.671** -0.204 0.704 0.167 -0.175 0.129 0.0747 -0.610*** -0.610
(0.918) (0.392) (0.164) (0.589) (0.419) (0.590) (0.220) (0.320) (0.309) (0.499) (0.465) (0.190) (0.233) (0.439) (0.210) (0.191) (0.456)
Head w age -0.00822 0.626*** -0.0699 0.174 -0.0315 1.677*** -0.159 -0.765*** 0.259 -0.813*** -0.968*** -0.591*** 0.0901 -0.210 -0.149 -0.0320 1.102***
(0.519) (0.221) (0.0927) (0.333) (0.237) (0.334) (0.124) (0.181) (0.175) (0.282) (0.263) (0.108) (0.132) (0.248) (0.119) (0.108) (0.258)
Hhold Emp 0.268 0.0887 -0.00529 -0.765*** 0.224* -0.0554 -0.102 -0.218** -0.0628 -0.130 0.125 -0.0894 0.0669 0.134 0.199*** 0.00181 0.226*
(0.273) (0.117) (0.0488) (0.176) (0.125) (0.176) (0.0655) (0.0953) (0.0920) (0.149) (0.139) (0.0567) (0.0694) (0.131) (0.0626) (0.0570) (0.136)
Adult Age 1.627 -0.370 0.907** -8.260*** 0.233 2.254* 0.331 -0.0613 0.324 0.464 0.813 -0.252 0.406 1.034 -0.199 0.680 0.00803
(2.094) (0.893) (0.374) (1.345) (0.956) (1.347) (0.502) (0.730) (0.705) (1.139) (1.061) (0.435) (0.532) (1.003) (0.479) (0.437) (1.042)
Child age -0.693* -0.372** 0.0878 2.461*** -0.323* -0.931*** -0.00535 0.0739 -0.0605 0.0618 -0.136 0.0636 0.0117 -0.0355 -0.106 -0.0392 -0.125
(0.378) (0.161) (0.0676) (0.243) (0.173) (0.244) (0.0907) (0.132) (0.127) (0.206) (0.192) (0.0785) (0.0962) (0.181) (0.0866) (0.0789) (0.188)
Head Age -1.466 -0.467 -0.0989 10.37*** -0.688 -4.865*** 0.988** 1.405** 0.283 -1.416 1.052 -0.0371 -0.524 -1.685** 0.0981 -0.444 -2.007**
(1.780) (0.760) (0.318) (1.144) (0.813) (1.146) (0.427) (0.621) (0.599) (0.969) (0.902) (0.369) (0.452) (0.852) (0.408) (0.371) (0.885)
Most Edu -0.422 0.886 0.699*** -0.745 -0.968 0.559 0.132 -0.935* 0.690 -1.075 -0.765 -0.783*** 0.325 -0.522 0.0270 1.097*** 0.857
(1.410) (0.602) (0.252) (0.906) (0.644) (0.907) (0.338) (0.492) (0.475) (0.767) (0.715) (0.293) (0.358) (0.675) (0.323) (0.294) (0.701)
2.stratum -0.781 -0.0353 0.130 -0.144 -0.440 0.868 -0.755** -1.377*** -0.469 3.188*** -1.472** 1.092*** -0.144 0.0147 0.0622 0.392 -0.531
(1.395) (0.595) (0.249) (0.896) (0.637) (0.898) (0.334) (0.487) (0.469) (0.759) (0.707) (0.290) (0.354) (0.668) (0.319) (0.291) (0.694)
3.stratum -3.452 -1.526 -0.500 -2.182 -2.171 2.234 -1.498 -3.409** 2.490* 10.42*** -4.609** 1.446* -1.546 0.192 4.135*** 0.836 -1.447
(4.233) (1.806) (0.756) (2.719) (1.932) (2.724) (1.015) (1.477) (1.424) (2.303) (2.145) (0.879) (1.076) (2.027) (0.969) (0.883) (2.105)
4.stratum 6.751*** -0.818 -0.395 -2.698** -0.973 -1.061 -0.205 -0.913 0.412 0.930 1.230 0.0256 -0.136 -0.685 -0.547 -0.0292 -1.283
(1.793) (0.765) (0.320) (1.151) (0.818) (1.153) (0.430) (0.625) (0.603) (0.975) (0.909) (0.372) (0.455) (0.858) (0.410) (0.374) (0.892)
5.stratum 4.150*** 0.751** 0.240 -2.938*** -0.425 3.980*** -0.630*** 0.0342 0.474 3.340*** -3.294*** 0.762*** -0.672*** -0.914** 0.517*** -0.937*** -0.379
(0.896) (0.381) (0.159) (0.576) (0.407) (0.577) (0.214) (0.311) (0.300) (0.485) (0.454) (0.185) (0.227) (0.427) (0.150) (0.186) (0.444)
6.stratum 6.136*** 0.537 0.0967 -2.781*** -0.315 4.697*** 0.347 0.00885 0.319 1.699*** -3.257*** 0.275 -0.964*** -1.954*** Omitted -0.964*** 0.394
(1.105) (0.418) (0.175) (0.710) (0.447) (0.711) (0.235) (0.342) (0.330) (0.533) (0.560) (0.203) (0.249) (0.469) (0.204) (0.487)
7.stratum 4.991*** Omitted Omitted -2.641*** Omitted 4.305*** Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted -2.732*** Omitted Omitted Omitted 0.402* Omitted Omitted
(1.171) (0.752) (0.753) (0.593) (0.224)
Cluster -0.000351 -0.000321 8.99e-06 0.00189*** 0.000239 -8.75e-05 -0.000402** -0.00103*** 0.000177 0.000430 -0.000318 -0.000149 0.000463** 0.00129*** 0.000305 -0.000239 -0.00178***
(0.000810) (0.000345) (0.000145) (0.000520) (0.000370) (0.000521) (0.000194) (0.000282) (0.000272) (0.000441) (0.000410) (0.000168) (0.000206) (0.000388) (0.000185) (0.000169) (0.000403)
Tobacco -5.837 -2.723* 0.139 4.676* 5.820*** 0.402 -0.493 -0.488 -0.834 1.160 0.288 -0.750 -0.445 0.599 -0.428 -1.257 0.548
(3.739) (1.595) (0.668) (2.401) (1.706) (2.405) (0.896) (1.304) (1.258) (2.034) (1.895) (0.776) (0.950) (1.790) (0.856) (0.780) (1.859)
Cons 504.6* 226.5** 30.70 -265.3 -300.4** -148.9 -73.30 -506.5*** 595.5*** 659.1*** -190.8 144.5*** 97.51 -818.9*** -161.3*** 79.15 -27.35
(266.7) (113.8) (47.62) (171.3) (121.7) (171.6) (63.92) (93.00) (89.72) (145.1) (135.1) (55.34) (67.74) (127.7) (61.04) (55.62) (132.6)
Obs. 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092 4,092
R-squared 0.248 0.005 -0.002 0.193 -0.004 0.080 0.015 -0.089 -0.040 0.147 0.013 -0.066 0.081 -0.144 -0.040 0.064 0.017
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Table A 14: Three-Stage Least Squares, Bottom 50% 
Variable Food Alc Health Sch Clothing Housing Water Electricity Alt. Energ Daily Tprt Other Tprt Equpt Ent Tele Remit Hse Care Pers. Cre
d -6.315*** 8.989*** -0.113 -2.096** -3.174** 0.571** -0.0950 0.114 2.204*** -0.325 1.504** -1.136*** 0.174 -0.218 0.196 0.464*** -0.517
(2.235) (0.956) (0.505) (0.935) (1.411) (0.269) (0.209) (0.0825) (0.774) (0.227) (0.635) (0.373) (0.134) (0.338) (0.226) (0.155) (1.318)
LnM 121.9 12.01 -24.29 -36.87 76.27 -5.299 -5.798 -0.699 12.44 -10.64 6.245 8.403 2.540 -48.22*** -5.151 -7.765 -105.8**
(90.30) (38.62) (20.42) (37.79) (57.03) (10.88) (8.427) (3.334) (31.26) (9.173) (25.64) (15.07) (5.413) (13.64) (9.125) (6.282) (53.26)
LnM2 -5.659 -0.615 1.104 1.704 -3.383 0.219 0.270 0.0346 -0.525 0.500 -0.260 -0.293 -0.113 2.216*** 0.253 0.364 4.607*
(4.067) (1.739) (0.920) (1.702) (2.568) (0.490) (0.380) (0.150) (1.408) (0.413) (1.155) (0.679) (0.244) (0.614) (0.411) (0.283) (2.399)
Adult prop -5.380* 2.127 -0.473 3.263** 4.006** 0.105 0.469 -0.0831 0.331 0.107 -1.505* -0.0485 0.134 0.518 -0.501 -0.00480 -3.479*
(3.175) (1.358) (0.718) (1.329) (2.005) (0.383) (0.296) (0.117) (1.099) (0.323) (0.902) (0.530) (0.190) (0.480) (0.321) (0.221) (1.873)
loghhsize -2.866** 0.305 0.0263 2.983*** 2.192** -0.102 0.0399 -0.0597 -0.948** -0.0833 -0.565 0.127 0.0436 -0.0192 -0.162 -0.194** -0.830
(1.350) (0.577) (0.305) (0.565) (0.852) (0.163) (0.126) (0.0498) (0.467) (0.137) (0.383) (0.225) (0.0809) (0.204) (0.136) (0.0939) (0.796)
Head Sch 0.247 -0.0462 0.00404 0.364 0.113 -0.0997 0.0454 0.0307 0.0938 0.0582 -0.670** 0.221 0.0487 0.0203 0.164 0.00402 -0.719
(1.003) (0.429) (0.227) (0.420) (0.633) (0.121) (0.0936) (0.0370) (0.347) (0.102) (0.285) (0.167) (0.0601) (0.151) (0.101) (0.0698) (0.591)
Head w age 3.269* 1.034 -0.851** -1.584** -1.685 1.057*** -0.288 -0.0749 1.011 -0.238 -0.146 -0.795** -0.0448 -0.645** -0.0133 -0.0809 0.279
(1.913) (0.818) (0.433) (0.801) (1.208) (0.230) (0.179) (0.0706) (0.662) (0.194) (0.543) (0.319) (0.115) (0.289) (0.193) (0.133) (1.128)
Hhold Emp 0.377 0.0333 0.0412 -0.876*** 0.363 -0.0524 -0.0441 -0.0206 0.00809 -0.0191 -0.00695 0.0704 0.0227 -0.0511 0.0332 0.0563** 0.182
(0.404) (0.173) (0.0914) (0.169) (0.255) (0.0487) (0.0377) (0.0149) (0.140) (0.0411) (0.115) (0.0675) (0.0242) (0.0611) (0.0409) (0.0281) (0.239)
Adult Age 3.846 -0.0246 0.690 -6.085*** 0.853 -0.0956 0.119 -0.101 1.123 -0.0955 -1.011 1.042** 0.230 0.515 -0.253 -0.0507 -0.876
(2.958) (1.265) (0.669) (1.238) (1.868) (0.356) (0.276) (0.109) (1.024) (0.300) (0.840) (0.494) (0.177) (0.447) (0.299) (0.206) (1.744)
Child age -0.419 -0.0726 0.0859 2.093*** -0.785** -0.0717 0.0465 0.00953 -0.229 0.0238 -0.173 -0.117 -0.0118 0.0177 -0.0603 0.0331 -0.300
(0.510) (0.218) (0.115) (0.214) (0.322) (0.0615) (0.0476) (0.0188) (0.177) (0.0518) (0.145) (0.0852) (0.0306) (0.0771) (0.0516) (0.0355) (0.301)
Head Age -2.080 -1.172 -0.493 8.790*** -3.334** -0.553* -0.119 0.147 -0.656 0.189 1.024 -0.720 -0.176 -0.613 0.156 0.143 -0.230
(2.684) (1.148) (0.607) (1.123) (1.695) (0.323) (0.251) (0.0991) (0.929) (0.273) (0.762) (0.448) (0.161) (0.405) (0.271) (0.187) (1.583)
Most Edu 0.348 0.632 -0.462 0.295 -0.988 0.365** -0.167 -0.0529 -0.638 -0.111 0.257 -0.776*** -0.0204 -0.0598 -0.171 -0.181* 2.207***
(1.349) (0.577) (0.305) (0.564) (0.852) (0.162) (0.126) (0.0498) (0.467) (0.137) (0.383) (0.225) (0.0808) (0.204) (0.136) (0.0938) (0.795)
2.stratum -0.172 -0.314 -0.267 0.0449 1.367 0.185 -0.158 -0.0268 -0.445 -0.179 -0.0521 -0.190 -0.00530 -0.167 0.0917 0.123 0.311
(1.468) (0.628) (0.332) (0.614) (0.927) (0.177) (0.137) (0.0542) (0.508) (0.149) (0.417) (0.245) (0.0880) (0.222) (0.148) (0.102) (0.866)
4.stratum 7.913*** -1.282** 0.277 -0.260 -3.089*** -0.113 0.0504 0.0195 -0.337 0.0775 0.329 -0.786*** -0.00306 -0.0934 -0.164 0.106 -2.297***
(1.191) (0.509) (0.269) (0.498) (0.752) (0.143) (0.111) (0.0440) (0.412) (0.121) (0.338) (0.199) (0.0714) (0.180) (0.120) (0.0828) (0.702)
5.stratum 2.650 1.951 -2.033 -2.579 2.457 -0.899 -0.831 0.261 -2.195 0.372 0.376 0.571 0.102 -1.012 0.131 0.209 -12.39***
(5.697) (2.436) (1.725) (3.193) (4.819) (0.686) (0.532) (0.210) (1.972) (0.579) (2.167) (1.273) (0.457) (1.152) (0.576) (0.396) (4.500)
6.stratum -12.53 0.929 Omitted Omitted Omitted -2.992*** 1.499* 0.0562 -0.570 -0.118 Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted -0.261 -0.180 Omitted
(9.305) (3.979) (1.121) (0.868) (0.344) (3.221) (0.945) (0.940) (0.647)
7.stratum Omitted Omitted -2.522 -3.648 3.612 Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted -0.448 0.379 0.00357 -1.893 Omitted Omitted -8.530
(2.104) (3.894) (5.876) (2.642) (1.553) (0.558) (1.405) (5.488)
Cluster 0.00163 -0.000594 -0.000171 0.000616 0.00255*** -0.000334** 0.000404*** 3.14e-06 -0.00171*** -0.000140 -0.00103*** -0.000422* 7.02e-05 5.21e-05 -0.000238* -0.000126 -0.00183**
(0.00130) (0.000558) (0.000295) (0.000546) (0.000824) (0.000157) (0.000122) (4.82e-05) (0.000451) (0.000132) (0.000370) (0.000218) (7.82e-05) (0.000197) (0.000132) (9.07e-05) (0.000769)
Tobacco -1.553 0.687 0.368 -1.488 2.875 -0.106 0.108 -0.0180 -1.849 -0.230 -0.258 1.164** 0.678*** -0.221 0.141 -0.0640 0.0618
(3.483) (1.490) (0.788) (1.458) (2.200) (0.420) (0.325) (0.129) (1.206) (0.354) (0.989) (0.581) (0.209) (0.526) (0.352) (0.242) (2.054)
Cons -598.1 -53.45 134.7 182.1 -408.3 34.03 30.76 3.469 -66.59 56.23 -33.44 -55.80 -14.54 261.2*** 27.06 41.34 623.7**
(500.9) (214.2) (113.2) (209.6) (316.3) (60.34) (46.74) (18.49) (173.4) (50.88) (142.2) (83.58) (30.02) (75.65) (50.62) (34.85) (295.4)
Obs. 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212 3,212
R-squared -0.001 0.058 -0.017 0.154 -0.070 0.094 0.038 0.000 -0.003 -0.027 0.003 -0.209 -0.004 -0.581 -0.003 -0.078 -0.085
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Table A 15: Chi-square statistics for Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity 




Food 47.64 47.87 52.98 37.99 
Alcohol 55.00 63.38 74.87 44.32 
Health 24.90 8.83 26.72 9.89 
School 29.79 14.38 17.97 34.07 
Clothing 37.10 52.54 49.64 44.91 
Housing 83.82 41.00 80.08 32.21 
Water 45.64 9.03 58 19.68 
Electricity 206.31 63.29 182.96 65.24 
Alt. Energy 83.24 37.64 95.74 45.22 
Daily Transport 30.31 41.48 42.53 17.20 
Other Transport 32.27 11.77 30.88 21.58 
Equipment  130.53 68.71 106.23 100.45 
Entertainment 14.12 16.44 13.68 15.52 
Telephone 70.30 27.34 65.64 54.53 
Remittance 30.37 40.34 44.37 17.38 
House Care 37.96 48.51 54.84 53.8 
Personal Care 923.38 634.85 572.16 162.95 
Notes: The table shows chi-square statistics associated with a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity. The null hypothesis 
is that 𝑑, 𝑙𝑛𝑀 and (𝑙𝑛𝑀)2 are exogenous. The hypothesis is rejected for most of the categories. Chi-square statistics whose 


















Table A 16: Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for the coefficient on d, restricted sample  
Coefficient 
on d in: 














  (0.480) (0.636) (0.716) (0.623) (0.771) 
Alcohol 5.502*** 4.667*** 6.106*** 4.780*** 6.024*** 
  (0.194) (0.246) (0.298) (0.257) (0.334) 
Health -0.135 -0.073 -0.170 -0.204* -0.109 
  (0.101) (0.109) (0.167) (0.112) (0.178) 
School -1.594*** -1.504** -1.683*** -1.526*** -1.493*** 
  (0.259) (0.379) (0.358) (0.403) (0.332) 
Clothing -0.394 -0.057 -0.700* -0.213 -0.557 
  (0.259) (0.290) (0.420) (0.282) (0.465) 
Housing -0.558*** -1.324*** -0.037 -1.428*** 0.061 
  (0.200) (0.410) (0.058) (0.397) (0.094) 
Water -0.140* -0.232 -0.066* -0.307** 0.002 
  (0.081) (0.167) (0.037) (0.148) (0.074) 
Electricity -0.205** -0.465** -0.006 -0.407** 0.021 
  (0.099) (0.192) (0.072) (0.202) (0.029) 
Alt. Energy 0.124 0.235 0.055 -0.014 0.096 
  (0.165) (0.227) (0.236) (0.188) (0.269) 
Daily Tport -0.057 -0.111 -0.053 -0.062 -0.035 
  (0.174) (0.307) (0.182) (0.334) (0.080) 
Other Tport 0.079 0.468* -0.161 0.275 0.081 
  (0.195) (0.257) (0.290) (0.317) (0.225) 
Equipment  0.062 0.136 0.002 0.218* -0.084 
  (0.086) (0.106) (0.133) (0.122) (0.119) 
Entertain. 0.127 0.150 0.086* 0.142 0.060 
  (0.078) (0.154) (0.052) (0.160) (0.048) 
Telephone -0.181 -0.094 -0.217 -0.211 -0.166* 
  (0.143) (0.263) (0.134) (0.271) (0.095) 
Remittance -0.133* -0.035 -0.194* -0.098 -0.158** 
  (0.078) (0.122) (0.100) (0.139) (0.080) 
House Care 0.033 -0.116 0.132** -0.096 0.153*** 
  (0.066) (0.122) (0.062) (0.129) (0.053) 
Personal  -1.060*** -1.105*** -0.974** -0.994*** -1.043** 
  (0.261) (0.328) (0.403) (0.313) (0.444) 
Sample 
size 
8,555 4,545 4,010 4,092 3,212 
 
Notes: The results shown above are only for the coefficient on 𝑑 in equation (2.1) for the exact same sample as that used for 
the Three stage least squares (3SLS).  The OLS results presented in the table are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.3. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** implies that the coefficient on 𝑑 is statistically significant at the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance respectively. Tport is an abbreviation for transport. Alt is an abbreviation for alternative, entertain is 
short for entertainment and personal is short for personal care.   
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CHAPTER 3: PRICE AND EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES OF   
DEMAND FOR CIGARETTES IN UGANDA 
 
3.1. Introduction  
Uganda’s smoking prevalence estimates are relatively high by African standards. According to the 
Tobacco Atlas, estimates for adult smoking prevalence for males and females were 17% and 2% 
respectively in 2013 (Eriksen, et al., 2015). Comparable estimates for Africa place adult male and 
female smoking prevalence at 14% and 3% respectively (Blecher and Ross, 2013). Among Ugandan 
youths, smoking prevalence is even higher. The most recent Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS) 
estimated youth prevalence among Ugandan males at 19% and that of females at 11% (Musoke, 2008). 
For Africa, comparable estimates of youth smoking prevalence were 9% for young males and 3% for 
young females (Blecher and Ross, 2013). There is some expectation that smoking prevalence and 
tobacco consumption in Uganda will increase in the coming years driven by strong economic growth 
and declining real prices of tobacco products. According to the World Bank, real GDP growth has 
averaged 7% per year over the period 2005 to 2014 (World Bank, 2015). The rate of inflation averaged 
10% per year over the same period (ibid.). As a consequence, the real price of cigarettes declined by 
3% between 2008 and 2012 (Eriksen, et al., 2015). The combination of strong economic growth and 
relatively high inflation has likely made tobacco products in Uganda more affordable. Meanwhile, a 
recent joint assessment by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Government of Uganda 
noted an increase in the incidences of heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, strokes 
and cancer, diseases that are linked to the usage of tobacco products (WHO, 2012b).  
 
Increasing excise taxes on tobacco products is the single-most effective policy tool for reducing the  
demand for tobacco products (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; IARC, 2011). Unfortunately, excise taxes 
in Uganda are low and well below the WHO’s recommended target. The percentage of the cigarette 
retail price that is due to the excise tax (known as the excise tax burden) was estimated at 25% in 2013 
(WHO, 2013b). WHO recommends an excise tax burden of at least 70% of the retail price (WHO, 2010). 
We know from several studies that cigarettes (and all other tobacco products) are generally price 
inelastic. Available estimates put the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in the range of -0.20 to 
-0.60 (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; IARC, 2011; Guindon et al., 2015). The implication of these 
estimates is that by increasing taxes on cigarettes, countries can decrease consumption and at the 
same time increase tax revenues.  
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To the best of my knowledge, there are no published estimates of the price elasticity of demand for 
cigarettes in Uganda. As a matter of fact, there are very few published estimates of the price elasticity 
of demand for cigarettes in Africa. The comprehensive survey of the literature on the price elasticity 
of demand for cigarettes by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC, 2011) was only 
able to list two sub-Sahara African countries (South Africa and Zimbabwe) as having published 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand. Even though we expect cigarettes to be price inelastic in 
most countries, policymakers still demand local evidence before initiating policy changes. There is, 
therefore, a need to generate local evidence in Africa to support civil society’s efforts in encouraging 
governments to increase the excise tax as part of a comprehensive strategy.      
 
The literature has traditionally estimated price elasticities of demand using aggregate time series data 
on cigarette consumption and prices. This partly explains why there are only a handful of countries in 
Africa with estimates of the price elasticity of demand: many African countries do not maintain time 
series data of a sufficient time length to allow for consistent estimates. On the other hand, many 
countries often conduct household expenditure surveys or household budget surveys. Deaton (1988) 
proposed a method that uses data from household expenditure surveys to estimate price elasticities 
of demand of goods and services covered by the surveys. A small literature has recently emerged that 
uses Deaton’s method in estimating price elasticities of demand for cigarettes in Low- and Middle-  
Income Countries (John, 2005; John, 2008a; Eozenou and Fishburn, 2009; Guindon et al., 2011; Chen 
and Xing, 2011). The advantage of Deaton’s method is that it adequately deals with concerns about 
simultaneity bias that often plague time series studies (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000). And the fact 
that sample sizes for household surveys often number in the thousands allows for the estimation of a 
richer set of elasticity estimates than would be the case with time series data.  
 
This chapter uses Deaton’s method along with the 2005 and 2009 rounds of the Uganda National Panel 
Survey (UNPS), a household expenditure survey, to estimate price and expenditure elasticities of 
demand for cigarettes in Uganda. I focus on cigarettes because the UNPS does not contain detailed 
enough information on other tobacco products. My estimates of the price elasticity and expenditure 
elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Uganda fall within the range of estimates in the literature. I find 
that cigarettes are price inelastic with demand expected to decline by 3% to 4%, at the very least, for 
every 10% increase in prices (that is, price elasticity of -0.30 to -0.40). I also find that cigarettes in 
Uganda are normal goods with demand expected to increase by about 1% for every 10% increase in 
household expenditure. These results are robust to the exclusion of outliers in the data. Unfortunately, 
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I am unable to estimate elasticities for different sub-samples (the rich, poor, etc…) owing to the small 
number of households that report positive expenditures on cigarettes in the UNPS. This is a general 
shortcoming of Deaton’s method. Guindon et al. (2011) go around this problem by estimating 
elasticities for sub-samples using a simple share-log functional form (Gibson and Rozelle, 2005). As I 
discuss later, the share-log functional form requires a large enough sample which Guindon et al. satisfy 
by pooling 9 rounds of India’s massive National Sample Survey. Further, the share-log functional form 
does not address the issue of quality shading which is a real problem when using self-reported prices 
by households. That is, households are likely to trade down to cheaper brands in response to a price 
rise. Failure to account for quality shading can bias elasticity estimates. All in all, the results in this 
chapter suggest that Uganda, by increasing taxes on cigarettes, can reduce cigarette consumption and 
increase excise tax revenues at the same time.   
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature. Section 3.3 discusses 
Deaton’s method in some detail and Section 3.4 discusses the data, the Uganda National Panel Survey. 
Section 3.5 presents the main econometric results and presents results for the robustness tests. 
Section 3.6 discusses some limitations and 3.7 concludes.  
 
3.2. Literature review 
There are generally two approaches to estimating the price and income (or expenditure) elasticity of 
demand for cigarettes. One approach uses aggregate time series data while a second approach uses 
household-level data. Until about 25 years ago, estimates of elasticities of demand were based nearly 
exclusively on time series studies. The paucity of time series data in Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
(LMICs) has meant that most of the estimates of the price elasticity of demand have come from the 
developed world. The time series literature on cigarette demand is vast and has been ably surveyed 
by Chaloupka and Warner (2000) and by the International Agency for Research on Cancer’s (IARC) 
2011 Handbook on the Effectiveness of Tax and Price Policies for Tobacco Control. The studies 
reviewed by Chaloupka and Warner (2000) had price elasticities of cigarettes ranging from -0.30 to -
0.50, centering around -0.40. The studies reviewed by IARC (2011) had price elasticity estimates in the 
-0.20 to -0.60 range. The IARC Handbook also reviewed studies estimating the income elasticity of 





The majority of time series studies on the demand for cigarettes in Africa have been done on South 
Africa. These studies (Reekie, 1994; Van Walbeek, 1996; Economics of Tobacco Control Project, 1998; 
Van Walbeek, 2005; Boshoff, 2008) find long-run price elasticities in the range -0.16 to -1.52 and 
income elasticities ranging from 0.37 to 1.70. Only three studies, all time series, were identified by 
IARC (2011) has having been done on African countries other than South Africa. The Economics of 
Tobacco Control Project (2008) estimated a long-run price elasticity of demand for Zimbabwe of -0.85 
and an income elasticity of 1.67. Aloui (2003) estimated a price elasticity of between -1.36 and -1.54 
and income elasticity between 0.87 and 1.04 for Morocco. Hanafy et al. (2011) working with Egyptian 
data estimated a price elasticity equal to -0.47 and an income elasticity equal to 1.60. In a recent 
systematic review mainly focussing on time series studies conducted in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Guindon et al. (2015) find that the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes is most likely 
below -0.50 (that is, below 0.50 in absolute terms) with a 95% confidence interval of -0.35 to -0.51.  
 
A criticism of studies using aggregate time series data is that they do not adequately deal with 
simultaneity bias since aggregate consumption and aggregate price are determined at the same time. 
Some studies, usually from the United States, go around this by exploiting exogenous changes in state-
level cigarette taxes (Keeler, et al., 1993; Hu et al., 1994, 1995; Sung et al., 1994). Exogenous changes 
in tax rates are uncommon in most parts of the world and especially so in LMICs. Secondly, time series 
econometric techniques require sample sizes of appropriate length in order to deliver consistent 
estimates. However, most LMICs do not have time series data of a sufficient time span. These reasons 
are largely behind the growing interest in estimating price and income (or expenditure) elasticities of 
demand for LMICs using household level data. Concerns about simultaneity bias are less pronounced 
with household level data since each household is too small to influence the price on its own. Further, 
sample sizes for most of the surveys tend to number in the thousands allowing for the estimation of 
a richer set of elasticities. A number of studies over the last decade have made use of a technique 
developed by Deaton (1988) to estimate price and expenditure elasticities27 of demand from 
household survey data for LMICs. Deaton’s method relies on the empirical fact that prices of most 
goods in LMICs often vary across geographical space (across clusters) owing to the presence of 
significant transportation costs. Prices also vary across geographical space because markets are often 
localised in nature such that it is difficult to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. In this way, 
price in Deaton’s method largely varies exogenously in contrast to time series studies where price is 
                                                          
27 Since Deaton’s method uses data from expenditure surveys, the income elasticity is often referred to as an 
expenditure elasticity under this literature.  
75 
 
endogenously determined. Deaton’s method has two additional attractive properties: (1) it adjusts 
price elasticity estimates for quality heterogeneity and (2) it accounts for measurement error which is 
a problem with household surveys. Below I review studies that have used Deaton’s method to 
estimate price and expenditure elasticities of demand for cigarettes in some detail since this chapter 
contributes to this literature.  
 
John (2005) was the first to use Deaton’s method to estimate price and expenditure elasticities of 
demand for cigarettes. He used the 1999 to 2000 round of India’s National Sample Survey and 
estimated price elasticities of -0.22 for urban India and -0.56 for rural India. His estimates for the 
expenditure elasticity of demand were 1.72 for urban India and 2.37 for rural India suggesting that 
cigarettes were luxury goods. John (2008a) used the same dataset and the same method as his 2005 
study with the exception that he only considered households that reported positive cigarette 
consumption. His argument for excluding households with zero expenditure on cigarettes was based 
on his finding (John, 2008b) that smoking and non-smoking households were fundamentally different 
in that they had different preferences. That is, cigarettes were not an argument in the utility function 
of non-smoking households. By excluding households with zero expenditure, John (2008a) was 
therefore estimating conditional elasticities. His estimates of the price elasticity of demand for urban 
and rural India were respectively -0.19 and -0.34, slightly smaller (in absolute terms) than his 2005 
estimates. His estimates for the expenditure elasticity were 1.59 and 2.37, almost identical to the 2005 
findings. Eozenou and Fishburn (2009) used the 1998 Vietnam Living Standards Survey and Deaton’s 
method and estimated price and expenditure elasticities of demand equal to -0.53 and 0.30 
respectively. The expenditure elasticity estimate suggested that cigarettes were a normal good in 
Vietnam.   
 
Guindon et al. (2011) used data from three rounds of India’s National Sample Survey (1993/94, 
1999/2000 and 2004/05) and Deaton’s method to estimate price and expenditure elasticities of 
demand for cigarettes in India. In some specifications, particularly when treating districts as clusters, 
they found price elasticity estimates of cigarettes that were much higher (in absolute terms) than 
those estimated by John (2005, 2008a). On the other hand, when treating villages/urban blocks as 
clusters, they found price elasticity estimates that were not statistically different from zero. Their 
expenditure elasticity estimates were, however, in line with those in John (2005, 2008a). Estimating 
elasticities for subsamples (poor, rich, more educated, less educated, etc…) is problematic for 
subsamples with Deaton’s method because the number of cigarette consuming households are often 
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too few to start with. In order to estimate elasticities for subsamples in India, Guindon et al. pooled 9 
rounds of India’s National Sample Survey and used a simple share-log functional form (Gibson and 
Rozelle, 2005).28 They found that households from lower social castes tended to respond more to 
changes in cigarette prices. They, however, did not find consistent patterns in differences in price 
elasticities across household income, educational levels and urban/rural strata.  
 
Chen and Xing (2011) use Deaton’s method and data from China’s Urban Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey collected between 1999 and 2001. They find price elasticity estimates for 
cigarettes in the range -0.35 to -0.56 and expenditure elasticity estimates in the range 0.27 to 0.45. 
Chen and Xing check how their estimates compare with a two-part model that separates cigarette 
demand into smoking participation and smoking intensity. The two-part model delivers a higher price 
elasticity (-0.82) which Chen and Xing conclude is likely due to the failure of the two-part model to 
account for quality heterogeneity.  
 
With the exception of some of the specifications in Guindon et al. (2011), the handful of studies using 
household-level data along with Deaton’s method tend to arrive at price elasticity estimates for 
cigarettes in the range of -0.10 to -0.60. The studies all conclude that the consumption of cigarettes 
does increase (or does not decline) with a rise in household income (expenditure), implying that 
income elasticities are non-negative.  
 
The International Tobacco Control (ITC) Policy Evaluation Project based at the University of Waterloo 
is currently collecting tobacco-dedicated household and individual-level data from Low-and Middle- 
Income Countries (LMICs). The advantage with the ITC surveys, unlike traditional income and 
expenditure surveys, is that they assure large sample sizes of smoking households and smoking 
individuals and they explicitly collect information, including price, on different tobacco brands. The 
small number studies that has so far been conducted on ITC surveys in LMICs (Nargis et al., 2010; 
                                                          
28 With the share-log functional form, the demand for cigarettes is a function of household expenditure, 
household characteristics and average cluster prices. The last point follows from the assumption that prices vary 
across geographical space. Unlike Deaton’s method, the share-log functional form does not adjust the final price 
elasticity estimates for quality heterogeneity. As discussed below, failure to adjust for quality heterogeneity is 
likely to bias the elasticity estimates away from zero.  
77 
 
Nargis et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2015) also tend to find price elasticity estimates for cigarettes in the 
-0.10 to -0.60 range.   
  
3.3. Method 
This chapter uses the method proposed by Deaton (1988) and extended in Deaton (1989, 1990 and 
1997) to estimate price and expenditure elasticities for cigarettes in Uganda. The method exploits the 
fact that prices of most goods in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) vary across geographical 
space (and are fixed within clusters) owing to the presence of significant transportation costs and the 
fact that markets are usually small and isolated. This last point makes it difficult to take advantage of 
price disparities between markets. Since most household expenditure surveys in LMICs do not collect 
data on prices, Deaton proposes the use of what he calls “unit values” as a proxy. In the case of 
cigarettes, unit values, 𝜐, are defined as the ratio of total household expenditure on cigarettes, to 
quantity of cigarettes purchased or 
 𝜐𝑖𝑐 =  
𝑥𝑖𝑐
𝑞𝑖𝑐
      (3.1) 
 
where 𝜐𝑖𝑐, 𝑥𝑖𝑐  and 𝑞𝑖𝑐 are respectively the unit value, expenditure and quantity of cigarettes in 
household 𝑖 located in cluster 𝑐. Unit values, however, are not the same thing as prices. For one thing, 
unit values hide a great degree of quality heterogeneity whereas the classic treatment of demand 
concerns itself with homogeneous goods. With quality heterogeneity, households may respond to a 
price increase by shifting to a lower “quality” brand of cigarettes with a small decline in quantity. 
Deaton refers to this as “quality shading”. Under classic demand theory, the only outcome of a rise in 
prices is a reduction in demand. With quality shading, the price elasticity of demand will be 
overestimated.29 Secondly, unit values are not the same as prices because of measurement error. 
Households are unlikely to correctly recall the amount of money spent on cigarettes and/or the 
                                                          
29 Recall that the formula for the price elasticity of demand, 𝜀, is given as: 






where Δ𝑞 and Δ𝑝 are the changes in price and quantity respectively. With quality shading, the price does not 
change in full and so the reported change in price (which is really the reported change in unit value) is smaller 
(in absolute size) than it would be if we had actual price data. Since the denominator in the price elasticity 
formula is smaller than it would otherwise be, the estimated price elasticity is bigger in absolute size.    
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quantity consumed. In some cases, the survey enumerator might incorrectly capture this information. 
In such a case, the ratio of expenditure to quantity would result in a wrong price even if cigarettes 
were a homogeneous product (i.e. cigarettes were not susceptible to quality shading). The presence 
of measurement error will bias the estimate of the price elasticity of demand.30    
 
By defining quality as “the value of a bundle of goods at fixed reference prices” (Deaton, 1997, p. 297) 
and assuming that preferences are separable over bundles of goods (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b), 
Deaton derives formulas that can be used to correct the final price elasticity estimates for quality 
shading.31 In as far as measurement error is concerned, recall that prices are assumed fixed within 
clusters. In other words, all households within a cluster should report prices that converge on the 
“cluster price” (which could either be the average cluster price or the median cluster price). Any 
household reporting a price that is different from the cluster price should be as a result of 
measurement error. Quantifying these deviations from the cluster price allows us to correct our price 
elasticity estimates for measurement error (see below).   
 
Deaton’s method proceeds in a series of steps. The first step involves checking whether prices (unit 
values in this case) vary across geographical space. This can be done in one of two ways: (1) using 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to divide the total variation in unit values into “within cluster variation” 
and “between cluster variation” or (2) running a regression of unit values on cluster dummies. A large 
F statistic in either case leads to the conclusion that unit values vary across space. In the second step, 
one estimates “within cluster” regressions of the form: 
    
𝑙𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐 =  𝜆 +  𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑐 +  𝜸𝒁𝒊𝑐 +  𝜓𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑐 +  𝑒𝑖𝑐    (3.2) and 
𝑤𝑖𝑐 =  𝛼 +  𝜀𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑐 +  𝜹𝒁𝒊𝑐 + 𝜃𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑐 +  (𝐹𝐸𝑐 + 𝑢𝑖𝑐) (3.3)  
 
𝑤𝑖𝑐 represents the share of cigarette expenditure in total household expenditure for household 𝑖 in 
cluster 𝑐 and 𝑙𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐 is the log of the unit value, derived according to equation (3.1) for household 𝑖 in 
                                                          
30 The direction of the bias will depend on the nature of the correlation, if at all any, between measurement 
error in expenditure and measurement error in quantity (see Deaton, 1997, p. 292 – 293).   
31 A full discussion of this is beyond the scope of this chapter but is contained in Deaton (1997, p.296 – 299).   
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cluster 𝑐. 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑐 is the log of total household expenditure over the relevant reference period. 𝒁𝒊𝒄 is a 
vector of household specific characteristics including household size, household gender composition, 
gender of the household head,  proportion of adults in the household and years of schooling of the 
household head. Other variables in 𝒁𝒊𝒄 are the age of the household head and a dummy variable for 
whether the household head is formally employed or not. 𝐹𝐸𝑐 is a cluster fixed effect. I also include a 
year dummy in 𝒁 whenever I run equations (3.2) and (3.3) on the pooled sample. This captures any 
unobserved factors that are specific to different survey years.32 𝑢𝑖𝑐 and 𝑒𝑖𝑐 are the standard regression 
error terms. 𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑐 are the unobserved prices and consequently, equations (3.2) and (3.3) are estimated 
without them. The coefficients on the price terms can, however, be recovered (see below).  
 
Equation (3.2), referred to as the “unit value” equation, allows us to check for the presence of quality 
effects in the unit value data. A positive and statistically significant relationship between household 
expenditure and unit values, after accounting for household characteristics, would suggest the 
presence of quality effects. That is, richer households report higher unit values primarily because they 
are buying cigarettes of a higher quality. Knowing the pattern of the quality effects (i.e. the magnitude 
of 𝛽), allows us to correct our final price elasticity estimates for quality shading.  Equation (3.3), on 
the other hand, is a standard demand equation where the cigarette share is expressed as a function 
of household income (proxied by household expenditure), household characteristics and prices. 
Because of the assumption that prices are fixed within clusters and the fact that we do not have price 
data, prices are proxied by cluster fixed effects (𝐹𝐸𝑐). Further, the cluster fixed effects also allow us 
to hold constant cluster-level tastes and preferences. Similar tastes and preferences are to be 
expected for narrowly constructed clusters such as villages. Unlike the demand equation, the unit 
value equation (3.2) does not contain cluster-level fixed effects even though unit values are related to 
price. Adding a cluster-level fixed effect to equation (3.2) “would break the link between prices and 
unit values, would prevent [unit values] giving any useful information about [prices], and would thus 
remove any possibility of identification” (Deaton, 1997, p.295). Equations (3.2) and (3.3) also contain 
useful information about measurement error at the household level. The magnitude of the errors are 
captured by 𝑒𝑖𝑐 and 𝑢𝑖𝑐, the regression error terms. The relationship between the two errors (as 
captured by, say, the covariance) is useful in correcting the final price elasticity estimates for 
measurement error (see more below).   
                                                          
32 I run Deaton’s method on three datasets: the 2005 edition of the Ugandan National Panel Survey (UNPS), the 
2009 edition of the UNPS and on a pooled sample of the two surveys. See section 3.4 for more details on the 
data.   
80 
 
The third step involves stripping the household-level demand and unit values of the effects of 
household expenditure and household characteristics and then averaging across clusters. This step 
requires the following equations: 
 
𝑦𝑐





𝑖=1 𝑙𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐 −  ?̂?𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑐 −  ?̂?𝒁𝒊𝑐)  (3.4) and  
𝑦𝑐





𝑖=1 −  𝜀̂𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑐  −  ?̂?𝒁𝒊𝑐)  (3.5), 
 
where 𝑛𝑐 is the number of households in cluster 𝑐. 𝑦𝑐
1̂ and 𝑦𝑐
2̂ are the estimates of, respectively, cluster 
average unit value and cluster average demand after removing the effects of household expenditure 
and household characteristics (notice that 𝑦𝑐
1̂ and 𝑦𝑐
2̂ do not have the 𝑖 subscript because they 
represent cluster averages). Recall that our identifying assumption is that prices vary at the cluster 
level (i.e. between clusters and not within clusters). Given this identifying assumption, price elasticities 
of demand can only be obtained by seeing how cluster-level demand responds to changes in cluster-
level prices. This leads to the fourth step which involves regressing cluster-level demand, 𝑦𝑐
2̂, on 
cluster-level unit values, 𝑦𝑐
1̂. The coefficient on 𝑦𝑐
1̂ in such a regression can alternatively be obtained 
by dividing the covariance between 𝑦𝑐
2̂ and 𝑦𝑐
1̂ by the variance of 𝑦𝑐
1̂. That is ?̂?, the estimate of the 
coefficient on 𝑦𝑐
1, is obtained by 
 











   (3.6),  
 
 where 𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the average cluster size (households) in the sample; 𝜎
12̂ is the estimate of the 
covariance of the errors in equations (3.2) and (3.3); 𝜎11̂ is the variance of the errors in equation (3.2). 
Equation (3.6) is a standard errors-in-variables regression where the covariance and variance of errors 
is used to correct for measurement error. Notice that the correction factors for measurement error 




The fifth and final step in Deaton’s method applies quality correction formulas in obtaining the 
estimate of the price elasticity of demand, 𝜀?̂?, as follows: 
 
𝜀?̂?  = (
?̂?
?̅?
) −  ?̂?   (3.7), 
 
 where ?̅? is the average share of total household expenditure dedicated to cigarettes in the sample. 
?̂? and 𝜃, the estimates of the coefficients on the unobserved price terms in equations (3.2) and (3.3) 
respectively, are recovered as follows: 
 
?̂? = 1 −  
?̂?(?̅?− ?̂?)
?̂? +?̅?









?̂? +?̅?(1− ?̂?) 
                                (3.10).    
 
?̂? is the estimate of the coefficient on total household expenditure in equation (3.2), the within-cluster 
unit value equation, and 𝜀̂ is the estimate of the coefficient on total household expenditure in equation 
(3.3), the within-cluster demand equation. ?̂? is the errors-in-variables estimate of the coefficient of a 
regression of cluster-level demand on cluster-level unit value.  
 
Deaton also proposes the following formula for obtaining the estimate of the expenditure elasticity of 
demand, 𝜀?̂?: 
 
𝜀?̂?  = 1 + (
?̂?
?̅?




Deaton’s method is not without its critics. Gibson and Rozelle (2004 and 2005) show that using unit 
values as a substitute for actual price yields biased estimates for the price elasticity  of demand even 
after correcting for quality effects and measurement error. In one study, Gibson and Rozelle (2005) 
compare price elasticity estimates from unit values with estimates from actual prices obtained from a 
market survey and find that unit values give biased results. The criticisms notwithstanding, unit values 
present the most cost-effective way of saying something about the effect of price on demand. An 
alternative would be to conduct a detailed price survey (such as Gibson and Rozelle describe in their 
2005 paper) for each commodity and map these prices to each household. If done properly, such an 
exercise would go a long way in addressing some of the biases in Deaton’s method. But this would be 
many times more costly than using Deaton’s method. Alternatively, one can use time series data for a 
country’s aggregate consumption of cigarettes and some measure of aggregate prices to estimate 
price elasticities such as in Van Walbeek (2005). Unfortunately most sub-Saharan African countries do 
not have time series data of a sufficient time span to allow for consistent estimates of the price 
elasticity of demand. Further, time series estimates of the demand for cigarettes are likely to suffer 
from reverse causality and simultaneity bias (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000). Deaton’s method 
overcomes these problems in large part by relying on an exogenous driver of prices (transportation 
costs) and the fact that each household’s demand is too small on its own to affect overall demand.   
 
3.4. Data 
The data for this chapter come from the 2005 and 2009 editions of Uganda’s National Panel Survey 
(UNPS), a nationally representative survey. The UNPS is conducted by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
with technical assistance from the World Bank. Households that were surveyed in 2005 were revisited 
in 2009. Additional panel studies have since been conducted in 2010 and 2011. This chapter does not 
use data from the 2010 and 2011 rounds because the latter two panel surveys did not collect 
sufficiently detailed information on the quantities of cigarettes purchased by households. Specifically, 
information on whether the unit of purchase was a stick, packet or bundle was missing from the 2010 
and 2011 rounds of the survey. Deaton’s method requires that the units for the quantity variable be 
the same.33  
 
                                                          
33 One can convert non-standard units (say, sticks) into standard units (say, packs) if the survey is explicit in 
distinguishing reported units.  
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A two stage sampling design was used to select the 2005 sample. In the first stage, 783 Enumeration 
Areas (EAs) were drawn with probability proportional to size. In the second stage, simple random 
sampling (SRS) was used to select 3,123 households. The 2009 panel survey aimed at revisiting all the 
households that were interviewed in 2005 and achieved a sample size of 2,975 households.34 Since 
EAs are the smallest geographical unit in the survey and the use of SRS presumes that households 
within an EA are similar, I take EAs to represent clusters. 
 
The Uganda National Panel Survey collects an exhaustive list of information on the socio-economic 
characteristics of households. This includes information on household expenditure patterns, 
household composition patterns, and the occupational and educational status of household members. 
Information on the agricultural activities engaged in by households is also collected given that Uganda, 
like most African countries, has a prominent agricultural sector. In the household expenditure module 
of the survey, which is this chapter’s primary interest, households are required to recall expenditure 
on various goods and services. The recall period ranges from 7 days for cigarettes to one year for 
household expenditures on education, health and clothing to name a few. In this chapter, I convert all 
expenditures into weekly expenditures.35  
 
The expenditure module collects information on the quantity and total amount paid for cigarettes 
over the last 7 days. The quantities are recorded either as sticks or packets. I convert sticks into packets 
by dividing them by 20, which is the number of cigarettes in a pack in Uganda. The module also collects 
information on “other tobacco”. Unfortunately, there is not much additional information on what 
constitutes other tobacco let alone a careful distinction of the units in which quantities are collected. 
Because of this, I only focus on cigarettes in estimating the price elasticity of demand. Further, I cannot 
estimate cross price elasticities between cigarettes and other tobacco because of a lack of 
standardization in the units of the latter. Another unfortunate aspect of the Uganda National Panel 
Survey is that it does not distinguish between zero expenditures and expenditure information that is 
                                                          
34 Additional information on sample selection and other aspects of the survey can be accessed here: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTLSMS/0,,menuPK:3359053~pagePK:
64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:3358997,00.html 
35 Expenditures reported as recalled over the previous 30 days are converted to weekly expenditures by 
multiplying them by 7/30. Expenditures recalled over the previous year are converted to weekly expenditures 
by multiplying them by 7/365.  
84 
 
simply missing. In other words, a household’s information on cigarette expenditure is left out of the 
survey if (1) the household reported zero expenditure on cigarettes in the previous week or (2) the 
household was never asked this question or (3) the respondent did not know the answer to the 
question. Notice that case (1) coincides with a scenario where the household consumes cigarettes but 
did not do so in the previous week because, say, the price was high (i.e. a corner solution). It also 
coincides with a scenario where the household does not consume any cigarettes at all. On the other 
hand, cases (2) and (3) are scenarios where information is simply missing. Because the survey is not 
explicit about distinguishing zero expenditures from missing expenditures, I choose to only use 
households that reported positive cigarette expenditures in estimating the price elasticity of demand. 
In other words, I estimate conditional price elasticities of demand.36, 37, 38  
 
In estimating the price elasticity of demand, I run two specifications. The first specification estimates 
separate price elasticities of demand for the 2005 and 2009 rounds of the Ugandan National Panel 
Survey. In the second specification, I pool the 2005 and 2009 datasets and estimate a single price 
elasticity of demand. That is, I treat the 2005 and 2009 panels as if they were separate cross-sectional 
surveys. To allow for comparisons across years, I express all unit values and total expenditures in terms 




                                                          
36 An alternative approach would be to assume that all households without information on cigarette expenditure 
reported zero consumption in the previous period. In other words, to assume away missing information. This 
would not be advisable given that households with genuinely missing information are unlikely to be trivial for a 
good like cigarettes. Respondents to household surveys in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) are 
usually female spouses who might not know if their husbands smoke (especially for “light” smokers) and if they 
do, may not feel comfortable in disclosing this information due to the socially undesirable nature of smoking in 
Africa.     
37 If the survey were explicit in distinguishing zeroes from missing information, one could use the method 
proposed by Vermeulen (2003) to test for whether reported zeroes are a result of corner solutions or a result of 
households not being consumers of cigarettes.  
38 John (2008a), using Deaton’s method, also estimates elasticities for smoking households only.  




Table 3.1: Summary statistics from the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS) 
Variable 2005 2009 Pooled Sample 
Percentage of households with positive cigarette expenditure 9% 7% 8% 
Average cigarette share in total household expenditure 8.86% 7.67% 8.40% 
Real average unit value per pack  1,952.11 1,056.26 1,605.40 
Average unit value per  pack (USD equivalent) 0.83 0.45 0.68 
Average weekly quantity of cigarettes (in packs) 1.45 1.55 1.49 
Ave. real h/hold expenditure (last 7 days in Ugandan Shillings) 34,598.08 32,784.07 33,896.02 
Ave. household expenditure (last 7 days USD equivalent) 14.72 13.95 14.42 
Average household size 5.58 6.33 5.87 
Average age of household head in years 41.13 43.73 42.15 
Average proportion of male heads 86.81% 90.17% 88.12% 
Average proportion of adults 54.58% 46.88% 51.59% 
Average proportion of males in household 53.27% 52.00% 52.63% 
Average years of schooling of household head 6.55 5.81 6.26 
Average proportion of heads with some employment 89.74% 84.43% 87.73% 
Total number of clusters 178 121 299 
Total number of households 274 173 447 
Average number of households per cluster 1.54 1.43 1.49 
Notes: Summary statistics for the relevant variables from the 2005 and 2009 Uganda National Panel Survey (UNHS) and the 
pooled sample. Adults are those household members who are 18 years or older. 
 
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the relevant variables from the data. I report but do not 
discuss the summary statistics for the pooled sample because in most cases, the variables for the 
pooled sample are the averages of the 2005 and 2009 datasets.  
 
8% of the sample of households from 2005 reported positive expenditures on cigarettes in the last 7 
days. For 2009, this number was 7%. The share of the weekly budget allocated to cigarette expenditure 
was, on average, 8.86% in 2005 and 7.67% in 2009. Although Uganda’s cigarette expenditure share is 
relatively high, it falls within the range identified by John (2008b) particularly for LMICs. The reported 
average unit value per pack in 2010 Ugandan Shillings was 1,952 (83 US cents) in 2005 and 1,056 (45 
US cents) in 2009.40 To the extent that unit values are a good proxy of actual prices, then the foregoing 
would suggest that cigarettes became cheaper, in real terms, by about 46% over the four year period 
in question. The average weekly household expenditure expressed in 2010 Uganda shillings was 
34,598 (USD15) in 2005 and declined slightly by 5% to 32,784 (USD14) in 2009. The rest of the 
                                                          
40 I convert 2010 Uganda shillings into US dollars by using the 2010 end of year exchange rate between the 
shilling and the dollar available from www.oanda.com.   
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summary statistics in Table 3.1 mainly pertain to the 𝒁 vector of control variables used in the 
regressions (see equations 3.2 and 3.3 above).  
 
3.5. Econometric results 
 
3.5.1.  Main results  
In this section of the chapter, I present and discuss the results of implementing Deaton’s method. 
Recall from Section 3.3 that the main identifying assumption behind the method is that prices vary 
across geographical space. The validity of this assumption can be tested using Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) techniques. I report the results of the ANOVA exercise in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Testing the spatial variation hypothesis 
2005 sample 2009 sample Pooled sample 
F statistic p value R-squared n F statistic p value R-squared n F statistic p value R-squared n 
1.29 0.08 0.70 274 1.12 0.33 0.72 173 1.26 0.06 0.72 447 
Notes: The F statistic and the p-value are associated with the null hypothesis of no spatial variation in unit values. The 
hypothesis is rejected in the 2005 and pooled samples but not in the 2009 sample. The R-squared measures the proportion 
of variation in prices taking place between clusters. n is the total number of households.  
 
According to the results of the ANOVA procedure, most of the variation in unit values takes place 
between clusters. The R-squared, which measures the proportion of total variation in unit values 
between clusters, is at least 70% in all three data specifications. The F statistics associated with a null 
hypothesis of no spatial variation are all large with the exception of the 2009 sample. Even with the 
2009 sample, the R-squared is 72%. In large part, the assumption of spatially varying prices is 
confirmed by the data. John (2005) and John (2008a) also find that cluster effects explain at least 70% 
of the variation in unit values in India.41       
 
The next step in Deaton’s method involves running the within-cluster unit value and budget share 
regressions (as per equations 3.2 and 3.3). The results for the unit value regression for all three 
                                                          




samples are reported in Table 3.3. The results in the table show that quality effects are present in the 
data: households with higher household expenditure tend to report higher unit values controlling for 
other household characteristics and controlling for year effects in the pooled sample. The expenditure 
elasticities of quality range between 0.11 and 0.23. That is, reported unit values rise by between 1% 
and 2% for every 10% increase in household expenditure. These expenditure elasticities of quality 
compare favourably with those estimated for cigarettes by John (2005), John (2008a), Eozenou and 
Fishburn (2009), Guindon et al. (2011) and Chen and Xing (2011). These studies find expenditure 






















Table 3.3: Results of the unit value regression (equation 3.2) 
 (2005) (2009) (Pooled) 
Variables lnv lnv lnv 
    
lnx 0.234*** 0.115** 0.176*** 
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.036) 
Size -0.042 -0.010 -0.019 
 (0.124) (0.119) (0.088) 
Adults -0.203 0.159 -0.071 
 (0.295) (0.300) (0.213) 
Males 0.261 0.131 0.239 
 (0.216) (0.223) (0.159) 
Education -0.143* 0.108 -0.023 
 (0.080) (0.074) (0.055) 
Age -0.015 -0.409** -0.123 
 (0.153) (0.166) (0.114) 
Gender 0.217 0.218 0.225* 
 (0.163) (0.183) (0.123) 
Work -0.144 0.101 -0.000 
 (0.141) (0.118) (0.094) 
Year   -0.191*** 
   (0.061) 
Constant 4.957*** 6.602*** 5.490*** 
 (0.692) (0.739) (0.511) 
    
No. of households 233 147 380 
R-squared 0.115 0.126 0.110 
Notes: Results of the regression of the log of unit value (lnv) on the log of household expenditure (lnx) and other household 
characteristics (see equation 3.2). Household size (Size), education of household head (Education) and age of household 
head (Age) are in natural logarithms. Adults refers to the proportion of adults in a household and adults are defined as aged 
18 years or older. Males is the proportion of males in a household. Gender is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 
1 if the household head is male and zero if they are female. Work is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the 
household head is employed and zero otherwise. Year takes on the value of 1 if the household was surveyed in 2005 and 
zero if surveyed in 2009. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
The other variables in Table 3.3 are not statistically significant with the exception of the education 
level of the household head in the 2005 sample and age for the household head in the 2009 sample. 
Other variables that are statistically significant are the gender dummy and the year dummy in the 
pooled sample.  Households in the 2005 sample with heads who are more educated tend to report 
smaller unit values (although the effect is only significant at the 10% level). For 2009, households with 
heads who are older tend to report smaller unit values. And in the pooled sample, the gender of the 
head of household matters for the reported unit values. Households headed by males tend to report 
higher unit values controlling for other characteristics. The year dummy in the pooled sample is 
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negative, agreeing with the observation from Table 3.1 that reported unit values declined in real terms 
between 2005 and 2009.    
 
Table 3.4: Results of the budget share regression (equation 3.3) 
 (2005) (2009) (Pooled) 
Variables w w w 
    
lnx -0.056*** -0.065*** -0.056*** 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.013) 
Size 0.002 0.039 0.002 
 (0.031) (0.043) (0.023) 
Adults 0.008 0.092 0.011 
 (0.072) (0.103) (0.054) 
Males 0.013 0.010 0.001 
 (0.059) (0.068) (0.042) 
Education -0.001 -0.012 -0.007 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.015) 
Age 0.028 -0.077 0.009 
 (0.044) (0.072) (0.035) 
Gender -0.038 -0.108* -0.050* 
 (0.037) (0.056) (0.029) 
Work 0.037 0.058 0.044* 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.026) 
Year   -0.320*** 
   (0.107) 
Constant 0.533*** 0.963*** 0.618*** 
 (0.193) (0.292) (0.148) 
    
No. of households 233 147 380 
R-squared 0.866 0.909 0.876 
Notes: Results of the regression of the cigarette budget share (w) on the log of household expenditure (lnx) and other 
household characteristics (see equation 3). Household size (Size), education of household head (Education) and age of 
household head (Age) are in natural logarithms. Adults refers to the proportion of adults in a household and adults are 
defined as aged 18 years or older. Males is the proportion of males in a household. Gender is a dummy variable which takes 
on the value of 1 if the household head is male and zero if they are female. Work is a dummy variable which takes on the 
value of 1 if the household head is employed and zero otherwise. Year takes on the value of 1 if the household was surveyed 
in 2005 and zero if surveyed in 2009. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster fixed effects 
are suppressed for space reasons but are jointly statistically significant at the 1% level for the 2005 and pooled samples and 
at 10% for the 2009 sample.   
 
Table 3.4 reports the results of running the budget share regression (equation 3.3) on household 
expenditure alongside other household characteristics, cluster fixed-effects and year effects (for the 
pooled sample). In Table 3.4, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
household expenditure and the share of the household budget allocated to cigarettes. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients on the log of household expenditure are similar in all three data 
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specifications. The cigarette budget share tends to fall as household expenditure rises. The cluster 
fixed effects, whose results are not presented in Table 3.4 for purposes of space, are all jointly 
statistically significant at the 1% level for the 2005 and pooled samples and at the 10% level for the 
2009 sample. This means that unobserved but fixed factors at the cluster level (prices, tastes, 
preferences, etc…) matter for cigarette demand. The only other variables that are significant in Table 
3.4 are the gender variable (2009 and pooled sample) and the work dummy (pooled sample). For the 
2009 and pooled samples, households headed by males tend to allocate smaller budget shares to 
cigarettes. On the other hand, in the pooled sample, households with an employed household head 
tend to allocate more of the household’s budget to cigarettes.    
 
The next step in Deaton’s method involves stripping unit values and the budget shares of the effects 
of household expenditure and household characteristics and averaging by cluster, as per equations 
(3.4) and (3.5). Afterwards, I obtain an estimate of ?̂?, the coefficient in an errors-in-variables 
regression of cluster-level demand on cluster-level unit value, as per equation (3.6). ?̂? is corrected for 
measurement error using the residuals from the within-cluster unit value and within-cluster budget 
share regressions as described in equation (3.6). The final step in Deaton’s method involves applying 
equation (3.7) along with the quality-correction formulas in equations (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) to obtain 
an estimate of the price elasticity of demand. The price elasticity estimates for Uganda for the 2005, 




                                                          
42 Since the formulae in equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11) are not Stata commands, the standard 
errors have to be obtained via the method of the bootstrap. For the price elasticity of demand, this is done by 
running the cluster-level regressions 1000 times and in each instance using the formulae in equations (3.7), (3.8), 
(3.9) and (3.10) to compute the price elasticity. That is, I end up with 1000 estimates of the price elasticity. The 
standard error is then calculated as “half the length of the interval that is symmetric around the bootstrapped 
mean [of the 1000 estimates], and that contains 68.3% of the bootstrapped estimates” (Deaton, 1997, p317). 
Since the inputs into calculating the expenditure elasticity of demand are all within-cluster coefficients (see 
equation 3.11), within-cluster regressions (3.2) and (3.3) are run 1000 times in obtaining bootstrapped standard 




Table 3.5: Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Uganda 
 (2005) (2009) (Pooled sample) 
    







 (-0.368 , -0.284) (-0.280 , -0.235) (-0.499 , -0.311) 
    
No. of households 233 147 380 
No. of clusters 184 130 314 
Notes: Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Uganda for the 2005, 2009 and pooled samples. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in square brackets. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
 
The estimates in Table 3.5 show that cigarettes are price inelastic in Uganda.  The estimates for the 
price elasticity of demand for the three data specifications are all statistically significant at the 1% 
level. For 2005, the price elasticity is estimated at -0.33 while for the 2009 sample the estimate is at -
0.26. The pooled sample has a slightly more responsive elasticity at -0.41. Taken together, these 
results imply that the demand for cigarettes in Uganda is expected to decline, at the very least, by 
between 3% and 4% for every 10% rise in prices.43 These results fall within the range of estimates for 
studies that use Deaton’s method (-0.10 to -0.60) and studies using aggregate time series data (-0.20 
to -0.60).   
 
The results presented in Table 3.5 are conditional price elasticities and, therefore, only measure price 
responsiveness among households whose members continue to smoke. We, however, know that a 
price rise encourages some smokers to quit as well as deters young people from starting to smoke in 
the first place (Forster and Jones, 2001; Tauras et al., 2001; Nicolas, 2002; Cawley et al., 2004; Franz, 
2008). Therefore, the total price elasticity of demand is made up of the conditional elasticity (as 
                                                          
43 Ideally, the three price elasticity estimates in Table 3.5 should roughly be the same. For instance, the estimate 
of the price elasticity from the pooled sample should not be that different to the estimates of the two constituent 
samples. However, inputs into the formulae for calculating the price elasticity of demand (equations 3.7 to 3.10) 
are sample specific and might therefore influence the final estimate. For instance, the average cigarette budget 
share, ?̅?, which features in all of the formulae in equations 3.7 to 3.10, is equal to 0.089, 0.077 and 0.084 for 
the 2005, 2009 and pooled samples respectively. Such small differences are likely to influence, in a small way, 
the final estimates.      
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estimated in Table 3.5) and the elasticity associated with cessation and initiation (sometimes referred 
to as the participation elasticity). The magnitude of the participation elasticity is often equal to that of 
the conditional elasticity so that the total elasticity is twice the conditional elasticity (see Table 5.1 in 
IARC, 2011). This implies that the total price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Uganda is likely to 
be higher (in absolute size) than the results presented in Table 3.5.    
 
Table 3.6 presents estimates of the expenditure elasticity of demand using equation (3.11) and 
coefficient estimates from Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The estimates in Table 3.6 show that cigarettes are 
normal goods in Uganda. That is, cigarette demand does not, at the very least, decline with an increase 
in household income (expenditure).   
 
Table 3.6: Estimates of expenditure elasticities of demand for cigarettes in Uganda 
 (2005) (2009) (Pooled sample) 
    







 (-0.531 , 0.796) (-1.014 , 1.100) (-0.333 , 0.647) 
    
No. of households 233 147 380 
Notes: Estimates of the expenditure elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Uganda for the 2005, 2009 and pooled samples. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are in square brackets. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. Since the expenditure 
elasticity of demand is estimated at the household level (see equation 3.11), I only report the number of households.  
 
 
3.5.2.  Robustness 
The estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes presented above are likely to be 
influenced by extreme unit values given that the sample size is relatively small. To check the 
robustness of my estimates, I follow Guindon et al. (2011) and exclude unit values that are greater 
than 2.5 standard deviations and 5 standard deviations from their respective means. (Given the 
similarity of the results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, I only perform the robustness test on the pooled sample). 
The first-stage within-cluster regressions for the robustness tests are presented in Appendix B in Table 
B1 and Table B2. The expenditure elasticities of quality are fairly similar to those in Table 3.3: reported 
unit values rise by 0.15 for every 1% increase in household expenditure. Similarly, the coefficients on 





Table 3.7 contains the estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes for the robustness 
tests. I have also included in Table 3.7, estimates for the pooled sample taken from Table 3.5. The 
second column (column 2) excludes unit values that deviate by more than 5 standard deviations from 
the mean while the third column (column 3), being more stringent, excludes unit values that deviate 
by more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean. The price elasticity estimates in columns 2 and 
3 are statistically significant at the 1% level and are similar to the estimate from the pooled sample 
taken from Table 3.5. Table 3.8 presents the results of the robustness test for the expenditure 
elasticity (I have also included the estimates from the pooled sample from Table 3.6). The results in 
Table 3.8 are similar to those in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.7: Estimates of price elasticities of demand for cigarettes in Uganda (Robustness check) 
 (Pooled sample) (2) (3) 







 (-0.499, -0.311) (-0.521 , -0.253) (-0.555 , -0.235) 
    
No. of households 380 378 375 
No. of clusters 314 312 312 
Notes: Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Uganda for the pooled sample and for the pooled sample 
with extreme unit values excluded. Column 1 (pooled sample) includes all unit values. In column 2, all unit values that are 
equal to or greater than 5 standard deviations from the mean are excluded. In column 3, all unit values that are equal to or 
greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean are excluded. Bootstrapped standard errors are in square brackets. 95% 
confidence intervals are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 3.8: Estimates of the expenditure elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Uganda (Robustness 
check) 
 (Pooled sample) (2) (3) 







 (-0.333, 0.647) (-0.274 , 0.646) (-0.292 , 0.690) 
    
No. of households 380 378 375 
Notes: Estimates of the expenditure elasticity of demand for cigarettes in Uganda for the pooled sample and for the pooled 
sample with extreme unit values excluded. Column 1 (pooled sample) includes all unit values. In column 2, all unit values 
that are equal to or greater than 5 standard deviations from the mean are excluded. In column 3, all unit values that are 
equal to or greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean are excluded. 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses. 
Since the expenditure elasticity of demand is estimated at the household level (see equation 3.11), I only report the number 





This chapter does not present estimates of price and expenditure elasticities of demand for different 
subsamples of the Ugandan population. Policymakers are, for instance, interested in learning how 
responsive poorer households are to prices and expenditure vis-à-vis richer households, or in learning 
the degree of responsiveness to price and expenditure changes of urban households relative to rural 
households. Unfortunately, the small number of households reporting positive expenditure on 
cigarettes in the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS) makes analysis of subsamples problematic.44 
One way of going around this is to combine several rounds of the UNPS so as to boost the sample size, 
similarly to what Guindon et al. (2011) did with several rounds of India’s National Sample Survey. 
However, there have only been 4 rounds of the UNPS to date and the cigarette expenditure data in 
the last two rounds was not collected at a sufficiently detailed level to allow for the calculation of unit 
values. Secondly, this chapter does not provide elasticity estimates for other tobacco products such 
as leaf or loose tobacco and it does not provide cross-price elasticities between cigarettes and other 
tobacco products. The consumption of other tobacco products is likely to be substantial, particularly 
among the poor, given that Uganda is a tobacco growing country. Unprocessed tobacco products are 
likely to find their way into the market. Knowing the price and income responsiveness of demand for 
products such as leaf tobacco is likely to be important to policymakers. Unfortunately, as stated in the 
data section, the UNPS does not collect detailed enough information on other tobacco products to 
allow for the estimation of these elasticities.    
 
Secondly, this chapter has provided elasticity estimates only for households that reported positive 
expenditures on cigarettes. That is, the estimates in this chapter are conditional price and expenditure 
elasticities. Policymakers, in wanting to know the overall impact of tax measures, are often interested 
in the overall price and expenditure elasticities of demand. As detailed in the data section, I am unable 
to include households with zero expenditure in the analysis because the UNPS does not distinguish 
between households reporting zeroes and those whose expenditure information on cigarettes is 
missing.        
                                                          
44 For instance I attempted to estimate price elasticities of demand for upper/lower income households and for 
urban/rural households using the pooled sample and found elasticities that go against theoretical expectations 
and elasticity estimates found in the literature. This is probably due to the small sample sizes that make the 




The hope is that future editions of the Uganda National Panel Survey will collect detailed enough 
information on household expenditures on not only cigarettes but on other tobacco products as well.  
 
Finally, the small number of households per cluster means that the elasticity estimates presented in 
this chapter likely suffer from two sources of bias. Firstly, the reported unit values are likely 
endogenous because they are obtained from a few households in each cluster. A second source of 
bias is measurement error given that the measurement error correction formula in equation 3.6 
requires that clusters contain many households.  
 
3.7. Summary and conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to estimate price and expenditure elasticities of demand for cigarettes in 
Uganda. In doing so, I used the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS) and exploited the empirical fact 
that unit values, a measure of prices, varied exogenously across geographical space in Uganda. The 
last point allowed me to control for possible endogeneity in the cigarette demand equation.  
 
I focussed on cigarettes because the first two rounds of the UNPS did not collect detailed enough 
information on other tobacco products to allow for the estimation of their elasticities using Deaton’s 
method, which was the method I used in the chapter. For example, the survey was not explicit about 
the units in which other types of tobacco products were purchased. Using standardised units is critical 
with Deaton’s method. Further, I was only able to estimate conditional elasticities because the UNPS 
does not distinguish between households reporting zero expenditure on cigarettes and those whose 
information is missing. Failure to separate zero expenditures from expenditure information that is 
missing is likely to result in biased estimates especially if the pattern of missing values is systematic. 
Lastly, sample size restrictions made it difficult to estimate separate elasticities for different sub-
samples of Uganda’s population.  
 
I found that cigarette demand was price inelastic in Uganda with an elasticity estimate ranging 
between -0.3 to -0.4. This means that the quantity of cigarettes demanded is expected to decline by 
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between 3% and 4%, at the very least, every time prices rise by 10%. This estimate of the price 
elasticity of demand falls within the range of estimates found in the literature.  
 
The price elasticity estimate for Uganda is likely to be a lower bound estimate (in absolute terms) given 
we know that conditional elasticities of demand are smaller (in absolute terms) than total elasticities 
of demand. The total elasticity incorporates, in addition to reductions in demand, the fact that some 
smokers are likely to quit and some young people are unlikely to initiate when prices rise. The 
literature tends to find that the total price elasticity of demand is, on average, twice (in absolute terms) 
the conditional elasticity of demand (IARC, 2011).   
 
My estimates of the price elasticity of demand suggest that Uganda can reduce cigarette consumption 
by increasing excise taxes on cigarettes. Further, and given that the reduction in demand is expected 
to be proportionately smaller than the increase in prices, the country can increase excise tax revenues 
at the same time. The important point to note is that the tax increases have to be real, inflation-
















APPENDIX B   
Table B 1: Unit value regression (equation 3.2) for robustness tests 
 (1) (2) 
Variables lnv lnv 
   
lnx 0.152*** 0.148*** 
 (0.031) (0.027) 
Size 0.011 -0.022 
 (0.077) (0.067) 
Adults 0.116 0.054 
 (0.186) (0.162) 
Males 0.152 0.146 
 (0.138) (0.121) 
Education 0.001 0.024 
 (0.048) (0.042) 
Age -0.181* -0.216** 
 (0.099) (0.086) 
Gender 0.213** 0.173* 
 (0.107) (0.092) 
Work -0.022 0.028 
 (0.081) (0.071) 
Year -0.145*** -0.102** 
 (0.054) (0.047) 
Constant 5.801*** 5.964*** 
 (0.446) (0.388) 
   
No. of households 378 375 
R-squared 0.118 0.142 
Notes: Results of the regression of the log of unit value (lnv) on the log of household expenditure (lnx) and other household 
characteristics for the pooled sample only. In column 1, all unit values that are equal to or greater than 5 standard deviations 
from the mean are excluded. In column 2, all unit values that are equal to or greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the 
mean are excluded. Household size (Size), education of household head (Education) and age of household head (age) are in 
natural logarithms. Adults refers to the proportion of adults in a household and adults are defined as aged 18 years or older. 
Males is the proportion of males in a household. Gender is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the household 
head is male and zero if they are female. Work is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the household head is 
employed and zero otherwise. Year takes on the value of 1 if the household was surveyed in 2005 and zero if surveyed in 









Table B 2: Budget share regressions (equation 3.3) for robustness tests 
 (1) (2) 
Variables w w 
   
lnx -0.056*** -0.055*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Size 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Adults 0.011 0.013 
 (0.054) (0.055) 
Males 0.001 0.004 
 (0.042) (0.042) 
Education -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
Age 0.009 0.003 
 (0.035) (0.037) 
Gender -0.050* -0.053* 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Work 0.044* 0.054* 
 (0.026) (0.028) 
Year -0.145*** -0.102** 
 (0.054) (0.047) 
Constant 0.618*** 0.627*** 
 (0.148) (0.153) 
   
No. of households 378 375 
R-squared 0.876 0.879 
Notes: Results of the regression of the cigarette budget share (w) on the log of household expenditure (lnx) and other 
household characteristics for the pooled sample only. In column 1, all unit values that are equal to or greater than 5 standard 
deviations from the mean are excluded. In column 2, all unit values that are equal to or greater than 2.5 standard deviations 
from the mean are excluded. Household size (Size), education of household head (Education) and age of household head 
(age) are in natural logarithms. Adults refers to the proportion of adults in a household and adults are defined as aged 18 
years or older. Males is the proportion of males in a household. Gender is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if 
the household head is male and zero if they are female. Work is a dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the 
household head is employed and zero otherwise. Year takes on the value of 1 if the household was surveyed in 2005 and 
zero if surveyed in 2009. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster fixed effects are suppressed 











CHAPTER 4: EVALUATING SOUTH AFRICA’S TOBACCO CONTROL 
INITIATIVE: A SYNTHETIC CONTROL APPROACH 
 
4.1. Introduction 
South Africa has since 1994 aggressively and consistently increased the excise tax on cigarettes so as 
to meet and maintain a total tax burden (including Value Added Tax) of 50% of the average retail 
selling price. The target was met in 1997 and revised upwards to 52% in 2004. The tax rises have 
translated into substantial increases in the inflation-adjusted retail selling prices of cigarettes. For 
instance, the average real price per pack of cigarettes increased by 110% between 1994 and 2004 and 
by 190% if one extends the period to 2012 (see Figure 4.1). The increase in prices has coincided with 
substantial declines in prevalence and consumption. Van Walbeek (2005) estimated that prevalence 
declined from 31% of the adult population in 1993 to 24% in 2003 while aggregate cigarette 
consumption and per capita consumption declined by 32% and 46% respectively over the same period. 
Real excise tax revenues increased during this time in spite of the fact that cigarette consumption was 
declining. In 2012 rands, real annual tax revenues increased from R3billion in 1994 to R11billion in 
2012, an increase of 270%.45   
 
Declines in prevalence and consumption were well underway by the time the tax increases began in 
1994 (Van Walbeek, 2002; 2005). In the absence of a credible counterfactual (a what-if scenario), the 
impact of taxes on consumption and prevalence is likely to be overstated. The literature evaluating 
the impact of South Africa’s aggressive tobacco control efforts is not very extensive.  
 
This chapter uses a transparent data-driven technique, the Synthetic Control method developed by 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended in Abadie et al. (2010), to create a credible 
counterfactual of cigarette consumption in South Africa from 1994 to 2004. The counterfactual is 
constructed as a weighted average of the per capita cigarette consumption of countries similar to 
South Africa that did not initiate large-scale tobacco control measures over the period 1994 to 2004. 
Using this counterfactual, I am able to estimate a “treatment effect” of South Africa’s tax increases on 
cigarette consumption. I find that per capita cigarette consumption would not have continued 
declining in the absence of the consistent tax and price rises that began in 1994. Specifically, I estimate 
                                                          
45 Tax revenue data are taken from the National Treasury of South Africa and CPI from Statistics South Africa. 
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a treatment effect of 36% by 2004. That is, per capita cigarette consumption in 2004 was 36% lower 
than it would have been had the government not consistently increased excise taxes in the preceding 
years. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides some background to South 
Africa’s tobacco control measures. Section 4.3 reviews the literature evaluating tobacco control 
measures in South Africa and in other parts of the world. Section 4.4 describes the Synthetic Control 
method in some detail and Section 4.5 describes the data. Section 4.6 discusses the selection of the 
control countries (what I call the donor pool) while Section 4.7 presents the main results and conducts 
placebo tests. I present the results of the robustness tests in Section 4.8 while Section 4.9 discusses 
what implications, if any, illicit trade has for my estimates of the treatment effect. Section 4.10 
concludes.     
 
4.2. Tobacco Control in South Africa 
Prior to 1994, South Africa did not consciously target the consumption of tobacco products on public 
health grounds. According to Van Walbeek (2005), the relegation of public health concerns in tobacco 
tax policy was likely due to the cordial relations that existed between the tobacco industry and the 
National Party, the party that ruled South Africa from 1948 to 1994. The end result was that the real 
tax on cigarettes, the main tobacco product in South Africa, declined by 70% between 1961 and 1990 
(ibid.). Coincidentally, per capita cigarette consumption increased by 60% from 50 packs in 1961 to 80 
packs in 1991 (ibid.).  
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the medical research community (Yach, 1982) and the South African 
Medical Research Council (1988, 1992) published research showing that tobacco consumption 
imposed a net cost on the country. For instance, the 1992 study by the South African Medical Research 
Council (SAMRC) estimated the costs of tobacco consumption at 1.82% of GDP against benefits of 
0.49% of GDP (SAMRC, 1992). The publicity generated by these studies rallied the public health 
community and civil society behind the common goal of getting the South African government to take 
tobacco control seriously. The momentum that had built up during the 1980s and early 1990s, along 
with the impending change of government, culminated in the passing of the Tobacco Products Control 
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Act of 1993 by Parliament.46 The big turning point, however, came in 1994 when the new African 
National Congress-led government announced that the government would target a tax burden on 
cigarettes (including Value Added Tax) of 50% of the retail price to be phased in over a number of 
years (Republic of South Africa, 1994). As a result, 1994, 1995 and 1996 saw excise tax increments of 
respectively 25%, 25% and 18% (Republic of South Africa, 1994, 1995, 1996). In 1997, the Minister of 
Finance announced a large increase of 52% in the excise tax on cigarettes, a move that was expected 
to bring the total tax burden (including Value Added Tax) to 50% of the average retail selling price 
(Republic of South Africa, 1997). From 1997, the annual increases on excise taxes on cigarettes have, 
therefore, been predictable in order to maintain the stipulated tax burden.47 In 2004, the total tax 
burden was revised upwards to 52% of the average retail selling price (Republic of South Africa, 2004).  
 
South Africa’s aggressive excise tax policy since 1994 has translated into substantial increases in the 
real price of cigarettes. From 1994 to 2012, the average real price per pack of cigarettes increased by 
190% (see Figure 4.1). Between 1994 and 2004, which is the period I evaluate in this chapter, the 
increase in the real price per pack was 110%. This is in stark contrast to the period before 1994 which 
saw considerable declines in the real price of cigarettes. It is this unprecedented increase in real 









                                                          
46 Saloojee (1994), Malan and Leaver (2003) and Van Walbeek (2005) contain detailed accounts of the events 
and debates leading up to the adoption of the Tobacco Products Control Act of 1993.  
47 Because the industry responds by increasing retail prices, the tax burden is always slightly less than the 
government’s target (see Van Walbeek, 2005, 2006).  
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Figure 4.1: Trends in the excise tax per pack of cigarettes, real price per pack of cigarettes and 
consumption of cigarettes in packs, South Africa 1960 to 2012 
 
 
Notes: Based on data from the National Treasury of South Africa and Statistics South Africa.  
 
 
4.3. Literature review 
The literature evaluating the impact of South Africa’s tax increases since 1994 on prevalence and 
consumption is not very extensive. Van Walbeek (2002, 2005) investigated the impact of the tax 
increases on prevalence and consumption by fitting a linear trend to the All Media and Products Survey 
(AMPS), which is a commercially generated dataset. He estimated that smoking prevalence in South 
Africa declined from 31% of the adult population in 1993 to 24% in 2003. He also found that African 
and Coloured population groups experienced the biggest declines in prevalence over the same period. 
In terms of consumption, Van Walbeek (2005) found that aggregate consumption declined by 32% 
over the period 1993 to 2004 whereas per capita consumption declined by 46%. Boshoff (2008) 
estimated a vector autoregression (VAR) in an attempt to assess the relative importance of price 
changes, income changes and general health awareness in influencing cigarette demand over the 
period 1996 to 2006. He estimated demand elasticities for price, income and health awareness and 
found that all three factors were important in influencing cigarette demand over the period 1996 to 
2006. Bosch and Koch (2014) examined the regressivity of a large tax increase in 2006 by exploiting 
the fact that data collection for the Income and Expenditure Survey coincided with the tax increase. 
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They found that cigarette taxes became less regressive after the tax increase. Other work has instead 
focussed on estimating the impact of the tax increases on illicit trade (Blecher, 2010, 2011; Van 
Walbeek, 2014) and on the impact of the Tobacco Products Control Amendment Act of 1999 on 
restaurant revenues (Blecher, 2006; Van Walbeek et al., 2007).  
 
An implicit assumption in the South African literature that evaluates tobacco control measures is that 
pre-intervention trends in, say, prevalence and consumption would have continued in the absence of 
the intervention. Given this, impact can be assessed by comparing present day consumption or 
prevalence with the magnitudes of these variables before the onset of treatment. That pre-
intervention trends would have continued without treatment is not directly evident for consumption 
and prevalence. The two variables were already declining by the time the government introduced its 
new tax policy on tobacco products (Van Walbeek, 2002, 2005). Any evaluation that does not attempt 
to create a counterfactual is likely to give a biased estimate of the impact of a particular tobacco 
control measure.48 
 
Internationally, researchers in the United States (US) have made progress in evaluating tobacco 
control initiatives by using counterfactuals. Warner (1977) was one of the first US studies to do this. 
He estimated a regression of per capita cigarette consumption on cigarette price and other covariates 
using time series data from before the Surgeon-General’s 1964 report and the ensuing anti-smoking 
campaigns. He then used the estimated coefficients from the pre-treatment period to predict what 
per capita cigarette consumption would have been like in the absence of the campaigns. The 
treatment effect was then calculated as the difference between predicted consumption and actual 
consumption in the treatment period. Warner’s conclusion was that per capita cigarette consumption 
would have been 30% higher in 1975 had the anti-smoking measures not happened. Implicit in 
Warner’s study was the assumption that the pre-intervention regression coefficients remained stable 
even after the intervention. That this assumption was unlikely to hold, in general settings, was pointed 
out by Lucas (1976) in his important critique of econometric models of policy evaluation.  
 
More recent work in the US has focussed on developing methods of conducting policy evaluations 
that avoid some aspects of Lucas’s critique. For instance, Fichtenberg and Glantz (2000) evaluated 
                                                          
48 Koch and Tshiswaka-Kashalala (2008, p2) make a similar point.  
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California’s tobacco control programme by comparing rates of change in per capita cigarette 
consumption in California against rates of change in the rest of the US. They found that after the 
introduction of the programme in 1989, California’s rate of decline in per capita cigarette consumption 
exceeded that of the rest of the US by 2.72 packs per year. A critique of the method in Fichtenberg 
and Glantz (2000) is that treatment effects were underestimated since the rest of the US included 
states that, alongside California, had also implemented some tobacco control measures.49  The 
method in Abadie et al. (2010), which I describe fully below, attempts to correct for this shortcoming 
by comparing California to only those states that did not implement large-scale tobacco control 
measures after 1989.    
 
4.4. Method 
This chapter uses the method developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended further in 
Abadie et al. (2010) to evaluate South Africa’s tobacco control policies from 1994 to 2004. The method 
involves estimating South Africa’s counterfactual cigarette consumption trend line following the 
consistent hikes in cigarette excise taxes that began in 1994. In other words, the method involves 
creating a synthetic South Africa, a country that looks like South Africa in all relevant respects except 
for the tax hikes. The observed outcome variable for the “real” South Africa is then compared to the 
outcome variable for the synthetic South Africa. In this section I discuss in some detail the formal 
aspects of the method.  
 
4.4.1.  Identification 
Suppose I have 𝐽 + 1 regions and region 1 experiences a policy change and is therefore referred to as 
the “treated” region. The remaining 𝐽 regions do not experience the policy change and since I use 
these regions to construct a counterfactual scenario for the treated country, I collectively refer to 
them as the “donor” pool. The policy change happens at time period 𝑇0 where 1 ≤ 𝑇0  < 𝑇0 + 𝑃 with 
𝑃 being the number of time periods after treatment. In the case of South Africa, 𝑃 = 10 and 𝑇0 =
1994 (Below I motivate why I choose to end the evaluation 10 years after 1994). The outcome variable 
of interest is 𝑌𝑖𝑡  with 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐽 + 1 and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇0 + 𝑃. For any region 𝑖 and time period 𝑡, I can 
define 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼  and 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁. 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼  is the observed outcome variable and 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 is the outcome variable in the absence 
                                                          
49 For example, Alaska, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York and Washington had raised their 
state cigarette taxes by at least 50 US cents over the period 1989 to 2000 (Abadie et al., 2010).  
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of treatment (the superscripts 𝐼 and 𝑁 are chosen to represent respectively “intervention” and “no 
intervention”). That is, 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 is unobserved after 𝑇0 but is equal to 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼  before 𝑇0. Given this, I can then 
define the treatment effect of the policy change, 𝛼𝑖𝑡, as: 
 
𝛼𝑖𝑡  =  𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐼 −  𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁      (4.1) 
 
for 𝑡 =  𝑇0 + 1, … , 𝑇0 + 𝑃. The complication is that 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 is unobserved for all 𝑡 >  𝑇0. In order to 
estimate the effect of the policy change, I need to estimate 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑁 after treatment. Suppose 𝑌𝑖𝑡  evolves 
according to the equation 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆𝑡 +  𝜽𝑡𝒁𝒊 +  𝜹𝑡𝝁𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡     (4.2) 
 
where 𝜆𝑡 is some factor common to all regions, 𝒁𝒊 is a vector of observed factors and 𝝁𝑖  is a vector of 
unobserved factors that have an impact on 𝑌𝑖𝑡. 𝜽𝑡 and 𝜹𝑡 are the unknown time varying parameters 
associated with 𝒁𝒊 and 𝝁𝑖  respectively.
50 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the unobserved error term with mean zero. Given a 
donor pool and a 𝐽 × 1 vector of weights 𝑾 = (𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝐽+1)′ such that 𝑤𝑗  ≥ 0 and 𝑤2 +  𝑤3 + ⋯ +





𝑌𝑗𝑡 =  𝜆𝑡  + 𝜽𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
𝒁𝒋 +  𝜹𝑡  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
𝝁𝑗 +  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
𝜀𝑗𝑡       (4.3). 
 
 That is, I can always express the outcome variable of a treated region as a weighted average of the 
regions in the donor pool. For 𝑖 = 1 (i.e. the treated country), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and 
Abadie et al. (2010) show that there exists a 𝐽 × 1 vector of weights 𝑾∗ = (𝑤2
∗, … , 𝑤𝐽+1
∗ )′  with 𝑤2
∗ +
 𝑤3
∗ + ⋯ + 𝑤𝐽+1
∗ = 1 and 𝑤𝑗
∗  ≥ 0 such that 
                                                          
50 Notice that 𝒁𝒊 and 𝝁𝒊 do not have time subscripts. We can think of their values as fixed over short periods of 
time but still allow for their effects, via 𝜽𝑡 and 𝜹𝑡 respectively, to vary across time. The method also allows for 












𝑌𝑗2 =  𝑌12 
. 











𝒁𝒋  =  𝒁𝟏     
 
That is, I can always exactly recreate the pre-treatment characteristics of the treated region using only 
the donor pool and the weights in 𝑾∗.51 Since the factors in 𝝁𝑖  are unobserved, I cannot create their 






𝝁𝒋  =  𝝁𝟏                                                (4.5) 
 
also holds (Abadie et al., 2010, p495). Having recreated the pre-treatment characteristics of the 
treated country using the donor pool, I can then use the same linear combination of regions to trace 
out the time path of the outcome variable after treatment. This time path is the outcome variable I 
would have observed for the treated region in the absence of treatment (the counterfactual). The 
difference between the counterfactual trend line and the actual trend line is then an estimate of the 
treatment effect. Formally, given equations (4.4) and (4.5), the treatment effect estimator for 𝑖 = 1 is 
 
                                                          
51 Appendix B of Abadie et al. (2010) contains the mathematical proofs related to this point.  
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𝑌𝑗𝑡                                   (4.6) 
 
for 𝑡 > 𝑇0 and 𝑗 = 2,3, … , 𝐽.
52  
 
The treatment effects estimator in equation (4.6) is a generalized version of the standard difference-
in-difference estimator (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p227 – 243). Whereas the standard difference-in-
difference estimator assumes that the effects of the unobserved factors are fixed and therefore can 
be “differenced” out, (4.6) allows for them to be time varying. This is an attractive property given that 
the impact of most factors is likely to change over time as opposed to remaining fixed. In addition, the 
treatment effects estimator in equation (4.6) is a dynamic estimator that gives us the treatment effect 
at each point in time after treatment. The standard difference-in-difference estimator only gives a 
static average treatment effect. Further, Abadie et al. (2015) show that the Synthetic Control 
estimator in (4.6) is related to the standard regression estimator in the sense that both apply the idea 
of weights that sum to one. The only difference is that the Synthetic Control estimator restricts the 
weights to be non-negative, whereas the regression estimator places no such restriction on the 
weights. Not placing this restriction allows regression to perfectly fit a counterfactual even when the 
data does not allow for one. In more technical terms, regression allows extrapolation outside the 
support of the data whereas the synthetic control estimator can only perfectly fit a counterfactual if 
the data allows it to do so. Extrapolating from outside of the support of the data makes regression 
susceptible to the problem of “extreme counterfactuals” (King and Zeng, 2006).  
 
The equations in (4.4) are unlikely to hold exactly in practise. It is, therefore, desirable to get as close 
approximations to these equations as possible. One of the ways of assuring this is to have a donor 
pool of regions that share a “common support” with the treated region. In other words, the outcome 
variable for the regions in the donor pool should be influenced by the same factors as the outcome 
variable for the treated region.  That is, the outcome variable for both types of regions should evolve 
according to equation (4.2). Secondly, the treated region should be contained within the set of all 
linear combinations of the donor pool. This is technically known as the “convex hull” requirement 
(King and Zeng, 2006). These two conditions essentially require the treated region to not be too 
                                                          
52 For 𝑡 <  𝑇0, 𝛼1?̂? = 0. That is , before treatment, the treatment effect is zero.  
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extreme relative to the regions in the donor pool. In any case, the degree of pre-treatment discrepancy 
between the treated country and its synthetic counterpart can be assessed by calculating the Root 
Mean Square Error (RMSE) as: 
 
 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = (
1
𝑇0









                (4.7). 
 
A large RMSE would suggest a poor pre-treatment fit between the treated region and its synthetic 
counterpart. Using the Synthetic Control Method in this situation would not be advisable.  





∥ 𝑿1 −  𝑿0𝑾 ∥ =  √(𝑿1 − 𝑿0𝑾)
′𝑽 (𝑿1 − 𝑿0𝑾)  such that 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0  and 𝑤2 + 𝑤3 + ⋯ 
+ 𝑤𝐽+1 = 1                     (4.8) 
 
where 𝑿1 is a matrix of pre-intervention characteristics of the treated region (including 𝑌1𝑡 and 𝒁𝟏) 
and 𝑿0 is a matrix of the same pre-intervention characteristics for the regions in the donor pool. 𝓜 
is the set of all vectors satisfying the requirement that their elements sum to one and are non-
negative53 and 𝑽 is some diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements weight factors in 𝒁𝟏 according to 
how well they predict the outcome variable 𝑌i𝑡. The problem in (4.8) seeks to minimize, by selecting 
𝑾∗,  a measure of distance between the treated region and the donor pool.54 The minimization 
problem in (4.8) can be solved numerically in Stata using the Synth routine.55   
 
                                                          
53 For instance, 𝓜 might contain a vector with the following elements (1  0  0 … 0) or another vector with 
elements (0.5  0  0 … 0.5) and so on.   
54 Recall that ∥   ∥ is the Euclidean norm or Euclidean metric, a distance function.   
55 Available from Jens Hainmueller’s website at http://web.stanford.edu/~jhain/synthpage.html  
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4.4.2.  Inference 
In order to ensure that the treatment effect identified in equation (4.6) is not due to random chance, 
Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) suggest inferential techniques based on the idea of placebo tests. They 
suggest constructing synthetic counterparts for all the regions in the donor pool, one at a time, and 
for each region estimating a treatment effect according to equation (4.6). This exercise results in the 
construction of an empirical distribution of treatment effects similar to the student’s 𝑡 distribution. 
The identified effect for the treated region is statistically significant (i.e. not due to chance) if the 
probability of obtaining an effect as large as that of the treated region, in the empirical distribution of 
treatment effects, is small. In other words, the effect for the treated region is statistically significant if 
the number of donor regions that show a treatment effect, even after receiving a placebo, is small.56  
 
4.4.3.  Implementation 
In terms of implementing the method for South Africa, I follow the approach in Abadie et al. (2010). 
𝑌𝑖𝑡, the outcome variable, is cigarette consumption per capita (in sticks). The vector 𝒁𝟏 comprises of 
the standard predictors of cigarette demand found in the literature (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; 
IARC, 2011). The variables in 𝒁𝟏, include the following : the real price of a pack of cigarettes, real Gross 
Domestic Product per capita (real GDP per capita), alcohol consumption per capita (expressed in litres 
of pure alcohol) and the proportion of adults in the total population. Alcohol consumption is included 
in the analysis given that recent work has shown that there is a positive and statistically significant 
association between cigarette and alcohol consumption (Dierker et al., 2006; Cohn et al., 2015).  𝒁𝟏 
also includes lagged values of per capita cigarette consumption to capture some aspect of habit 
formation (Warner, 1977; Chaloupka, 1991). The data sources for all these variables are discussed in 
detail in Section 4.5 below.  
 
My choice of conducting the evaluation over the period 1994 to 2004 is due to the World Health 
Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) which came in to effect in 2005. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the treaty encourages countries to implement a wide array of tobacco control 
measures. I, therefore, expect that most of the countries in my donor pool began, from 2005 onwards, 
to think seriously about tobacco control, a situation that might result in a downward bias in my 
                                                          
56 This idea is borrowed from medical trials, where patients receiving a placebo are not expected to show results 
that are similar to patients receiving the actual drug, if the drug is effective.    
110 
 
treatment effect estimates. Further, Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) consider a ten year period to be a 
sufficient timespan to properly evaluate the effects of a policy change.57  
 
The Synthetic Control method has gained prominence after being favourably reviewed by Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009) in their extensive survey of the impact evaluation literature. It has been used to 
assess episodes of economic liberalization across the world (Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013), to quantify 
the economic costs of conflict in Spain (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003) and the economic effects of 
reunification in Germany (Abadie et al., 2015). From a public health perspective, the method has been 
used to evaluate California’s Tobacco Control Programme (Abadie et al., 2010), to quantify the health 
benefits of the liberalization of the sex trade in the US state of Rhode Island (Cunningham and Shah, 
2014) and to estimate the effect of bar closing times on traffic accidents in the United Kingdom (Green 




The data used in this chapter come from a number of sources. Data on the outcome variable, cigarette 
consumption per capita (in sticks), come from the World Cigarette Report published by the ERC Group 
(ERC, 2010). The ERC Group is an independent research company that compiles market intelligence 
data on an annual basis on a number of products, including cigarettes. The country coverage of the 
World Cigarette Report is extensive and also contains complete time series on cigarette consumption 
from 1990 to 2009. Consumption data from the report has been used previously by Blecher (2011) to 
investigate the impact of advertising bans on cigarette consumption.58  
 
                                                          
57 In their 2010 paper on California’s tobacco control initiative, Abadie et al. evaluate the initiative’s effect for 
the period running from 1989 to 2000. In their 2015 paper on the economic effects of reunification on West 
Germany’s economy, Abadie et al. conduct the evaluation over the period 1990 to 2000.   
58 An alternative data source for consumption is the Tobacco Country Profiles available from the World Health 
Organization (WHO) at http://www.who.int/tobacco/surveillance/policy/country_profile/en/. Unfortunately, 
and as noted by Blecher (2011, p139), the Tobacco Country Profiles do not contain complete consumption series 
for the time periods that I am interested in.   
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Cigarette price data is from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU’s) Worldwide Cost of Living Survey. 
The survey has been collecting cigarette price data alongside the price of other goods and services for 
140 cities since 1990.59 For cigarettes, prices are collected semi-annually from supermarkets, medium-
priced retailers and more expensive specialty stores for two brands: Marlboro (or the nearest 
international equivalent) and the cheapest local brand (or the cheapest brand in the absence of a local 
brand). I follow Blecher and Van Walbeek (2004, 2009) and Blecher (2008, 2011) and use the price of 
a pack of the cheapest brand. This is because the cheapest brand is usually the most popular brand in 
a country and consequently its price is the most representative. The price data is expressed in constant 
2000 US dollars using the United States Consumer Price Index City Average for All Items (United States 
Department of Labour).60 A drawback of using the EIU price data is that cigarette prices are only 
collected from a few cities (sometimes only a single city) within a country. This might reduce the 
representativeness of the price data.  
 
GDP per capita and data on the proportion of adults (16 to 64 years) in the population come from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.61 GDP per capita is expressed in constant 2000 
US dollars. Finally, data on alcohol consumption per capita (in litres of pure alcohol) comes from the 
World Health Organization’s Global Information System on Alcohol and Health.62  
 
4.6. Selection of the Donor Pool 
The validity of the Synthetic Control method relies on the selection of a donor pool that meets the 
following set of criteria: (i) the common support requirement, (ii) the convex hull requirement and (iii) 
regions in the donor pool should not have experienced treatment during the relevant time period. In 
selecting an appropriate donor pool, I begin by addressing the third requirement and then work 
backwards to (i) and (ii).   
 
                                                          
59 For more see: http://www.eiu.com/handlers/PublicDownload.ashx?fi=data-section/worldwide-cost-of-
living.pdf&mode=m  
60 Available at www.bls.gov  
61 Available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators  
62 Available at http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.GISAH  
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In order to select a donor pool consisting of untreated countries, I rely on the work on cigarette 
affordability by Blecher and Van Walbeek (2004, 2009). Blecher and Van Walbeek propose a measure 
of cigarette affordability, the Relative Income Price (RIP), which is calculated as the ratio of the cost of 
100 packs of cigarettes in a country to that country’s real GDP per capita. A declining RIP means that 
cigarettes are becoming more affordable while a rising RIP signifies declining affordability. In their 
2009 paper, Blecher and Van Walbeek were able to classify 77 countries according to whether they 
experienced increasing affordability or declining affordability over the period 1990 to 2006. These 
were countries for which the authors were able to obtain complete and comparable data on real 
cigarette prices and real GDP per capita over the period 1990 to 2006. The authors identified 37 
countries where cigarettes became more affordable over the period 1990 to 2006.63 For 20 out of the 
37 countries, the increase in affordability occurred because of a decrease in the real price of cigarettes 
coupled with an increase in real GDP per capita. For the remaining 17 countries, the increase in 
affordability was due to real GDP per capita growing faster than the increase in real prices.  
 
I opt to use the increase in affordability over the period 1990 to 2006 as a proxy for the absence of 
treatment. That is, I regard countries whose affordability increased on average over this period as not 
having enacted significant tobacco control measures. This is obviously the case for the 20 countries 
where affordability increased as a result of declining real cigarette prices. I contend, however, that 
even for the remaining 17 countries where affordability increased due to real incomes growing faster 
than real prices, a conclusion of the absence of treatment is a reasonable one to make. This is because 
effective tobacco control measures require (i) real tax/price increases and (ii) real tax/price increases 
that grow faster than the rate of growth in incomes (WHO, 2010; IARC, 2011). I also recognise that the 
Relative Income Price (RIP) might have some shortcomings in identifying whether a country has 
instituted tobacco control measures or not. For instance, a country may have adopted a wide set of 
tobacco control measures such as advertising bans and/or clean indoor air policies but neglected to 
significantly increase real cigarette prices. My measure of treatment would consign this country to the 
pool of potential donor countries in spite of its tobacco control efforts. In as much as I recognise that 
tobacco control measures constitute more than just tax/price measures, the tobacco control literature 
recognises the primacy of tax/price policies in curbing demand (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000; IARC, 
2011). In any case, I would consider my estimates of the treatment effect to be lower bound estimates 
                                                          
63 See Figure 4 in Blecher and Van Walbeek (2009).  
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if the donor pool had some countries whose treatment status was misclassified in the manner 
suggested above.  
 
An alternative approach would be to determine treatment status based on the Tobacco Country 
Profiles available from WHO.64 Unfortunately, the country profiles are often not clear as to whether 
the listed tobacco control measures have been implemented effectively or not. Further, the country 
profiles often provide the analyst with lots of room for discretion in classifying treatment status. On 
the other hand, the Relative Income Price (RIP) measures outcomes and not the intent of treatment. 
Secondly, the RIP, in using a rigid decision rule, leaves the analyst with little room for discretion and 
in this way limits errors due to misclassification. Lastly, the procedure of assigning treatment based 
on the RIP is transparent, a hallmark of the Synthetic Control method.   
 
My criterion for identifying treatment correctly classifies many of the countries that are known for 
having instituted significant tobacco control measures over the period 1990 to 2006. For example, 
South Africa, the country of interest in this chapter, is correctly classified as treated since its Relative 
Income Price (RIP) increased (i.e. affordability declined) on average over the period 1990 to 2006. 
Thailand, a country whose positive experience with tobacco control is often held up as a model for 
other Low- and Middle-Income Countries  (Levy et al., 2008; Sangthong et al., 2012), is also classified 
as having undergone treatment. Most of the developed countries, whose tobacco control efforts 
predate the 1990s, are also classified correctly as treated. On the other hand, the list of untreated 
countries consists mainly of Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), an expected outcome given 
these countries’ slow progress in implementing effective tobacco control measures over the period 
1990 to 2004 (Jha and Chaloupka, 2000).  The full list of treated and untreated countries from Blecher 
and Van Walbeek’s 2009 paper are contained in Table C1 in Appendix C.    
 
Having identified the potential donor pool, I need to ensure that the common support and convex hull 
requirements are met. The two requirements are readily satisfied by excluding from my potential 
donor pool in Table C1 countries that are dissimilar to South Africa in some fundamental way. One of 
the most transparent ways of ensuring this is to use the World Bank’s Country Classification System 
                                                          
64 Available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/surveillance/policy/country_profile/en/  
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based on per capita income.65 I rely on Blecher and Van Walbeek’s (2009) usage of the Classification 
System as it stood at the time of writing their paper and exclude from the donor pool all high income 
countries.66 These countries are often perceived as being structurally different in many respects to 
Low- and Middle-Income countries such that including them in the donor pool would risk violation of 
the convex hull and common support requirements. Lastly, I drop from the potential donor pool 
countries without a complete set of data for all variables over the period 1990 to 2004.67 The final 
donor pool consists of 24 countries which are listed in Table 4.1.   







Costa Rica Romania 
Cote d’Ivoire Senegal 




Jordan   
Malaysia  
Notes: List of untreated countries from Table C1 that are not high income countries and have a complete set of data over 
the period 1990 to 2004.  
 
The final donor pool consists of countries that are often thought of as South Africa’s peers. The list 
contains Latin American, sub-Saharan African, North African and South-East Asian countries. The 
donor pool also contains three countries from the BRICS group (Brazil, India and China).68 The BRICS 
countries are often thought of collectively as the vanguard of emerging economies.  
 
                                                          
65 Available at http://data.worldbank.org/news/2015-country-classifications  
66 This results in the exclusion of Kuwait, Bahrain, Czech Republic, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Finland, 
Luxembourg and Norway.  
67 This results in the exclusion of Bangladesh, Croatia, Iran and Serbia and Montenegro.   
68 BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Russia is not in the donor pool as it was classified 
as treated according to criterion outlined in Section 4.6.   
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4.7. Main results 
This section presents the main results of implementing the Synthetic Control method for South Africa 
using the donor pool listed in Table 4.1.  
 
4.7.1.  Treatment effects 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the solution to the minimization problem stated in equation (4.8). 
According to Table 4.2, synthetic South Africa is a linear combination of 27.6% of Argentina, 47.6% of 
Brazil, 14.6% of Chile, 0.7% of Romania and 9.4% of Tunisia. In other words, this combination of 
countries with their respective weights, produces the lowest pre-treatment root mean square error 
(RMSE) between the actual South Africa and its synthetic counterpart. The pre-treatment RMSE 
between the actual South Africa and its synthetic counterpart obtained by applying the weights in 
Table 4.2 is 0.144. That is, on average, the pre-treatment difference between South Africa and 
synthetic South Africa for the outcome variable is about one-tenth of a per capita cigarette. The 
optimal weights in Table 4.2 show that synthetic South Africa is mostly made up of Latin American 









































Notes: The table shows the vector of optimal weights, 𝑾∗, obtained as the solution to the problem in equation (4.8). 
 
In Table 4.3, I compare the average pre-treatment characteristics, the predictors in 𝒁𝟏, for South Africa 
with its synthetic counterpart using the weights in Table 4.2. The table shows that synthetic South 
Africa resembles the actual South Africa in most of the pre-treatment characteristics. The only variable 
whose pre-treatment average differs between South Africa and its synthetic counterpart is alcohol 
consumption per capita: South Africa’s average is somewhat higher than its synthetic counterpart. 
This is due to the fact that South Africa’s alcohol consumption per capita is “extreme” relative to the 
countries in the donor pool. In other words, there is no linear combination of countries in the donor 
pool than can perfectly reproduce South Africa’s alcohol consumption profile (i.e. in terms of alcohol 
consumption, South Africa is unlikely to be in the convex hull of the donor pool). Having one or two 
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predictors that differ in magnitude between the treated country and its synthetic counterpart is typical 
of the Synthetic Control method as the treated country is likely to have some “extreme” predictors.69   
 
Table 4.3: Average pre-treatment characteristics for South Africa and Synthetic South Africa 
  
South Africa Synthetic South 
Africa 
Log of GDP per capita 8.44 8.28 
Price of cigarette pack in USD 0.89 1.15 
Pure alcohol consumption (in litres) 9.05 7.11 
Proportion of adults in population 58.62 60.95 
Consumption (1992) 947 945.58 
Consumption (1990) 1010 1008.86 
Notes: Average pre-treatment characteristics for South Africa and synthetic South Africa. Obtained by applying the weights 
in Table 4.2 to the pre-treatment characteristics of the donor pool. Alcohol consumption is in litres of pure alcohol per capita.  
 
Having shown that synthetic South Africa largely matches actual South Africa in its pre-treatment 
characteristics (as evidenced in Table 4.3 and by the pre-treatment RMSE), I can now use synthetic 
South Africa to estimate the treatment effect of the policy change. Figure 4.2 plots cigarette 
consumption per capita for South Africa and synthetic South Africa over the period 1990 to 2004. The 
vertical distance between the two lines is the estimate of the treatment effect (see equation 4.6). As 
one would expect, there is hardly any treatment effect before 1994 as the two lines are 
indistinguishable from one another. The last point is another way of judging the success of the 
Synthetic Control method in reproducing South Africa’s pre-treatment characteristics.  
 
After the onset of treatment in 1994, the two lines in Figure 4.2 begin to diverge with South Africa’s 
consumption line being everywhere lower than synthetic South Africa’s consumption line. South 
Africa’s per capita cigarette consumption declines throughout the treatment period whereas synthetic 
                                                          
69 In their study assessing the economic costs of reunification on West Germany’s economy, Abadie et al. (2015) 
were unable to find a linear combination of donor countries that reproduces West Germany’s average pre-
treatment inflation rate. This is because West Germany had a very low inflation rate in the pre-treatment period 
compared to the OECD countries which form the donor pool in their study. Similarly, Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003) in their study of the economic costs of conflict in Spain were unable to reproduce the Basque region’s 
pre-treatment industrial share as a percentage of total production. This is because the Basque region, which is 
the treated region in their study, had a very high pre-treatment industrial share relative to the rest of Spain.    
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South Africa’s trend line initially rises and eventually stabilises at around 800 cigarettes per capita 
from the year 2000.  
 
Figure 4.2: Cigarette consumption per capita, South Africa vs Synthetic South Africa 
 
Notes: The figure shows the trend lines in per capita consumption of cigarettes for South Africa and its synthetic counterpart. 
As is clear in the figure, the two lines are indistinguishable before the onset of treatment in 1994 but diverge after treatment.   
 
Figure 4.3: Treatment effect 
 
Notes: The figure shows the gap in per capita cigarette consumption between South Africa and synthetic South Africa over 
the period 1990 to 2004. The gap is calculated using equation (4.6). As can be seen from the figure, the treatment effect (the 
gap) is on average zero between 1990 and 1993. Thereafter, it is negative which means that synthetic South Africa has a 





One of the factors that might explain why per capita cigarette consumption stopped declining for 
synthetic South Africa after 1994 is the performance of the economy. The literature on the demand 
for cigarettes in South Africa tends to find a positive income elasticity of demand (Reekie, 1994; Van 
Walbeek, 1996; Economics of Tobacco Control Project, 1998; Van Walbeek, 2005; Boshoff, 2008). That 
is, on average and ceteris paribus, cigarette demand tends to rise with an increase in incomes and 
tends to fall with a decrease in incomes. Between 1980 and 1994, South Africa’s real GDP per capita 
declined at the average rate of 1% per year.70 On the other hand, between 1994 and 2004, real GDP 
per capita increased at the rate of 2% per year. Therefore, the decline in consumption that was already 
underway by 1994 would likely have stopped, in the absence of tax increases, simply because incomes 
began to rise. On the other hand, per capita consumption for synthetic South Africa stabilized as 
opposed to increasing after 1994 likely because other factors such as increased health awareness were 
also at play (Boshoff, 2008).  
 
Figure 4.3 presents another way of visualizing the treatment effect. The line in the figure measures 
the cigarette consumption gap between South Africa and its synthetic counterpart (Table C2 in 
Appendix C provides actual estimates of the treatment effect). Between 1990 and 1993, the treatment 
effect is approximately zero. By 1995, the first year after treatment begins, South Africa’s per capita 
cigarette consumption is 38 cigarettes less than its synthetic counterpart (or 4% below). The treatment 
effect increases with each additional year the authorities raise excise taxes on cigarettes so that by 
2004, South Africa’s per capita cigarette consumption is about 290 cigarettes less than its synthetic 
counterpart. That is, South Africa’s per capita cigarette consumption is 36% lower than where it would 
have been had treatment not began in 1994.  
 
4.7.2.  Placebo tests 
The treatment effects from Section 4.7.1 might have been produced by random chance in which case 
they would not be statistically significant. To confront this assertion, I use the inferential techniques 
suggested by Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) and described in Section 4.4.2. I place South Africa in the donor 
pool and subject each of the countries in Table 4.1 to the same synthetic control routine as I did for 
South Africa. This exercise results in a distribution of effects against which South Africa’s treatment 
effects can be compared. South Africa’s treatment effects would be statistically significant (i.e. not 
                                                          
70 Obtained from the World Bank’s Development Indicators database available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed October 2015).   
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due to random chance) if the probability of obtaining a treatment effect as large as South Africa’s, in 
the distribution of treatment effects, were small. These are called placebo tests because I do not 
expect many of the untreated countries in Table 4.1 to have treatment effects as large as those 
observed for the treated country. Figures 4.4 to 4.7 present the results of running the placebo tests. I 
also include in the figures South Africa’s treatment effect from Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.4 presents the treatment effects for all 25 countries. In the figure, most of the countries have 
treatment effects that are greater than zero or equal to zero over the period 1995 to 2004 (recall from 
equation 4.6 that a successful treatment results in a negative difference between a country’s cigarette 
consumption per capita and its synthetic counterpart in the treatment period). South Africa’s 
treatment effect appears unusual in the figure although it is matched by Brazil’s treatment effect 
(Brazil’s treatment effect is the other line that is also everywhere less than zero). Brazil’s pre-
treatment fit, with a RMSE of 95, is however poor making it a bad comparison for South Africa which 
has a pre-treatment RMSE of 0.14. Looked at differently, Brazil’s pre-treatment fit is about 600 times 
poorer than South Africa’s pre-treatment fit. Consequently, in Figure 4.5 I do not present the 
treatment results of countries whose pre-treatment RMSEs are greater than 500 times South Africa’s 
pre-treatment RMSE. This results in the exclusion of four countries.71 South Africa’s unusual treatment 
effect is now visible. By 2004, no other country has a treatment effect as large as South Africa’s. The 
probability of obtaining a treatment effect as large as South Africa’s is 1/21 = 4.76%, which is less than 
the 5% level used in standard tests of statistical significance.  Figures 4.6 and 4.7 continue the exercise 
of not presenting the treatment results of countries with poor pre-treatment fits. Figure 4.6 excludes 
countries with a pre-treatment RMSE that is 100 times greater than South Africa’s.72 Figure 4.7 
excludes countries with a pre-treatment RMSE that is 50 times greater than South Africa’s.73 The 
unusual nature of South Africa’s treatment effect is now more evident in figures 4.6 and 4.7. The 
probability of obtaining an effect as large as South Africa’s in Figure 4.6 is 1/14 = 7% whereas in Figure 
4.7 the probability is 1/10 = 10%. Both probabilities are small given the number of countries in Figures 
4.6 and 4.7. Cunningham and Shah (2014) and Dube and Zipperer (2015) make the point that a 10% 
                                                          
71 Brazil (RMSE = 95), China (RMSE = 281), Romania (RMSE = 139) and Tunisia (RMSE = 123).  
72 In addition to the countries in footnote 71, the following countries are also excluded: Argentina (RMSE = 17), 
Colombia (RMSE = 32), Costa Rica (RMSE = 39), Egypt (RMSE = 23), India (RMSE = 23), Jordan (RMSE = 28) and 
Vietnam (RMSE = 26). 
73 In addition to the countries excluded in footnotes 71 and 72, Figure 4.7 excludes Chile (RMSE = 12), Pakistan 
(RMSE = 9), Panama (RMSE = 13) and Philippines (RMSE = 10).   
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level is actually a stringent threshold for making inference under the Synthetic Control method given 
that donor pools usually contain a small number of countries.     
 
 
         Figure 4.4: Placebo test 1                                                               Figure 4.5: Placebo test 2 
 
 
        Figure 4.6: Placebo test 3                                                                  Figure 4.7: Placebo test 4 
 
 
Another way of presenting the results of the placebo tests is to divide each country’s post-treatment 
RMSE by its pre-treatment RMSE and then to rank the ensuing ratios for all countries. This is attractive 
because it avoids the arbitrary RMSE cut-offs that I used in Figures 4.4 to 4.7 and at the same time 
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penalises countries with large treatment effects but poor pre-treatment fits (like Brazil).74 Figure 4.8 
presents the results of this ranking exercise for all the 25 countries in Table 4.1. In the figure, the ratio 
for most countries is so small that it is not even visible in the figure (the actual ratios are reported in 
Table C3 in Appendix C). On the other hand, at about 5, 000, the magnitude of South Africa’s ratio is 
large and is only surpassed by Indonesia’s ratio. The results from Indonesia’s placebo test cannot, 
however, be regarded as a successful treatment. This is evident in Figure C1 in Appendix C which plots 
Indonesia’s treatment effect against South Africa’s. Indonesia’s treatment effect is mostly positive 
over the period 1995 to 2004 implying that its per capita cigarette consumption is mostly greater than 
synthetic Indonesia’s consumption, a situation that can hardly be described as a successful treatment. 
Indonesia’s unusually high ratio in Figure 4.8 is the result of a very low pre-treatment RMSE relative 
to South Africa and the fact that the calculation of the post-treatment RMSE does not distinguish 
between negative and positive treatment effects.75 The Indonesian case notwithstanding, the 
probability of obtaining a ratio as large as South Africa’s in Figure 4.8 is 2/25 = 8% which is small given 











                                                          
74 This ratio is similar to the 𝑡 statistic used in standard inferential methods. A large 𝑡 statistic is obtained 
whenever the identified effect is large relative to the standard error. The pre-treatment RMSE, in my case, plays 
the role of a standard error while the post-treatment RMSE plays the role of the identified effect.  
75 The RMSE formula squares and sums over the deviations (which are essentially the treatment effects). See the 
RMSE formula in equation (4.7). 
76 If I only consider successfully treated countries, then this probability reduces to 1/25 = 4%.  
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Figure 4.8: Ranking of treatment effects 
 
Notes: The figure shows rankings of ratios of post-treatment root mean square errors (RMSE) to pre-treatment RMSEs for 




This section tests the robustness of my treatment effect estimates from Section 4.7. Firstly, I check 
whether the treatment effects are sensitive to the composition of the donor pool. I do this by 
excluding, one at a time from the donor pool, the countries in Table 4.2 that have positive donor 
weights and re-estimating the treatment effect. This is done so as to guard against the possibility that 
my estimated effects are being driven by a single donor country with a positive weight. Secondly, I 
vary the timing of the onset of treatment to account for any delays in the implementation of the policy. 
 
Figures 4.9 to 4.13 present the results of successively excluding from the donor pool countries which 
earlier had positive weights. The pattern of the trajectories of synthetic South Africa is similar across 
the five figures and, more importantly, similar to the pattern in Figure 4.2. By 2004, the five figures all 
show a counterfactual consumption level of around 800 cigarettes per capita which was what I found 
in Figure 4.2. Table 4.4 compares the actual treatment effect estimates of the robustness tests with 
the main results from Section 4.7. The treatment effects are presented as annual percentage 
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deviations from their respective counterfactual trend lines. Column (2) shows the main results while 
columns (3) to (7) show the results from excluding, one at a time, donor countries with positive 
weights from the donor pool. The treatment effect estimates by 2004 are similar across columns (2) 
to (7). By 2004, all specifications report a treatment effect of at least 30%. My treatment effects 
estimates are, therefore, not disproportionately influenced by the composition of the donor pool.    
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      Figure 4.9: Excluding Argentina                                                              Figure 4.10: Excluding Brazil                                                                                                                             
                  
 
 
                     Figure 4.11: Excluding Chile                                                              Figure 4.12: Excluding Romania 
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                   Figure 4.13: Excluding Tunisia                                                                                     Figure 4.14: Treatment beginning in 1995 






























Romania     
(6) 
Excluding 





1990 0.11 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 0.00 0.09 
1991 0.11 -0.07 1.74 0.36 0.09 -0.03 0.33 
1992 0.15 0.03 -0.06 0.85 0.01 2.04 0.11 
1993 0.12 -0.14 -0.23 -0.22 0.05 -1.52 0.08 
1994 1.97 4.02 -8.74 2.75 1.72 -0.44 0.10 
1995 -4.31 2.18 -9.88 -2.56 -4.38 -6.63 -3.28 
1996 -9.60 -9.80 -17.99 -7.30 -9.72 -11.32 -10.08 
1997 -14.7 -16.02 -25.77 -11.64 -14.94 -15.26 -15.70 
1998 -16.07 -19.32 -27.98 -12.32 -16.26 -17.14 -17.29 
1999 -22.49 -24.60 -28.16 -19.95 -22.78 -23.48 -23.21 
2000 -26.51 -27.63 -35.85 -23.27 -26.72 -25.75 -28.24 
2001 -27.22 -29.40 -33.64 -23.96 -27.25 -25.61 -29.06 
2002 -25.54 -22.69 -28.83 -22.50 -25.54 -23.86 -26.59 
2003 -39.26 -32.71 -42.09 -36.48 -39.34 -38.51 -39.84 
2004 -35.75 -30.78 -36.11 -32.11 -35.84 -33.73 -37.19 
Notes: The numbers in columns (3) to (8) are treatment effects in percentages associated with the six tests for robustness. 
The numbers represent annual percentage deviations from their respective counterfactual trend lines. Column (2) reports 
the main results from Section 4.7. In column (3), Argentina is excluded from the donor pool, column (4) excludes Brazil, 
column (5) excludes Chile, column (6) excludes Romania and column (7) excludes Tunisia. Column (8) presents results for 
treatment beginning in 1995 as opposed to 1994.  
 
The final robustness check allows for the possibility that treatment did not begin in earnest in 1994. 
This is likely to have been the case if the initial tax increase was small relative to the ones in later years 
or if tobacco companies did not immediately pass-on, in full, the 1994 tax increase.77 Figure 4.14 and 
the last column of Table 4.4 (column 8) show treatment effect estimates under the assumption that 
treatment implementation was delayed by at least a year (i.e. started in 1995). In Figure 4.14, the 
pattern of the counterfactual trend line is very similar to the one in Figure 4.2 and similar to the ones 
in Figures 4.9 to 4.13. In the figure, counterfactual cigarette consumption per capita is also around 
800 cigarettes by 2004. The treatment effect by 2004 is also similar to the treatment effects obtained 




                                                          
77 Although the available evidence shows that tobacco companies immediately passed-on to consumers some 
of the tax rise (Van Walbeek, 2006), I nonetheless confront the possibility that full treatment was delayed.  
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4.9. The impact of illicit trade on the treatment effect 
The argument is often made that an aggressive excise tax policy, such as the one that South Africa has 
been implementing since 1994, might translate into an increase in the market for illicit cigarettes. If 
this is the case, then the treatment effect estimates from Section 4.7 might be overestimated. Blecher 
(2010, 2011) has provided some estimates of the size of South Africa’s illicit market over most of the 
period that I study in this chapter. Using several data sources, he obtained an estimate of the illicit 
market that was implied by smoking prevalence and legal consumption data. For 2004, which is the 
cut-off point in my evaluation, Blecher estimated an illicit market of between 5% and 12% of the total 
market.  
 
Using legal consumption data for 2004 from Table C2 in Appendix C (see column 2) and Blecher’s 
estimates of the illicit market in 2004, I can obtain an estimate of the total market (legal and illegal 
cigarettes) for South Africa. My estimates suggest that the total market for cigarettes in 2004 was 
somewhere between 548 and 592 cigarettes per capita.78 Comparing these estimates to synthetic 
South Africa’s estimate for per capita consumption in 2004 (column 3 in Table C2) results in a 
treatment effect of between 27% and 32%. That is, the treatment effect estimates, when one takes 
into account the size of the illicit market, are not very different from the main treatment effect 
estimate of 36% for 2004. In any case, the 27% estimate of the treatment effect, corresponding to 
Blecher’s upper bound estimate of the illicit market share, can be taken to be a lower bound estimate 
of the treatment effect.   
 
Subsequently, Van Walbeek (2014) has also attempted to measure the size of South Africa’s illicit 
market for cigarettes. He uses a method that compares predicted percentage changes in total 
consumption with actual changes in legal consumption. If predicted changes in total consumption are 
greater than actual changes in legal consumption, then the share of the illicit market is growing and 
vice versa.  
 
                                                          
78 In Table C2, the figure for legal cigarette consumption per capita in 2004 is 521 cigarettes. A 5% illicit market 
share implies that the legal market was 95% of the total market. Similarly, an estimate of 12% of the illicit market 
implies that the legal market was 88% of the total market.  
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Between 1995 and 2004, Van Walbeek’s estimates suggest that the share of the market that was due 
to illicit cigarettes remained virtually unchanged.79 Unfortunately, his method does not allow for me 
to obtain a treatment effect that takes into account the illicit market. This is because he estimates 
percentage changes in the share as opposed to providing estimates of the actual share. However, 
given the consensus that the illicit market share was very low when the new tax policy started 
(Blecher, 2010, 2011), Van Walbeek’s estimates suggest a small illicit market share over the period 
1995 to 2004. This implies that my main treatment effect of 36% by 2004 is, therefore, not incredibly 
overestimated.  
 
4.10. Summary and conclusion 
South Africa has consistently increased the excise tax on cigarettes since 1994 largely on public health 
grounds. In increasing the tax, the government has sought to maintain a total tax burden of at least 
52% of the average retail selling price (the target was initially set at 50%). This has resulted in 
substantial increases in the real price of cigarettes. For instance, between 1994 and 2004, the average 
real price per pack increased by 110%.  
 
The main focus of this chapter was to evaluate the impact on consumption of this unprecedented 
increase in the price of cigarettes. I argued in the chapter that comparing current cigarette 
consumption to cigarette consumption before 1994 was likely to overstate the impact of the tax rises. 
This is because consumption had already started declining by the time the government’s policy of 
raising taxes began.  
 
The challenge in conducting impact evaluations is to create a credible counterfactual of what would 
have happened to cigarette consumption in the absence of the tax rises. This chapter, therefore, used 
the Synthetic Control method to create such a counterfactual for South Africa. The counterfactual was 
created as a linear combination of the per capita cigarette consumption of countries similar to South 
Africa that did not engage in large-scale tobacco control initiatives over the period 1994 to 2004. Using 
this counterfactual, I found that South Africa’s cigarette consumption per capita would not have 
continued declining in the absence of the tax rises. Specifically, I found that cigarette consumption 
                                                          
79 Van Walbeek’s estimates of the change in the illicit market share range from an average decline of 2 
percentage points to an average increase of 2 percentage points over the period 1995 to 2004.   
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would have stabilized at around 800 cigarettes per capita from the year 2000. Further, I found that by 
2004, South Africa’s per capita cigarette consumption was 36% lower than it would have been had the 
tax rises not happened.  
 
South Africa’s successful experience with tobacco control holds many lessons for countries, 
particularly those in Africa, that are trying to forestall an impending tobacco epidemic. South Africa’s 
experience shows that significant public health dividends can be obtained by consistently increasing 

























APPENDIX C    
Table C 1: Treated and Untreated Countries 
Treated  Untreated 
Australia   New Zealand Argentina   Ireland 
Austria   Nigeria Bahrain   Jordan 
Azerbaijan   Papua New Guinea Bangladesh   Kuwait 
Belgium   Paraguay Brazil   Luxembourg 
Cameroon   Poland Chile   Malaysia 
Canada   Portugal China   Morocco 
France   Russia Colombia   Norway 
Gabon   Saudi Arabia Costa Rica   Pakistan 
Germany   Singapore Cote d'Ivoire   Panama 
Guatemala   South Africa Croatia   Peru 
Hong Kong   Spain Czech Rep   Philippines 
Hungary   Sweden Denmark   Romania 
Iceland   Switzerland Ecuador   Senegal 
Israel   Thailand Egypt   Serbia & Montenegro  
Italy   Turkey Finland   Sri Lanka 
Japan   U.A.E Greece   Tunisia 
Kenya   United Kingdom India   Uruguay 
Korea, Rep.   United States Indonesia   Vietnam 
Mexico   Venezuela Iran    
Netherlands   Zimbabwe     
            
            
Notes: Treated countries are those whose Relative Income Prices (RIPs) increased on average over the period 1990 to 2006 
(i.e. where affordability declined). Untreated countries are those whose RIPs declined on average over the same period (i.e. 














Table C 2: Actual estimates of treatment effects 













1990 1010 1008.86 1.14 0.11% 
1991 993 991.93 1.07 0.11% 
1992 947 945.58 1.42 0.15% 
1993 901 899.94 1.06 0.12% 
1994 883 865.95 17.05 1.97% 
1995 849 887.26 -38.26 -4.31% 
1996 796 880.52 -84.52 -9.60% 
1997 737 864.11 -127.11 -14.71% 
1998 692 824.46 -132.46 -16.07% 
1999 634 817.92 -183.92 -22.49% 
2000 577 785.12 -208.12 -26.51% 
2001 570 783.16 -213.16 -27.22% 
2002 597 801.77 -204.77 -25.54% 
2003 495 814.90 -319.90 -39.26% 
2004 521 810.86 -289.86 -35.75% 
Notes: Treatment effects in the fourth column obtained by using equation (4.6). The last column presents treatment effects 
as a percentage difference. The consumption numbers for synthetic South Africa are obtained by applying the weights in 
Table 4.2 to the cigarette consumption numbers of the donor countries in Table 4.1. Cigarette consumption data is from ERC 


















Table C 3: Ranking of ratios of post-treatment RMSE to pre-treatment RMSE 
Rank Country Post-treatment RMSE / pre-treatment RMSE  
1 Indonesia 5695 
2 South Africa 4341 
3 Uruguay 3436 
4 Senegal 112 
5 Philippines 58 
6 Chile 49 
7 Malaysia 37 
8 Cote d'Ivoire 28 
9 Colombia 27 
10 Sri Lanka 26 
11 Vietnam 23 
12 Egypt 23 
13 Pakistan 17 
14 Peru 16 
15 Jordan 16 
16 Panama 15 
17 Argentina 13 
18 Brazil 9 
19 Romania 8 
20 India 3 
21 Tunisia 3 
22 Morocco 2 
23 Ecuador 2 
24 Costa Rica 2 
25 China 2 
Notes: The Table shows a ranking of ratios of post-treatment RMSE to pre-treatment RMSE for all 25 countries in Table 4.1 














Figure C 1: Treatment effect, South Africa vs. Indonesia 
 





















CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to contribute to the literature on the economics of tobacco control with particular 
focus on sub-Saharan African countries. In so doing, I engaged with three broad but related themes in 
the literature: (i) the opportunity costs of tobacco expenditure within households, (2) the estimation 
of price elasticities of demand for cigarettes and (3) evaluating countries that have engaged in large-
scale tobacco control initiatives. In what follows, I briefly summarise the main findings and 
contributions of my thesis with respect to each of the themes. Thereafter, I discuss some ideas for 
future research.  
 
5.1. Main findings and contributions of the thesis 
In Chapter 2 of the thesis, I set out to investigate whether tobacco expenditure displaced other goods 
and services within Zambian households. In so doing, the chapter made two contributions to the 
literature. Firstly, the chapter used expenditure data from a sub-Saharan African country where a 
majority of the households were poor and, therefore, likely to be income constrained. Aside from 
work by Koch and Tshiswaka-Kashalala (2008), who did similar work on South Africa, this is the only 
other study to investigate this type of crowding out within Africa.  
 
The second contribution of Chapter 2 was more methodological. Previous work has used the method 
of instrumental variables to overcome the problem of reverse causality and/or simultaneity bias 
within demand systems. That is, the decision to spend on other goods and services is just as likely to 
be influenced by tobacco expenditure as tobacco expenditure is likely to be influenced by the 
expenditure on other goods and services. The instrumental variable of choice in the literature for 
tobacco expenditure has been the adult sex ratio. I argued in the chapter that the adult sex ratio was 
unlikely to satisfy the exclusion restriction. That is, the assumption of no correlation between the 
instrumental variable and the error term. This is because the adult sex ratio, being an aspect of 
household structure, is likely on its own to influence how households allocate expenditure between 
different goods and services. A plausible approach would be to use the adult sex ratio as an 
instrumental variable but allow for its correlation with the error term. This was the approach I adopted 




Even after allowing for the correlation of the adult sex ratio with the error term, I still confirmed many 
of the findings in the literature. For instance, I found that food and schooling were displaced by 
tobacco expenditure in most households. Other expenditure categories that were displaced included 
clothing, expenditure on transportation and on the maintenance of equipment. Lastly, and unlike 
previous literature, I did not find that tobacco expenditure led households to spend more on alcohol. 
My conclusion was that the positive association between tobacco and alcohol found in previous 
research was likely a correlation rather than a causal relationship.  
 
Traditionally, the costs of tobacco consumption have been thought of only in terms of mortality and 
morbidity. The findings from Chapter 2 show that a broader accounting of tobacco’s toll in Zambia 
should include, for instance, the costs associated with under-nutrition and under-investment in 
education by households.   
 
Even though we expect cigarettes to be price inelastic in most contexts, there is a demand for local 
evidence before initiating any meaningful policy changes. Outside of South Africa, there are currently 
few published estimates of the price elasticity of demand for tobacco products in Africa. Chapter 3, 
therefore, sought to provide such estimates for cigarettes in Uganda. The chapter made use of a 
method developed by Deaton (1988) that uses expenditure data and exploits the fact that prices of 
most goods and services tend to vary across geographical space in Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
(LMICs). The main finding from Chapter 3 was that cigarettes were price inelastic in Uganda with a 
price elasticity of demand in the -0.3 to -0.4 range. That is, each 10% rise in the price of cigarettes was 
expected decrease the quantity of cigarettes demanded by between 3% and 4%.  These estimates are 
within the range found in the literature.  
 
Given that cigarettes are price inelastic in Uganda, the government can reduce cigarette consumption 
and at the same time increase revenues by raising the excise tax on cigarettes. The important point is 
that the excise tax changes have to be real (i.e. inflation adjusted) for their impacts to be meaningful. 
Methodologically, the work in Chapter 3 shows that the plethora of expenditure surveys across Africa 




South Africa is an example of an African country that has since 1994 substantially increased the real 
excise tax on cigarettes largely on public health grounds. Consequently, the real average price per 
pack of cigarettes increased by 190% between 1994 and 2012.  We know from the literature reviewed 
in Chapter 3 that cigarette consumption is expected to decline whenever prices rise. We are, however, 
also interested in finding out what the trajectory of cigarette consumption would have been if the tax 
changes had not occurred. That is, we are interested in finding out the counterfactual. Counterfactuals 
are important in policy evaluations because they guard against the pitfall of wrongly attributing to a 
policy an outcome that would have happened anyway. 
 
In Chapter 4, created such a counterfactual for South Africa using the Synthetic Control method first 
proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). The counterfactual consumption trend line was 
estimated as a weighted average (or linear combination) of the trend lines of countries similar to South 
Africa that did not engage in large-scale tobacco control initiatives over the period 1990 to 2004. The 
counterfactual showed that per capita cigarette consumption would not have continued declining in 
the absence of the consistent tax rises that began in 1994. Specifically, the chapter found that 
consumption would have stabilized at around 800 cigarettes per capita from the year 2000. Lastly, I 
found that by 2004, South Africa’s cigarette consumption per capita was 36% lower than that it would 
have been if the tax rises had not occurred.  
 
South Africa’s experience with tobacco control shows that significant public health dividends can be 
obtained by consistently increasing the real excise tax on cigarettes.  
 
5.2. Ideas for future research 
This section discusses some ideas for future research.  
 
One of the main findings of this thesis is that tobacco expenditure displaces food consumption within 
Zambian households. An implication of this is that children in households with at least one smoker are 
likely to suffer from nutritional deficiencies when compared with children from non-smoking 
households. This hypothesis can readily be tested by comparing Z scores (or height-for-age measures) 
for children in the two types of households. Many African countries, including Zambia, regularly collect 
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anthropometric data (including Z scores for children) as part of the Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS). Data from the DHS can readily be used to conduct such analyses.  
 
Finally, the Synthetic Control method for creating counterfactuals can be used to conduct many types 
of policy evaluations in tobacco control. For instance, the method can go further in South Africa and 
provide an estimate of lung cancer cases averted since the government started raising excise taxes on 
cigarettes. The method can also be used to evaluate new approaches in tobacco control that have not 
yet been widely adopted. Australia’s enactment of plain packaging legislation in 2012 is a case in point.  
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